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Summary of Thesis: 
 
This thesis pursues two closely related lines of argument.  In the first half, I explore the Bataillean notion of 
man through his complex relationship with Hegel and Nietzsche.  The Janus-like conception that will be dis-
covered results from Bataille’s unwillingness to grant priority either to Hegel’s insights concerning the 
structure of consciousness or to Nietzsche’s claim, contra Hegel, that those putative insights ‘involve a vast 
and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization’ (The Gay Science)  
Bataille acknowledges the heuristic value of both thinkers’ work but ultimately refuses to let either become 
the dominant force within his thought. In the end Bataille’s human being remains caught between the ‘ex-
cess’ of Nietzschean Will and the ‘restriction’ of Hegelian consciousness.  He sees human existence, much 
like Freud, as moving with a ‘vacillating rhythm’ (Beyond the Pleasure Principle) between ‘conscious’ and 
‘unconscious’ activity.  This recognition leads him to conclude that there exists a fundamental ambiguity to 
human existence – the Impossible – which resists reduction or assimilation to any kind of formal discourse. 
The second half proceeds to explore this ambiguity in more detail by first teasing out the relationship be-
tween the traumatic experiences at the heart of two of Bataille’s novels against the Freudian notion of 
Trauma (repetition automatism) and its relation to the creation of Identity. This ultimately proves insuffi-
cient when it comes to interpreting the actions of Bataille’s fictional characters. However it opens a space 
within which other methodologies of interpretation, namely those of Lacan, Girard, and Derrida, can be in-
vestigated as potential sources of insight into those characters’ psychological structures and motivation. 
Here they are explored in relation to each other and in order to describe and explain more adequately the 
‘impossible’ ambiguity at the heart of Bataille’s novels and conception of the human. 
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Intoxication 
 
In his critique of Georges Bataille’s Inner Experience, Sartre claims that the experience of nonknowing “rejects 
every concept” that allows “designation and classification” (Bataille, 2004, p. 169) but ultimately fails. He 
claims that, “with the phrases ‘nothing’, ‘night’, and ‘a nonknowing that lays bare’ he has simply presented us 
with a fine little pantheistic ecstasy.” (pp. 170-2)  Bataille does not disagree with Sartre’s claims, writing that 
“He accurately analyzes my mental state and, as I should point out, objectively and clearly dissects this state”, 
going so far as to acknowledge that Sartre manages to uncover “the workings of my mind, underscoring the 
foolishness of its workings better from the outside that I could from the inside.” (p. 170) “I was moved” (p. 
170) Bataille tells us, and concedes that “I’ve myself observed these inextricable difficulties to which Sartre 
refers: my thinking and its workings took these very difficulties as their starting point, though this was like a 
landscape glimpsed from a speeding train.” (p. 172)  
 
 ‘Inner Experience’ is thus characterised as a movement where man is subject to “dissolution into movement” 
and are “reborn in other shapes, accelerating at catastrophic speeds” (p. 172). Bataille tells us: “Peering into 
the very limits of existence, my headlong path forward, as it formed and reformed (opened and closed), never 
excluded awareness of the emptiness and foolishness of my thinking.” (p. 172) Thus Bataille acknowledges 
Sartre’s claims, recognising the difficulty facing the inscription within words of an experience in which the 
subject is in movement.  Sartre views the ecstatic experience that Bataille communicates as “equivalent to the 
pleasure of drinking a glass of spirits or feeling the sun’s warmth at the beach” which cannot be “integrated 
into a framework of new endeavours and don’t contribute to forming a new humankind superseding itself 
towards new goals” (p. 173) The charge then is that Bataille’s dissolving movement doesn’t resolve anywhere. 
Bataille doesn’t overcome the surreptitious negative conceptualisation of nonknowledge, which puts him “on 
the path to transcendence” and is where, for Sartre, “you will find all of Mr. Bataille’s bad faith...” (p. 170) 
Bataille however highlights one important factor missing from Sartre’s critique. Sartre, judging Bataille from 
the outside, who “never intoxicated with any impulsiveness” (p. 172), fails to see the anguished revelation that 
is at the heart of this movement: 
That is true, although I insist: specifically from the fact that that is what they are, specifically because I 
am left empty, they continue on within me as anguish. What I tried to describe in Inner Experience is a 
movement that as it loses any possibility of coming to a halt, falls easily under the attack of a criticism 
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that thinks it can effect a halt from the outside, since this criticism itself isn’t caught in that movement. 
My giddy fall and the difference it introduces into the mind can be grasped only by those experiencing 
it for themselves. Hence the possibility of reproaching me, as Sartre has done, first with leading readers 
to God and then with leading them to the void! These contradictory reproaches support my own 
assertion: I don’t lead anywhere. (p. 173)  
 
Judging from the outside and not ‘giddy’ with intoxication, Sartre is unable to see, challenging Bataille on the 
appearance of what he says, that the “certainty of incoherence in reading, the inevitable crumbling of the 
soundest constructions, is the deep truth of books. Since appearance constitutes a limit, what truly exists is 
dissolution into common opacity rather than a development of lucid thinking. The apparent unchangingness of 
books is deceptive: each book is also the sum of the misunderstandings it occasions” (p. 173) The problem 
facing Sartre here then is one of interpretation, of approaching a text “from methods that, adequate only to an 
outcome of knowledge, confer on individuals whom they limit a sheerly fragmentary existence” and present 
“an existence which is mutilated with respect to the whole that remains inaccessible.” (p. 175) 
 
Bataille counters Sartre by claiming that his interpretation was bound to fall short owing to its sobriety.  
Without intoxication Bataille claims that one would fail to recognise the “uncoordinated flashes” of thought 
which withdraw “endlessly from a term to which its movement pushes it.” (p. 175) However, one might argue 
that rather than approaching from a position of philosophical sobriety and thus limiting his ability to be caught 
within Bataille’s movement, Sartre may be himself intoxicated with his own position, one which prevents him 
from sliding into an alternative mode of intoxication and blinds him to the self-effacing aspects of Bataille’s 
thought. Bataille recognised this difficulty affecting his own position: “I can’t tell if I’m expressing human 
helplessness this way, or my own...” (p. 175). It is here that I can state the aims of this thesis, where three 
central issues are to be explored: 
1) That within Bataille’s novellas there can be perceived a desire to affect the reader and induce a dislo-
cating moment of ‘trauma’. This trauma is one that seeks to undermine the fictional self-conscious 
subject through the uncovering of a locus of unintelligibility that resists the movement of negative 
appropriation that is constitutive of the subject, without however leading towards a position of total 
loss. Such a desire to enact trauma is an integral part of Bataille’s theoretical conception of literature 
arising as the result of a “still sickly will to agitation” (Bataille, 1985d, p. 93), reinforced by his con-
ception of Transgression and Taboo. 
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2) That Bataille’s conception of man – of his “whole human being” (Bataille, 2004, p. xxii) – is one of a 
contested individual, caught between the movement towards dissolution inherent within ‘life’ and the 
drive to restrict loss which is constitutive of the subject.  The reading proposed here is one that seeks 
to reveal Bataille’s man as caught between poles of affectivity, between excess and restriction, and 
recognises that neither total loss (except in death) nor complete appropriation is possible within the 
paradoxical lived life of man. In the relationship between Bataille, Hegel and Nietzsche, it will be 
shown that, as Bataille is not able to jettison the Hegelian tendency towards negativity, he will be 
unable to fully leave him behind (despite his conflicting engagement with Nietzsche), where the re-
sultant tension between their positions within Bataille’s work is evocative of his conception of man. 
3) That the process of interpretation, of reading the text, involves in the reader an intoxication with the 
position from which interpretation follows and, seeking to appropriate that which it interprets, exacer-
bates the acceleration towards that “terminal result” that produces the “excretion of unassimible ele-
ments.” (Bataille, 1985d, p. 99) The limitations of interpretive method as a negative process of appro-
priation will be explored with reference to Freud, Lacan and the ‘imaginary’ or fictive self.  Read in 
such a way, in attempting to delimit and appropriate the ambiguous locus – a festering nub of illegi-
bility – at the heart of Bataille’s work, we will see that the drive towards appropriation falls prey to its 
own methods of appropriation. This however is essential to understanding Bataille’s method of writ-
ing.  
One might say that the reading of Bataille’s work to be presented here is a conservative one, and one which 
seeks, as far as possible, to be mindful of the pitfalls of a reading which implies that one already approach the 
text  under the influence.  That is not to say that the reading being proposed here is superior to that of others, 
but instead, recognises that it is one interpretation amongst others, intoxicated in its own way, and recognises 
that the varying interpretations can be read as responses to the ambiguity that is at the heart of Bataille’s 
writing. What it does provide however in contrast to other interpretations is one which is sensitive to an aspect 
of Bataille’s work which often goes unnoticed within the secondary literature – that of the inevitability of the 
decline back into restriction following excess. My approach aligns itself with the insights Shoshana Felman 
provides into the problematic of interpretation where it seeks: 
Not so much to solve or answer the enigmatic question of the text but to investigate its structure; not so 
much to name and make explicit the ambiguity of the text, but to understand the necessity and rhetorical 
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functioning of the textual ambiguity.  The question underlying such a reading is thus not “What does the 
story mean?” but rather “How does the story mean?”  How does the meaning of the story, whatever it 
may be, rhetorically take place through permanent displacement, textually take shape and take effect.  
(Felman, 2003, p. 165) 
 
In her work Writing and Madness, Felman draws attention to the potential pitfalls which the critical reader 
must be aware of when approaching a text.  In reference to the critical divide between Freudian and anti-
Freudian readings of Henry James’ Turn of the Screw she identifies that when the critic begins the process of 
interpretation they bring with them their prejudices and preferences which affect not only how they approach 
a text, but also how they interpret it.  This results in a tendency (evidenced, she feels, in the critical debate 
surrounding James’s novella) “not so much to answer to the text, as to answer for the text.” (Felman, 2003, p. 
152)  James’ critics, both those of the Freudian and anti-Freudian camp are arguing about the appearance of 
the text under the rubric of Psychoanalytic attempts to interpret it.  The legitimacy of such an endeavour is 
what is brought into question, and as Felman argues, such an attempt leaves them blind to the fact that in their 
drive to answer ‘for’ the text, they are in truth being made to answer ‘to’ it; the ambiguity of the text serving 
to add oxygen to the already burning fire of Freudian fuel and interpretive heat.  Suleiman, in her essay 
‘Transgression and the Avant-Garde’, echoes this thought, and recognises that ‘textual’ interpreters of 
Bataille’s work suffer from a certain blindness: 
If there is one thing, however, that the theorists of textuality have taught us, it is that no reading is 
innocent. Every reading is an interpretation, and every interpretation is an appropriation of a text for its 
own purposes. Every interpretation has its blind spot, which I like to think of not only as the spot or 
place from which the interpreter cannot “see” his or her own misreading of a text, but also as the spot 
or place in a text from which the interpreter averts his or her gaze. (1995, p. 318)  
The ‘textual’ critics (Barthes, Sollers, Kristeva and Blanchot amongst others) for Suleiman recognise, as this 
thesis itself contends, that “Bataille’s pornographic narratives” are “inseparable from his other writings” (p. 
319), but their focus on the linguistic ‘games’ that Bataille plays leaves them blind to other aspects of Bataille’s 
narratives.  Barthes in his ‘The Metaphor of the Eye’ examines the “metaphorical composition” (2001, p. 120) 
of Bataille’s Story of the Eye and traces the migration of the image chains within Bataille’s work which 
“exhibits a controlled difference” between their successive variations. This migration is subject to a 
“metonymy that interchanges” and “sets about abolishing” the distinctions between them, resulting in a 
“blurred” world where “properties are no longer separate” and “form a wavy meaning” (p. 125). For Barthes 
it is this play with the structure of language which allows for the creation of a seam between two edges, and 
opens the space in which Bataille, through his writing, is able to draw in his reader: 
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Two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarising edge (the language is to be copied in its 
canonical state, as it has been established by schooling, good usage, literature, culture), and another 
edge, mobile, blank (ready to assume any contours), which is never anything but the site of its effect: 
the place where the death of language is glimpsed. (1975, p. 6) 
Bataille’s [writing] has the connotation of the man’s very being and is a style. Between the two 
something is born that transforms all experience into language that is askew. (2001, p. 127) 
By focussing on the linguistic structure and its violation, the ‘textual’ critic seeks to isolate within Bataille’s 
work the stylistic methodology which Bataille uses to draw his reader into a moment of diffusion.  However, 
for Suleiman, such a reading downplays the obscene representations within his work by focussing on “the 
primacy of Bataille’s linguistic violations over the sexual and cultural violations that the narrative represents” 
(1995, p. 319) which she argues arise more from “their general suspicion and critique of representation in art, 
and in narrative fiction in particular, than to sexual timidity” (p. 320)  In contrast to such a reading, she 
identifies in the work of Dworkin an overriding focus on representation. Suleiman tells us “she cannot take her 
eyes off it” and that this gives rise to an alternative blind spot: “Dworkin reads too quickly; she devours the 
text in order to get to its ‘core,’ or (to change metaphors) she traverses it without attention to its shape or the 
grain of its surface.” (p. 322)  This ‘wilful misreading’ by Dworkin however does serve to highlight a pertinent 
question that Suleiman feels is not addressed by those textual critics closely aligned with the intellectual avant-
gardes: 
Dworkin’s wilful misreading, or flattening, of Histoire de l’oeil provokes at least one important question 
of anyone interested in modern writing: To what extent are the high-cultural productions of the avant-
gardes of our century in a relation of complicity rather than in a relation of rupture vis-à-vis dominant 
ideologies?... twentieth century avant-gardes have proclaimed their subversive relation to the dominant 
culture; in a sense they have lived on (or off) this relation. (p. 325) 
Following her identification of the blind spot in both the textual and representational readings, she proceeds to 
present her own conception of Bataille’s work which combines aspects of both claims (of the linguistic 
violations in Barthes and the critique of narrative representations of sexuality in Dworkin)  to present her own 
synthetic reading: 
The female body in its duplicity as asexual maternal and sexual feminine, is the very emblem of the 
contradictory coexistence of transgression and prohibition, purity and defilement, that characterizes both 
the “inner experience” of eroticism and the textual play of the pornographic narrative. (p. 327) 
And: 
As far as Bataille’s text is concerned, it is clear that whichever interpretation one emphasizes, the focus 
is on the son’s view of the mother’s genitals, which invariably leads him to a recognition of sexual 
difference and to a split in his own experience: either through the combination of fascination and terror 
provoked by the mother’s sexuality (in the first interpretation), or through the combination of fear and 
desire, manifested in active versus passive sexual roles, as concerns his own castration (in the second 
interpretation)... In its self-conscious mediation on its own Oedipal sources, Bataille’s pornographic 
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fiction (one finds this mediation, in one form or another, in all Bataille’s novels) is a far cry from the 
pulp novels or trashy magazine photos that serve up their fantasies straight. The difference between them 
is, one could argue, the difference between blindness and insight. (p. 328) 
 
Recalling Felman, the focus within this thesis will not be to illustrate what the text means (what the obscene 
depictions mean or represent), nor the linguistic play1 within his texts, but how the text means. The how that I 
am proposing, that the ambiguous traumatic impact of Bataille’s literature reveals the contested nature of 
human existence, aligns with what Patrick ffrench claims as the “possibility of situating, historically and, let’s 
say, erotically, the action of the structural, its affect.” (1999, p. 25) Along with ffrench, I am mindful of attempts 
to establish Bataille as a ‘crown prince’ of transgressive literature who reveals the excessive ‘reality’ that 
exceeds the boundaries of restricted identity.  ffrench recognises that such a tendency reveals itself in certain 
strands of Bataille scholarship as “a desire to dirty one’s hands, to ‘get down into the shit’”, and it is with him 
that I recognise that this can reveal a tendency towards a “potentially exploitative and redundant discourse”2 
(p. 25)  Such a statement requires further qualification, and it is in reference to Nick Land’s The Thirst for 
Annihilation that we will turn to check such a tendency.  
 
Land’s book seeks – explicitly3 – to align itself with Bataille (along with Sade, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) 
and evoke the de-structive power of Bataille’s work.  He seeks to fight against the ‘inanity’ of Bataille 
scholarship (and academic discourse in general) which seeks to have him “pimped out into the career flows of 
the Western academies” (1992, p. xii) and that he sees as resulting in Bataille being “increasingly snarled up 
                                                 
1 I include the ‘textual’ readings as evoking the ‘what’ of Bataille’s writings as, despite claims to the effect that the 
sliding of linguistic rules pushes the reader towards dissolution, it does not seem apparent why this has the effect that it 
is claimed.  Richman stresses the following point which suggests that the textual interpreters overstate the importance of 
linguistic violations for Bataille’s aim of literature as enacting a practical heterology which reintroduces hetergenous  
elements: 
 
Bataille insists that he uses language in a “classical” fashion, implying that the experience of sovereignty cannot 
be transmitted through play on words. (1982, p. 69) 
 
2 It is worth mentioning ffrench’s own frame of reference here for he approaches these ‘redundant’ discourses – in relation 
to the reading of Bataille’s Story of the Eye - from a position where he states: “I hold that one cannot read Histoire de 
l’oeil except in relation to Barthes, today” (pp. 6-7) 
3 Some examples of Land’s self-alignment:  
 
“They are right to say that in trafficking these words I correspond to a zone of Nietzsche’s maximum detestation; 
vermin, disease, madness, anarchy, and religion flow through me as through their own space. Through Bataille 
also” (1992, p. 205) 
 
“The horror of Sade’s writing is not to be diminished... Perhaps no one has betrayed life with the ardour he has, 
unless Bataille, or myself.” (p. 193) 
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in the deconstructivist pulp industry of endless commentary on Logocentrism, Western metaphysics, and other 
various Seinsvergessenheiten.” (p. xiii) To this end, Land provides an incisive commentary ‘on’ Bataille which 
positions them both (Bataille and himself) on the outside of philosophical discourse, and which seeks to show 
that his texts result, to use Bataille’s comment on Nietzsche, in a “dazzling dissolution into totality” (2004, p. 
xxviii). In this vein Land poses the following question: 
What do we find in these texts after all? Even at the discursive level they seem to suggest that 
individuality, creativity, and possession are illusions, that literature is something quite other than work, 
and that completion is inevitably aborted. They dramatize their gaps, absences, discontinuities, repudiate 
their authenticity, contest themselves. The rafts of coherence one finds are always adrift in disorder and 
confusion. Tortured juxtapositions, fragments, and abandoned plans abound. (1992, pp. 177-8) 
In contrast to ‘academic’ interpretations, Land emphasises those ‘dissolving’ aspects of Bataille’s work which, 
drawing power from the excessive energy flowing from the general economy, “floods the nervous system with 
potentially catastrophic quantities of nervous excitation”. (p. 48) The “fragmentation” of the structure of 
Bataille’s writing which “cannot be domesticated” (p. 178), leads to a “death denuded all sophistical 
ornamentation” (p. 73) which “betrays, corrodes, and liquidates utility – regressing to the burning lava flow of 
its base materiality” (p. 185) Reading Land, one finds him obsessed with Bataille as an excremental writer, 
feeding off the excessive themes perceptible within his work and chastising those who seemingly ‘don’t get 
it’, descending as he does into grand verbiage as if in parody of Bataille himself: 
Ah! Such abysses of disease open before me. I decay, transfixed upon abolition. Ardent for collapse, I 
explore the rotting cities of the inner edge. The stink of opium interweaves with that of bat-dung and 
fungus. The moon mutters its electric paean to ruin, and I gaze into the grave of my life which gapes its 
moist idiocy. (p. 208) 
Perhaps such a characterisation is unfair, although given his staunch anti-intellectual tone throughout4, and his 
vehement disregard for practitioners of deconstruction in particular – he amusingly claims that “If 
deconstruction spent less time playing with its willy maybe it could cross the line...” (p. 26) – one senses that 
his desire to present Bataille (and himself) as an excessive, excremental writer has more to do with some desire 
to distance himself from the academy than an experience “of death entangled in wolf threads and ravings” (p. 
209)  We find two conflicting tendencies within Land’s work, one to present a work through Bataille, evoking 
the dissolute impossible experience, the second to concurrently utilise the very tools and tricks of those he 
                                                 
4 Land’s work is littered with broadsides against academia. He tells us: “Scholarship is the subordination of culture to 
the metrics of work” and “Scholars have an inordinate respect for long books, and have a terrible rancune against those 
that attempt to cheat on them. They cannot bear to imagine that short-cuts are possible, that specialism is not an 
inevitability, that learning need not be stoically endured... Scholars do not write to be read, but to be measured. They 
want it to be known that they have worked hard.” (1992, pp. 35-6) 
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despises.  His work is not a mad raving, but one through which a vein of academic rigour flows in parallel with 
the presentation of dissolution.  It is this academic rigour that goes unacknowledged and leads us to recognise 
that he remains blind to the inevitability of falling back into the ‘perversity’ of academic interpretation. By 
claiming that his work makes no “special pleading for itself” (1992, p. xiii) and contrasting it with that “pure 
pornography” which seeks to “season Bataille in preparation for his comfortable digestion by capital’s cultural 
machine” (p. xii) he fails to acknowledge the apparent hypocrisy of his academically orientated analyses of 
Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Aquinas and Augustine.  This, however, is not reason for the indictment of 
Land’s work, for as has already been noted, ‘intoxication’ (in Land’s case with the transgressive, subversive 
Bataille) is central to the problem of interpretation (see chapter 2.5) and, as this thesis will contend, the locus 
of ambiguity at the heart of Bataille’s work draws towards it those who to seek to interpret, interrogate and 
appropriate this festering nub. In being drawn towards it they ultimately fall prey to the ‘shock’ (Benjamin) of 
its traumatic affect when intoxication leads one to fail to prepare adequately5 for this irruption.   
 
As such, in recognising (genuinely or not) the interwoven practical elements (textual, representational, 
psychological, and economic) that Bataille puts into play to evoke his traumatic affect, Land exceeds other 
interpreters.  However, despite the subtlety of his interpretation (but perhaps not presentation), one can perceive 
within his work his own ‘blind spot’; that of the inevitability of the failure of the moment of ‘excessive’ 
communication and the return to ‘capital’s cultural machine’.  Land tells us: 
Due to the general hunger for land, and the richness of the sediment that has been carried down to the 
sea, these fragile traces are enthusiastically occupied, rice is cultivated upon them, and fish harvested 
from their shores. It takes no great feat of imagination to envisage the fate of the peasants and fishermen 
clustered on these insubstantial ripples of earth when the cyclones return. (p. 106) 
 
In the above anecdote, Land illustrates how the ‘economic’ need for appropriation shields us from the “harsh 
truth from which we can momentarily hide” (p. 106), and establishes an illusory sense of security and stability 
over and above the “immense explosions” (p. 106) which both gave birth to and will ultimately be subject to 
“annihilation... in which all stability is washed away”. (pp. 106-7)  ‘Clustered’ on the ‘insubstantial ripples’ of 
                                                 
5 Benjamin comments on the nature of the self and how it reacts to such ‘shocks’: “The threat from these energies is one 
of shocks. The more readily consciousness registers these shocks, the less likely they are to have a traumatic effect. 
Psychoanalytic theory strives to understand the nature of these traumatic shocks ‘on the basis of their breaking through 
the protective shield against stimuli.’ According to this theory, fright has a ‘significance’ in the ‘absence of any 
preparedness for anxiety’” (Benjamin, 1999, pp. 157-8)   
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land, the inhabitants eager appropriation of resources is foolhardy given the impending doom that awaits them.  
Land perceives the desire to exploit the resources that are deposited by the cyclone’s passing as akin to those 
of Reason and Philosophy, which “in its legitimate function is a defence against the sea” but is ignorant of the 
“longing for the open ocean” and the “dark fluidity at the roots of our nature” (p. 107) In this way, the life 
which has been reclaimed from the sea is presented as illusory, temporary and futile in the face of the vast 
impersonal destruction of nature.  What Land fails to acknowledge is that following the cyclone’s ultimate 
return new ‘fragile traces’ will be produced whilst the former are washed away and, much like before, new 
occupants will come, just as hungry and just as ignorant of the fragility of their predicament as those that came 
before. It is not a question therefore of excess versus restriction (as we will see in Chapter 2.3 where Bataille’s 
notions of Taboo and Transgression will be discussed), since their relationship, as Michele Richman tells us, 
is much more complex: 
The heterogeneous, which for Bataille encompasses the sacred, may ultimately be determined by the 
boundaries of the profane restricted economy, but the homogeneous itself also depends upon that limit 
for its definition and derives its internal cohesion from an initial ejection. The attraction/repulsion 
dynamic therefore shifts the frontiers between rationality and irrationality as they are established by the 
inside/outside limit. (1982, p. 53) 
 
The Terminal Phase 
 
The objectivity of heterogeneous elements thus is only of purely theoretical interest, since one can 
only attain it on the condition that one envisage waste products in the total form of the infinite 
obtained by negation (in other words, objective heterogeneity’s shortcoming is that it can only be 
envisaged in an abstract form, whereas the subjective heterogeneity of particular elements is, in 
practice, alone concrete). (Bataille, 1985d, p. 98) 
In his ‘Use Value of D. A. F. De Sade’ Bataille provides us with a conception of writing as an active, practical 
undertaking which seeks to accelerate the workings of a rational and productive accumulation to arrive at a 
‘terminal phase’ where the waste products of this process resist “regression to homogeneous nature” (p. 98) 
By outlining the “two polarized human impulses” (p. 94) of appropriation and excretion (aligned to the profane 
and sacred realms respectively) Bataille identifies that these two opposing tendencies are driving towards 
homogeneity in the first instance, and heterogeneity in the second.  However, he does not see both of these 
impulses as running parallel to each other, that is, in conflict for superiority. Indeed, owing to the character of 
rational appropriation which involves “everywhere replacing a priori inconceivable objects with classified 
series of conceptions or ideas” (p. 96), the inevitable result for Bataille is the definition – or excretion – of “the 
irreducible waste products of the operation.” (p. 96) Thus, the process of appropriation – that of “the sufficient 
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identification of an endless world with a finite world, an unknowable (noumenal) world with the known 
(phenomenal) world” (p. 96) – ultimately, by seeking to subsume the objects of the world into a unified and 
homogeneous system, delimits spaces which resist assimilation: 
The intellectual process automatically limits itself by producing of its own accord its own waste 
products, thus liberating in a disordered way the heterogeneous excremental element. Heterology is 
restricted to taking up again, consciously and resolutely, this terminal process which up until now has 
been seen as the abortion and the shame of human thought. (p. 97) 
These waste products are an inevitable, if unpalatable, result of the drive towards homogeneity.  However, 
Bataille acknowledges that the tendency to seek to “attain once again the notion of the unity of being” (p. 98) 
is one that attempts to avoid confronting at all costs its own waste products, and through a process of abstraction 
attempts to arrive at a “cancellation of their excremental character.” (p. 98) In seeking to re-appropriate for a 
second time the objects which are spat out of its process, they are reduced and defined again: 
It would be too easy to find in objective nature a large number of phenomena that in a crude way 
correspond to the human model of excretion and appropriation... One can attain it more generally 
through animals, plants, matter, nature, and being, without meeting really consistent obstacles. 
Nevertheless, it can already be indicated that as one moves away from man, the opposition loses its 
importance to the point where it is only a superimposed form... borrowed from a different order of facts. 
(p. 98)  
 
Bataille therefore identifies the need for a practical heterology which seeks to “resist this dilution” through an 
active process which “resolutely goes against this regression to homogeneous nature” (p. 98) and which, as he 
defines elsewhere, attempts to “affirm on the contrary that the universe resembles nothing at all and is only 
formless... that the universe is something akin to a spider or a gob of spittle” (1995, p. 52) Writing (or poetry) 
for Bataille is here a practical attempt to undermine the rational drive towards appropriation and sublimation 
of heterogeneous elements, which as he claims in his ‘Notions of Expenditure’, works to “provoke dread and 
horror through symbolic representations of tragic loss (degradation or death)” (1985c, p. 120) and seeks to 
effect in the reader what Barthes highlights as a recognition of “a scandal (an irregularity), that it is always the 
trace of a cut, of an assertion (and not of a flowering), and that the subject of this history... is never anything 
but a ‘living contradiction’: a split subject, who simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the consistency of his 
selfhood and its collapse, its fall.” (1975, p. 21) 
 
The poetry Bataille defines must be distinguished from what normally passes for poetry.  He stresses that 
heterological poetry bears little resemblance to a poetry which “is reduced to playing the role of the standard 
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of things” at the mercy of the “great historical systems of appropriation” (1985d, p. 97).  The poetry of which 
Bataille speaks recognises and seeks to exacerbate that terminal process of appropriation, utilising language 
and reason as a means towards the introduction of excremental, heterogeneous elements.  This process involves 
more than a mere play with words or the representation of – read symbolic – expenditure, for it is both the poet 
and reader who are involved in the game. Poetry, utilising language to accelerate the terminal process, induces 
in the reader who seeks to ‘appropriate’ it (for the tendency to appropriate is “characterized by a homogeneity 
[static equilibrium] of the author of the appropriation” (Bataille, 1985d, p. 95)) a potential laceration or split.  
The literary process, or perhaps better, the practical enactment of poetry, is an insubordinate process, not 
revolutionary, but one which tends towards agitation by working to liberate “impulses whose ambivalence is 
more and more pronounced” (p. 95) all the while being painfully aware of its complicity with the process of 
appropriation.  The poet is aware of such a predicament: 
Poetic expenditure ceases to be symbolic in its consequences; thus, to a certain extent, the function of 
representation engages the very life of the one who assumes it. It condemns him to the most 
disappointing forms of activity, to misery, to despair, to the pursuit of inconsistent shadows that provide 
nothing but vertigo or rage. The poet frequently can use words only for his own loss; he is often forced 
to choose between the destiny of a reprobate, who is as profoundly separated from society as dejecta are 
from apparent life, and a renunciation whose price is a mediocre activity, subordinated to vulgar and 
superficial needs. (Bataille, 1985c, p. 120) 
However, for Bataille, even in such a position, this attempt is essential: 
It is only by such insubordination – even if it is impoverished – that the human race ceases to be isolated 
in the unconditional splendour of material things. (1985c, p. 128) 
Bataille expands upon this in his Literature and Evil where within his study on Blake he draws attention to 
poetry’s dual aspect. Although the aim of poetry is to undermine the apparent mastery of the process of 
appropriation, it must acknowledge that the individual that is founded upon the very rejection of heterogeneous 
elements is a conscious individual. Though in relation to the total movement of appropriation and excretion 
this consciousness may only be partial or illusory, it nevertheless remains present, in relation to itself as a 
conscious subject: 
Though poetry does not accept sense-data in their naked state, it is by no means always contemptuous 
of the outer world. Rather, it challenges the precise limitations of objects between themselves, while 
admitting their external nature. It denies and it destroys immediate reality because it sees in it the screen 
which conceals the true face of the world from us. Nevertheless poetry admits the exteriority of tools or 
of walls in relation to the ego. (1973, p. 64) 
The reader and writer of poetry rely upon their consciousness to experience the very poetry which seeks to 
destroy its immediate reality.  Thus poetry and the poet are reliant upon the very system that they seek to 
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undermine.  Within such a space, the agitation of practical heterology seeks to exacerbate the appropriative 
tendency towards the ‘terminal phase’ which reveals man as a ‘scandal’.  Through ‘poetry’, Bataille seeks to 
effect between “between a man and his fellow creatures” (Bataille, 1991, p. 1) what Richman terms “disruptive 
‘breaks’ with the closed systems” (1982, p. 68) which define him as “a truncated creature severed from any 
sense of wholeness” (p. 43). It is through the “rending transgression of limits” (p. 74) which “divest the 
individual of impediments” (p. 69) that prevent a mode of communication, founded upon a movement born of 
crime – that is the transgression of the inviolable sanctity of the self – from taking place.  The ‘sickly will to 
agitation’ that drives the author to write seeks to undermine the structure which is “perceived as an agonising 
affliction” (Bataille, 1991, p. 1) “Literature”, Bataille tells us, “is communication: a sovereign author addresses 
sovereign humanity, beyond the servitude of the isolated reader” (1973, p. 160), and it is through his practice 
of poetry as agitation that he seeks to affect the reader and induce this moment of communication which 
interrupts the restricted economy of identity: 
Scandal is the same thing as consciousness: a consciousness without scandal is alienated consciousness 
– a consciousness, experience proves it, of clear and distinct objects, intelligible, or thought to be so. 
The passage from intelligibility to unintelligibility, from that which, no longer being knowable, suddenly 
no longer seems tolerable to us, is certainly at the origin of this feeling of scandal, but it is less a question 
of difference of level than an experience ‘given’ in the major communication of beings. (p. 171) 
This scandal takes the form of an irruption into the closed homogeneous economy of rationality and order. By 
revealing “the instantaneous fact that consciousness is consciousness of another consciousness” (Bataille, 
1973, p. 171), Bataille’s writing becomes what Hollier calls an “antiarchitectural gesture” (1992, p. 23).  By 
introducing a rupture that reveals the “multiplicity of consciousnesses that reflect each other” (Bataille, 1973, 
p. 171) the relational - and partial – restricted identity is subjected to a revelation of its “habitual activity” (p. 
171) that it has mistaken for the truth of itself, and is scandalized, shocked, and traumatized.  
 
For ffrench, this traumatic revelation is “a shock or affect which remains unrepresentable” and “will not allow 
itself to be represented, because it is immediate” (1999, p. 86). If this traumatic irruption is indeed 
unrepresentable, and given the previously highlighted reliance poetry has on the very structure Bataille seeks 
to subvert, the following difficulty is raised: If the poet is complicit with the very system of appropriation, if 
indeed to agitate he must use the very structure of linguistic appropriation to introduce heterogeneous elements 
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but resist the tendency which seeks to neutralize excremental phenomenon through the appeal to an objective, 
abstracted reality, then how can such an impossible poetry be possible? Can one write from within the structure 
that the poet seeks to unravel and, using its tools, inscribe “that untenable, impossible, purely novelistic instant” 
which equates with a man managing “to be hanged and then cut the rope at the very moment of his orgasm”? 
(Barthes, 1975, p. 7) 
Habermas and the Possibility of Sovereignty 
The fundamental economic question is inverted: the key problem is no longer the use of scarce resources 
but the unselfish expenditure of superfluous resources.  That is, Bataille proceeds from the biological 
assumption that the living organism collects more energy than it uses to reproduce its life.  The surplus 
energy is used for growth.  When this comes to a standstill, the unabsorbed surplus of energy has to be 
spent unproductively – the energy must be lost without gain.  This can occur in either a ‘glorious’ or in 
a ‘catastrophic’ form.  Socio-cultural life also stands under the pressure of surplus energy (Habermas, 
1984, p. 100) 
Habermas observes that Bataille’s conception of the Sovereign derives directly from his understanding of the 
biological ‘make-up’ of man; in life, man has more energy at his disposal than is required to sustain growth 
and reproduction. Following the accumulation of energy, if it cannot be utilised towards some useful end, it is 
instead expended in a way in which the utility of this expenditure is not considered.  This theory can be seen 
to apply to the erotic when, once the requirement for reproductive sexuality is no longer a necessity for survival 
– that is, the survival of the individual, family, society or humanity at large –desire gives rise to a surplus of 
erotically charged energy which finds an outlet through non-reproductive eroticism.  One thinks here of the 
advances in medical care that have led to a state where constant sexual activity aimed at reproduction is 
redundant as improving health care has led to a significant drop in infant mortality and (particularly in Western 
society) where the need to create a sufficiently large family to provide support and care to the elderly and 
infirm is no longer a necessity.  However, the energy that produces sexual desire is itself still present and, 
whilst not necessary for the support and growth of the individual or societal group, requires an outlet – in this 
case the erotic discharge.  
  
Now this for Habermas is not entirely problematic in and of itself.  What he takes issue with at this point is not 
Bataille’s ‘metaphysics’ or theory of expenditure but instead the apparent conflict between the identification 
of this ‘expenditure’ and the logic that he uses to draw his conclusions.  In delineating this moment of 
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sovereignty, Bataille has indicated a limit to reason in its ability to understand the totality of man’s 
‘being’.  However, as we shall see, Bataille believes that whilst this produces an inconsistency in knowledge, 
that is, the recognition of a rupture, by pushing ourselves towards this limit and through pursuing the object 
that produces this rupture we are able to obtain what Habermas calls a ‘boiling point’.  It is a point where, on 
the cusp of dissolution, the knowing subject is able to enter into the movement of total risk whilst retaining 
‘knowledge’ of the experiences which lacerate his being. In such a way, it could be said that Bataille is 
attempting to create a ‘science’ of sovereignty.  This science of sovereignty would involve an apparently 
paradoxical reclamation of the dissolving sovereignty into an Impossible Writing, a meditation on the moment 
of sovereignty and the experience that one has in this moment, where the Subject speaks as Subject in the 
moment of its own dissolution. Habermas identifies a potential problem with this attempt which forms the 
basis of his critique: 
If sovereignty and its source, the sacral, is related to the world of purposive-rational action in an 
absolutely heterogeneous fashion; if the subject and reason are constituted only by excluding all kinds 
of sacral power; if the other of reason is more than just the irrational or the unknown – namely, the 
incommensurable which cannot be touched by reason, except at the cost of the explosion of the rational 
subject – then there is no possibility of a theory that reaches beyond the horizon of what is accessible to 
reason and thematizes, let alone analyses, the interaction of reason with a transcendent source of 
power.  Bataille is aware of this dilemma; he has experimented with the idea of a non-objectifying 
science and speculated about the extreme where the knowing subject… reaches his ‘boiling point’.  At 
this point however, the knowing subject would – paradoxically – have to surrender his own identity and 
yet retrieve those experiences to which it was exposed in ecstasy – to catch them like fish from the 
decentred ocean of emotions. (1984, p. 101) 
  
Habermas identifies the central issue with which we are concerned: if in the moment of eroticism (that ‘boiling 
point’), the Subject has to let go of its Identity which is required to experience this very sovereignty, then how 
is this possible?  If this is indeed a paradox, and the experience exceeds the potential of reason to accumulate 
and maintain itself in Identity, then how can we legitimately claim to talk about this ‘sovereignty’; if it escapes 
discourse, it necessitates that one remains silent in regard to it. Bataille recognised this and posited that the 
experience itself forces a profound silence onto man, a silence akin to that of Christian mystics in the face of 
the divine for (as we will see in our coming analysis of Hegel); “Discursive knowledge remains hopelessly 
caught in the circle of linguistic sequences: ‘Language assembles the totality of what has meaning for us, but 
fragments it at the same time… Our attention remains directed towards that whole which slips away from us 
in a series of statements, but we cannot reach the point at which the flashes of successive statements yield to 
the grand illumination’.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 102)  Unable to create a meaning for the sovereign moment, the 
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movement of discursive knowledge remains perpetually caught in an attempt to sublimate within Identity the 
knowledge of a moment in which it is slipping away. 
 
At this point Habermas believes he has found the weak point in Bataille’s ‘critique’ of reason for he believes 
that, by establishing the limit of reason (and by proxy philosophy and science) but not being able to stop its 
voracious march towards knowledge, Bataille has ‘failed’ to press right through with what he set out to do.  He 
claims that “philosophy and science cannot in the same way break out of the universe of language” and that 
ultimately “Bataille undercuts his own radical critique of reason with the tools of theory” (Habermas, 1984, p. 
102). 
 
Habermas’ critique is analogous to that which Derrida makes against Foucault in his ‘Cogito and the History 
of Madness’.  Counter to Foucault’s claim that he “wanted to write a history of madness itself, that is madness 
speaking on the basis of its own experience and under its own authority” (Derrida, 2001, p. 39) Derrida raises 
the following challenge: 
Would not the archaeology of silence be the most efficacious and subtle restoration, the repetition, in 
the most irreducibly ambiguous meaning of the word, of the act perpetrated against madness – and be 
so at the very moment when this act is denounced? (2001, p. 41) 
In Foucault’s work, Derrida focuses upon the apparent ‘decision’ between reason and madness he finds in 
Descartes meditations and from which Foucault establishes the nature of madness as the ‘other’ of reason.  
From this, inferring the oppositional framework of the reason/madness structure, Derrida, much like Habermas 
in his critique of Bataille, homes in on the problem with such a conception: 
To be true and for there to be a real choice between them, it must be assumed in general that reason can 
have a contrary, that there can be an other of reason, that reason itself can construct or discover, and that 
the opposition of reason to its other is symmetrical. This is the heart of the matter. (2001, p. 48) 
We have already seen how Bataille employs oppositional notions in his writing to undermine the structure of 
restricted Identities founded upon them.  Day and Night, Good and Evil; such oppositions are subverted by 
Bataille in his work through the ‘reversal of cosmic order’.  Recognising this, we are able to make the claim 
that the undermining of these structures exhibited within his fiction can be extended to the Reason/Unreason 
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dichotomy identified by Habermas. 
  
The mistake that Habermas makes is to assume that Bataille wanted to write ‘sovereignly’ and that this also 
entailed an attempt to bring this writing into the sphere of significative discourse.  The assumption here is that 
the object of Bataille's method (to evoke the sovereign) is something that itself is able to be inscribed within 
the lexicon of rational discourse, that the moment of sovereignty must be equivalent to its exposition and the 
descriptive language used must be equivalent to the object.  We will see that this is in fact contrary to what is 
exhibited in his works. It is by a sleight of hand that Bataille creates a moment of communication that upsets 
the subject and language through its affect. 
 
Habermas misreads Bataille, just as Derrida, characteristically6, claims Foucault misreads Descartes.  It is such 
a misreading which ultimately undermines Habermas’ argument for he fails, as Derrida claims Foucault does, 
to recognize that: 
Language being the break with madness it adheres more thoroughly to its essence and vocation, makes 
a cleaner break with madness, if it pits itself against madness more freely and gets closer and closer to 
it: to the point of being separated from it only by the “transparent sheet” of which Joyce speaks. (Derrida, 
2001, p. 66) 
For Bataille it is not a case of overcoming reason or producing a ‘new’ philosophy founded upon the idea of 
excess. Instead, what he is attempting to show are the limitations of discursive language in pursuing the final 
object of its desire (the absolute). Far from revalorising language to bring this moment into a cohesive whole, 
Bataille wants to show how language itself leads us towards objects that irrupt through and open the wound 
that reveals itself as man.  It is by pushing significative discourse to a point of rupture that Bataille affords us 
a glimpse of, through the cracks and fissures, a picture of man contested; “Where would we be without 
language?  It has made us what we are.  It alone can show us the sovereign moment at the farthest point of 
being where it can no longer act as currency.  In the end the articulate man confesses his own impotence” 
(2006, p. 276) 
                                                 
6 Characteristic for Derrida makes the same charge against Lacan in his analysis of Poe’s work (as we will see in Chapter 
2.4), and also towards Searle in his ‘Limited INC’, the reply to Searle’s critique of his ‘Signature, Event, Context’  
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For Derrida, Descartes’ Cogito never truly makes the break with madness which he claims Foucault perceives.  
The certainty that the cogito achieves, that apparent triumph of reason over doubt, has for Derrida, owing to 
our being “too well assured of ourselves and too well accustomed to the framework of the Cogito”, blinded us 
to the “mad audacity” (2001, p. 67) which determines its inaugural moment: 
An original point which no longer belongs to either a determined reason or a determined unreason, no 
longer belongs to them as oppositional or alternative... Madness is therefore, in every sense of the word, 
only one case of thought... to this zero point at which determined meaning and nonmeaning come 
together in their common origin. (2001, p. 68) 
Here, one can infer that the ‘boiling point’ that Habermas speaks of is akin to that “silent and specific moment” 
where reason and unreason coalesce “at the point of greatest proximity to madness.” (Derrida, 2001, p. 72) It 
is here that the sovereign moment comes into view. It cannot, exceeding reason, ‘describe itself’, reflect on 
itself or produce a meaning for itself.  It is only within the boundaries of language that we can reflect upon this 
sovereignty, the irony being, that the closer it gets to the object of its reflection, the closer it is to its ruination.  In 
this way we can describe Sovereignty’s effects, we can observe its resultant phenomena, but we cannot, 
ultimately, capture this experience itself and reduce it to knowledge.  This moment is not knowledge; it is 
outside of that economy of equivalent exchange and provokes silence at the moment of its appearance. It makes 
me ecstatic; I am at the moment outside of myself, I am at once both I and not I. 
  
Bataille’s writing stands between the possible (reason) and the impossible (unreason) and “keeps within itself 
the trace of a violence.” This violence anticipates the “menacing powers of madness” (Derrida, 2001, p. 75) 
and seeks to create a moment which lacerates language and its structure of significant meaning.  However, as 
Bataille notes, this attempt to say the impossible cannot be completed within a ‘significant’ discourse.  
Philosophy and reason are not up to the task: “It uses language in such a way that silence never follows, so 
that the supreme moment is necessarily beyond philosophical questioning.  At any rate, it is beyond philosophy 
as far as philosophy claims to answer its own questions” (2006, pp. 274-5).  But, whilst Bataille recognises the 
limitations of language, he acknowledges the impossibility of avoiding the desire to inscribe the experience 
into his project. Whilst acknowledging the impotence of discourse in accumulating and subduing the 
experience, he recognises that apparently paradoxical drive to speak and attempt to draw it into understanding 
and significant discourse.  Anguish requires this; it pushes man towards an object it knows it will never obtain. 
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Yet this object can never be accumulated into the economy of absolute knowledge for, as we are aware, the 
individual Subject that is required in order to sublimate the object into knowledge is not present in the moment 
itself.7   
  
Following Hegel’s logic to its end, at the point of its apparent grasping of the object, man finds that the swelling 
tumult that is life exceeds this calculated formulation. Life exceeds this logic without presenting meaning, the 
sovereign moment itself a silent rebellion against calculated existence, a rebellion that arises from life itself 
and ruptures the formulated identity that brought it to this point. Meaning, knowledge and understanding begin 
to crack; life exceeds the possibility of understanding its own movement; serious calculation becomes 
impossible, finds itself outstripped, and the restricted Identity of man is provoked to silence in the face of its 
own self-excess.  It is at this point of rupture, this point of the dissolution of calculated ‘being’, that laughter 
is provoked. In the senseless quaking of the foundations of understanding, in the face of the void, a trembling 
laughter irrupts in a moment which exceeds calculation.  It is the paradoxical understanding of this impotence 
that provokes laughter which, as Derrida notes, provokes a response: 
To laugh at philosophy (at Hegelianism) – such, in effect, is the form of the awakening – henceforth 
calls for an entire ‘discipline,’ an entire ‘method of meditation’ that acknowledges the philosopher’s 
byways, understands his techniques, makes use of his ruses, manipulates his cards, lets him deploy his 
strategy, appropriates his texts.  Then, thanks to this work which has prepared it – and philosophy is 
work itself according to Bataille – but quickly, furtively, and unforeseeably breaking with it, as betrayal 
or as detachment, drily, laughter breaks out. (2001, p. 319) 
At this impossible moment, in the deepest folds of desire, discourse finds itself shipwrecked in the night of its 
own desire. As sirens lured ships off their course onto the jagged rocks which were their undoing, so the object 
of desire has run Identity aground, calculation has foundered, and is left groping in the dark of the cold wet 
night.  The problem faced is that this shipwreck is not totally unfamiliar territory; it is a strangely familiar 
place. A recognition of sorts occurs; the sovereign moment that forces rebellion greets us with a smile. Yet, 
before we can grasp it and reflect upon this moment, like the camera flash that momentarily blinds, we regain 
composure only to find that the picture has already been taken and, shaken, laughter irrupts. Provoked by 
                                                 
7 In this way, we can identify like Derrida that Bataille does not question Hegel’s phenomenology, he follows it 
unwaveringly and pushes it towards its own limits, to the point where the individual finds itself outstripped, and the logic 
of Hegel’s discourse unravels at the point of its potential completion. 
26 
 
desire, the questioning that is carried with it forces us to question this moment, to attempt to bring it into the 
fold of calculation. Ultimately however, we are forced to recognise that the methods of calculative reasoning 
fall short.  It is this impotent desire to understand that forces Bataille to recognise that the impossible moment 
cannot be subdued, and also that this moment provokes a necessary drive to attempt to do so nevertheless. The 
philosophical method being impotent then, as Derrida recognises, the task before us is not to bring this moment 
to heel. The questioning that provokes the attempt to catch this elusive impossible requires a different method, 
outside of the calculated discourse of philosophy, one that causes language to slide, and brings the experience 
as close as possible to enunciation.  Yet the problem that Bataille recognised remains. Derrida, echoing 
Habermas, asks: “how, after having exhausted the discourse of philosophy, can one inscribe in the lexicon and 
syntax of a language, our language, which was also the language of philosophy, that which nevertheless 
exceeds the oppositions of concepts governed by this communal logic?” (2001, p. 319) 
 
Bataille's answer to this charge is not contained within the texts themselves. Understood as a practical activity 
which seeks to affect the reader outside of the text and evoke a moment of communication, we have to 
understand that the impossible moment that Bataille sought to induce the moment to take place between himself 
and another outside of the text itself.  Bataille's Sovereign Communication occurs outside of the works 
themselves, or more precisely, it is through his work (his non-objectifying science) that we see him looking to 
bring about an affective communication that remains outside of the realm of knowledge which would seek to 
isolate and subdue the experience he seeks to evoke.   
 
What’s in a Name? 
There was not one man born in 1897 called Georges Bataille who wrote some of the most beautiful and 
most terrible books of twentieth century French literature.  Or not only one.  There is not one Georges 
Bataille but several, variously called Lord Auch, Louis Trente, Pierre Angelique.  Georges Bataille used 
pseudonyms... in such a way that before we begin to gain an understanding of his work, we need to see 
under which signs... (Surya, 2002, p. 88) 
Bataille wrote extensively (as is well recognised) under a myriad of names alongside his own.  Conventional 
wisdom would seem to dictate that given the nature of his preoccupations, the adoption of a pseudonym granted 
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Bataille a freedom of expression that might not have been possible had he published his more offensive works 
under his own name.  However when we recognise, as Surya (author of a detailed and illuminating biography 
of Bataille) did, that this adoption is not uniform across the entirety of his work:  “The play Bataille maintained 
with his names, real and borrowed, is quite different and positively complex” (2002, p. 89).  He informs us 
that the employment of pseudonyms is not consistent across the body of his literary output, with Story of the 
Eye, Le Petit, and Madame Edwarda requiring the use of a pseudonym, whilst the no less 'offensive' L'Abbe 
C, Alleluia and the outrageous Blue of Noon were published under his own name.  This leads us to recognise 
that we cannot draw the conclusion that his use of literary pseudonyms was as a result of practical 
considerations for the publication of his work.  After all, if the content of the former listed works required the 
use of this method of subterfuge, then why not the entirety of his fiction?  The answer here is not that the 
explicit content of his work determines whether it received his own signature or not, but instead is found in an 
ambiguous touch which Crowley describes for us: “Bataille's writing seeks to touch us.  That this touch is 
always mediated, never certain, always perhaps only a readerly fantasy, cannot rule out the opposite possibility: 
that it perhaps takes place” (2004, p. 767) 
 
We have already seen how Bataille sought to undermine the structure of reason that has the subject as its 
foundation, with his explicit aim being “to nullify a game of subordinate operations.” (2001e, p. 98)  And yet, 
it is only by bringing this together with his play of names that we can begin to see the notion of communication 
as “effective contact” (Crowley, 2004, p. 767) which leads us back to a recognition of the role these works play 
in his oeuvre as a whole.  What we will find is that the employment of the pseudonym in Bataille's work serves 
a purpose akin to that reversal of order examined previously for, through the use of these names, we see him 
trying to subvert the illusory quality of self-conscious subjectivity that he saw as erroneously equated with the 
whole of human existence.  Crowley addresses the problem of Bataille's use of pseudonyms and highlights for 
us the issue that is at the heart of tackling this problem: 
While the complications attaching to Bataille's proliferation of pseudonyms are undeniable, they are 
entirely unable to rule out the naive possibility that these are, after all, merely pseudonyms, adopted by 
the biographical subject...  this is not particularly interesting for the critic, admittedly; but the greater 
intellectual attractions of complication cannot remove its haunting platitude. (2004, p. 771) 
The question raised here is of the integrity of authorial identity, and it is through examining the status of the 
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author in Bataille's model of communication that we will begin to recognise the function his signatories play.  
As we have seen, Bataille takes words and language to be reflective of the structure of the subject that uses 
them, and language always being that of a social being we must recognise that the words that comprise the text 
are reflective and constitutive of both the author and reader.  The author, an 'I', and the reader, also an 'I', 
communicate through the book.  When Crowley hints at the problems surrounding Bataille's authorial identity 
what he is indicating is that the alter-ego, when employed, becomes a mask through which the writer speaks 
but which, as a mask, still implies the author behind it. In this sense there is not a formal identity between the 
two and yet there is a trace that is “residual: neither simply absent nor simply present” (2004, p. 771). Similarly, 
Dean tells us that Bataille’s use of pseudonyms is a “paradoxical strategy in which the author silences himself” 
and because of this “loses its point of reference”, which leads writing to come to occupy “a space between 
presence and absence” (1992, p. 233). The question of authorial integrity then is linked to Bataille’s literature 
as a practical activity. If his writing seeks to de-structure the reader through the impact of the reintroduction of 
excessive (heterogeneous) elements, then is it from a position of surety or fragility that the author attempts 
this? 
  
We will examine the nature of Bataille's relationship with his pseudonyms through the contestedly auto-
biographical ‘Coincidences’ which Bataille saw as “a psychoanalytic exercise employed to decode the 
meaning concealed in the obscene images of Story of the Eye” (Dean, 1992, p. 235).  Yet, before we plunge 
headlong into a mire of fragmented consciousness and psychoanalysis, we must be mindful of Bataille's 
position on the nature of self-consciousness.  Born of exhaustion, self-consciousness is only ever a pale shadow 
of the whole human being, a notion that includes that which exceeds this identity formed through restriction.  
It is through this identification that Bataille comes to recognise his own identity’s poverty, and it is imperative 
for our analysis here to recognise that the conception of Identity that Bataille seeks to illuminate, with all its 
anguish, tension and restriction, applies just as much to Bataille as the impersonal 'man'.  What will become 
apparent is that the person 'Georges Bataille' is as tenuous a construct as that of Louis Trente, Lord Auch et al.  
We must keep in mind that all the conditions that Bataille sought to evoke as applicable to man, were also 
applicable to him.  To name for Bataille is to distinguish, to solidify the demarcation between what is and what 
is not.  Surya claims that the use of pseudonyms in his work seeks to “hide” at the same time as breaking “the 
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formality of a name that has been handed down.” (2002, p. 89).  We shall see that the identity of 'Georges 
Bataille' itself was founded upon very flimsy ground, to the extent that it carried with it no more real authorship 
than that of his pseudonyms.  This is indeed a bold claim, and it is only through an investigation into his 
Coincidences that we will begin to understand what constitutes the justification for this.  It is vital however to 
do so as, once established, we will be able to see the psychological justification for the use of pseudonyms in 
his writing which, together with the inverted structural couplings present in his prose, will enable us to see 
more clearly why this 'tacky touch' is imperative to his notion of communication. Communication “effects, in 
fact, nothing substantive; an intermittent, unjustifiable contact with no content” and becomes “The unlocatable 
touch of Bataillean communication”, of “intermittent, ruptured proximity, no matter how distant”.  Ultimately 
within Bataille’s work, and perhaps frustratingly, we will find an “empty model, admittedly, which does no 
more than open a channel and shade it about with putative contact, but seriously, what more could we ask for?” 
(Crowley, 2004, pp. 775-9) 
Coincidences 
 
I was very astonished at having unknowingly substituted a perfectly obscene image for a vision 
apparently devoid of any sexual implication.  Still, I would soon have cause for even greater 
astonishment. (Bataille, 2001a, p. 70) 
Much has been made of the seemingly explanatory section following the main narrative in Story of the Eye.  
Questions surround the biographical integrity of the descriptions given, whether these descriptions themselves 
are a continuation of the preceding narrative of the work, and whether they should be taken into consideration 
as fictive or semi-fictive.  I do not intend to examine in detail the content of Coincidences with reference to 
the biographical history of Bataille himself.  To ask whether scenarios presented in the work are correlative to 
events in his life and historically accurate is fraught with difficulties. Dean notes that Bataille’s accounts of 
his past often challenged by those close to him. Recounting such an instance, she tells us of an occasion where 
his brother Martial suffered “distress” at Bataille’s “misrepresentation” (1992, p. 232) of their parents – both 
of whom are central ‘characters’ within the Coincidences.  Whether Bataille's mother really “suddenly lost her 
mind too” or whether his father wailed in syphilitic delirium “Doctor, let me know when you're done fucking 
my wife!” (Bataille, 2001a, p. 73) are not of concern.  The reason for this lack of attention will become clear 
in the following analysis, for what we will find is that the content of this work itself and the place in which 
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Bataille found himself able to write his 'first' work are of more importance.  We will find that, under the 
auspices of a course of psychoanalysis, connections have been made by Bataille, whether real or unreal, which 
bring into question the state of his Identity (suggesting a certain ir-reality to ‘Georges Bataille’ along with his 
pseudonyms), and reveal as the founding drive for his writing: “no precise goal, animated chiefly by a desire 
to forget, at least for the time being, the things I can be or do personally.” (Bataille, 2001a, p. 69) 
 
Bataille wrote his Story during (or shortly following) a course of analysis with the psychoanalyst Adrien Borel.8 
The importance of this writing under analysis cannot be overstated, for it is a crucial piece of the puzzle if we 
are to understand the relationship between the 'novel' and 'coincidences'.  Surya allows us a glimpse of the 
potential structure of the analysis which Bataille underwent with Borel.  Notably a “heterodox Freudian”, 
Borel's analysis he tells us was “above all else therapeutic, adaptive and founded with an attention to suffering”, 
performed in a way that was “not very rigorous” or “ritualised” and allowed the Analysand to investigate and 
“struggle with the violence of their unconscious” (2002, p. 97). 
 
The structure and content of the Coincidences closely mirrors the process of development that we find in the 
Freudian analysis of the Dream.  The psychical unpacking of representations found in Coincidences (where 
Bataille 'uncovers' repressed unconscious desires and memories) is analogous to those found in Freud's theory 
and method of Dream interpretation.  Ffrench notes how “the narrative structure of the text thus corresponds 
to a broadly psychoanalytic pattern” but stresses that critical differences exist between the two, primarily owing 
to the lack of a distinct analyst: “the text enacts its own auto-analysis, establishes a metatextual, narrative voice 
within the narrative, and this voice is in close but also parodic and subversive proximity to that of the analyst” 
(1999, pp. 92-3). By taking on the mantle of analyst and analysand Bataille concurrently subjects himself, and 
                                                 
8 We can be confident of the timing of this as he is the doctor to whom he refers as providing an anatomical correction of 
the colour of the bulls testes in his narrative: “I visited a friend of mine, who is a doctor”, he tells us, “I read the description 
to him, never having seen the skinned balls of a bull, I assumed they were the same colour as the erect cock of the animal... 
my friend remarked that I had absolutely no idea of what the glands I was writing about were really like, and he promptly 
read aloud a detailed description in an anatomical textbook.” (Bataille, 2001a) 
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is subject to, the process of analysis. Bataille draws out relations between the contents of his novel by 
“assuming a profound region of my mind” where an unconscious collusion takes place where “certain images 
coincide, the elementary ones, the completely obscene ones” and are shown to be linked at a point where 
unconscious desire and conscious awareness meet - a point that he terms “The breaking point of the conscious.” 
(Bataille, 2001a, p. 71) 
 
It is this breaking point that Bataille identifies as the place in which “personal memories were quickly 
associated with some harrowing images” (Bataille, 2001a, p. 72), thus allowing us to see the parallels between 
the personal process of 'working through' the content of Story and the dream analysis that we find in Freud.  
Bataille himself draws a link between several constituent parts of the narrative and his conscious or 
unconscious observations, such as between eyes and eggs, the deeply buried memory of his brother's practical 
jokes, and of the removal of the priest's eye with the witnessing of a bull tearing out the eye of the bull-fighter 
Granero.  In Freudian dream-analysis we see a similar developmental process where the Analysand, with the 
assistance of the Analyst, works through the manifest content of a dream to uncover the unconscious matter at 
the root of a 'disorder'.  We see this process evidenced clearly in Freud's A Case of Hysteria, where rather 
innocuous elements in the dreams of 'Dora' are through investigation revealed as having sexually traumatic 
origins.  In this relation Freud tells us: 
'That is to say, you knew that it was so – the meaning of the dream is now becoming even clearer.  You 
said to yourself; “this man is persecuting me, he want to force his way into my room.  My 'jewel-case' 
is in danger, and if anything happens it will be Father’s fault.”  For that reason in the dream you chose 
a situation which expresses the opposite – a danger from which your father is saving you.  In this part 
of the dream everything is turned into its opposite.' (2001a, p. 69) 
In his analysis of 'Dora', Freud claims that the manifest content of the dream and the Analysand's 'conscious' 
beliefs can be traced back to the unconscious lingering of several forgotten traumatic events, notably her latent 
homosexual desires for her mother and 'Frau K', and her repressed feelings of love for 'Herr K'.  These 
revelations seem in direct contradiction to the manifest content in 'Dora's' dreams as well as her conscious 
thoughts and feelings.  The revelation of her unconscious wishes and desires cause her no small amount of 
grief and result in the further repression and transference of her desire for vengeance onto Freud himself.  This 
he cites as her overriding motivation for her cutting short her course of treatment: 
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Her breaking off so unexpectedly, just when my hopes of a successful treatment were at their highest, 
and her thus bringing those hopes to nothing – this was an unmistakeable act of vengeance on her part.  
Her purpose of self-injury also profited by this action.  (Freud, 2001a, p. 109) 
It is inferred by Freud that his patient, unwilling to accede to the Analyst’s exposition of her underlying issues, 
transfers her unconscious troubles onto him.  It is implied that what is revealed to the patient is dangerous or 
threatening to the conscious psychological structure of her identity where what has been repressed manifests 
itself in the phenomena about which the patient seeks help.  However, in this case it is revealed that that it is 
not the patient’s neurotic tendencies (fits of coughing, abdominal pains and other phantasmic illnesses) that 
are to be treated, but instead it is the roots of these psycho-physically manifested neuroses that Freud wants to 
have exposed and resolved.  We see it evidenced in that the whole of 'Dora's' ego is presented as poisoned by 
her unconscious repressions, with her conscious beliefs being just as much a manifestation of and reaction to 
her unconscious memories and desires – for instance, her vehemently professed outrage at the advances of 
'Herr K' by the lake becomes for Freud only a reaction of her consciousness which is unwilling to deal with 
her unconscious desire to accede to these advances.  The upshot of analysis of this kind (aside from the 
problematic of the Freudian ‘reading’ itself) is that it reveals to us that the Subject, the self, the 'I' or Ego, is 
itself by no means eternal and unchanging.  Instead, we find the psychically constructed self that is conscious 
of itself revealed as a tenuous construction which in its conscious understanding of itself is blind to its own 
repressed desires and memories.  The 'I' that seeks out treatment for its neurotic afflictions is revealed as in 
cahoots with the symptoms afflicting it, these being the reaction of consciousness to its threatening 
unconscious that makes these symptoms manifest.  The subject is shown to be struggling with both its 
unconscious desires and repressed memories, and the revelation of its fractured, only ever partial nature, is 
fundamental to the psychoanalytical process.   
 
Freud finds the subject to be attempting to maintain a stable unity and coherence to its identity, which the 
symptoms of its afflictions reveal to be lacking.  However, more importantly for us, the totality of the 
construction of the 'I' is implicated in the manifestation of its neuroses; the desire for mastery which seeks to 
create a coherence of identity excludes aspects of the self that threaten this surety9.  The neurotic patient (and 
                                                 
9 This idea, along with a more detailed exposition of Freud’s thought will be addressed in Chapter 2.2. 
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by extension ourselves) have constructed a restricted domain of consciousness which is erected in opposition 
to, and consequently threatened by, past trauma and unconscious desire.  Freudian analysis here allows us to 
glimpse the fact that around, outside and underneath the restricted ego there is a sea of unconscious activity 
which, though fundamental to the creation and maintenance of Identity/Ego, in some cases can lead to the 
destruction of this self-same subjectivity. 
 
By subjecting to and being subject to a process of ‘auto-analysis’ Bataille thus struggles with a double 
movement of repression and sustained examination of the symptoms of his subjectivity manifest in the Story 
of the Eye. For ffrench, such self-examination is a process which is: 
The indication of a disorder, of a disease. But in the psychoanalytic sense it is also the sign of a conflict, 
the overcoming of a repression, of a crossing of boundaries, of a transgression. The symptom is also a 
manifestation, it is manifest, but it cannot be interpreted directly, it does not refer directly to the trauma 
or disease it results from, but has undergone a work of transformation, a work of displacement of forms. 
(1999, pp. 29-9) 
He continues: 
Symptomal form, then, is a form which is always already ruptured, deformed, unformed, hollowed out 
by the movement of differentiation which ‘informs’ it. The maintenance of this notion of a form (not 
form) is evidently difficult – it is difficult not to just slip into a consideration of it as a new form, leaning 
too heavily on the positive side of the operation, or a consideration of it as nothing, overemphasising 
the negative turn. The difficulty of form (not form) whose contours are effaced by its own inkstain, is 
connoted by the clinical register of the word symptom: pain, tension, illness. (p. 29) 
It is perhaps then, as the double veiling/unveiling which reveals the ‘trauma’ at the heart of the symptomal 
form of Bataille’s literature, that we should view the following statement from Bataille: 
He shrieked in a stentorian voice: 'Doctor, let me know when you're done fucking my wife!'  For me, 
that utterance, which in a split second annihilated the demoralising effects of a strict upbringing, left me 
with something like a steady obligation, unconscious and unwilled: the necessity of finding an 
equivalent to that sentence in any situation I happen to be in; and this largely explains Story of the Eye. 
(2001a, p. 73) 
So what conclusion can we draw from Bataille’s use of the pseudonym?  As a process of ‘auto-analysis’ 
Bataille’s Story reveals an author subject to a dual process of interrogation/defence and demarcates a space in 
which the self is brought into question, through writing, by its own writing self.  Through such a lens we can 
view the employment of pseudonyms as the placing of a marker, a placeholder to indicate the site of a subject 
examining its struggle to master its own origins whilst subject to the “difficult and unmediatizable nature of 
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immediate shock” (ffrench, 1999, p. 86). It is this trauma that threatens to undermine and destabilise his 
fractured self and which reflexively lends an ir-reality to the Identity that was ‘Georges Bataille’.  His own 
Identity having suffered traumatic lacerations he finds no ground upon which he can build a solid bastion of 
self.  We recognise also that his conception of the whole human being, paradoxically fractious and under threat 
of dissolution as it is, applied just as much to him as to impersonal man.  ‘The extant relations are judged 
unacceptable and are perceived as an agonising affliction’ he tells us.  It is by recognising the restricted identity 
that is self-consciousness which, through the many byways of repression seeks to ignore its traumatic origin, 
we can begin to see what is meant by him wanting ‘to modify the relations that exist between a man and his 
fellow creatures’.  We are not seeing here a herald of the second coming of a Zarathustra, nor the messenger 
from the gleaming spires of the Hegelian Absolute. Instead we see man trapped within a lie of his own making, 
believing that he can overcome his limitations, ignorant of his self-deception, yet rushing headlong towards 
his own dissolution.  No resolution is found within Bataille’s work; instead we find only violence.  It is a 
violent intent, directly seeking to affect those whom it can; to lacerate and re-open an already festering wound.  
However, we risk getting too far ahead of ourselves – you cannot get to the top floor without getting in the lift 
at ground level – and thus we turn to Bataille’s ground, that of Hegel and his Absolute. 
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1.1: Bataille, Being Hegel, Being Nietzsche 
 
 
Hegel closes; he closes the library back upon itself with the identity of the subject and the object, an 
identity produced when the long journey accomplished by discourse reaches its end point at the 
moment of absolute knowledge.  Nietzsche, on the contrary, undermines the library, causes it to 
explode, puts fire to it.  A double register, then, for this library which, on the one hand, evokes 
Bataille’s work place – Bataille, the conserver of knowledge, a Hegelian civil servant at the library, 
which, as one knows, was the National Library; but on the other hand, the latter evokes the place 
worked through by Bataille, that space of the book that he transgressed, even though this meant 
damning several of his own works (Hollier, 1995, pp. 62-3) 
 
A complex relationship exists within Bataille’s work between Hegel and Nietzsche.  Hollier characterizes it 
thus; Bataille is led into a position in which he “must actualize Hegel but hide Nietzsche.” (1995, p. 65) To 
hide Nietzsche? Does he mean Bataille seeks not to mention him, to keep him hidden from view?  Not so, as 
even a cursory reading of Bataille’s work will make clear.  The tie that binds Bataille and Nietzsche runs deep, 
and is one that has been rightly recognized in Bataillean scholarship10, which acknowledges that “except for a 
few exceptions, my company on earth is mostly Nietzsche…” (Bataille, 2004, p. 3)  
 
In his ‘Horror of Liberty’, Stuart Kendall, quoting Bataille, evokes the depth that this influence runs to when 
he states: “Bataille does not simply agree with what Nietzsche says; he is not merely influenced by him… 
Bataille, for whom ‘each thing is a parody of another, or the same thing in a deceptive form,’ presents himself 
as the same as Nietzsche” (2009, p. 57)  This itself is a view that finds grounding no doubt in Bataille’s own 
claims that are littered throughout his work. Bataille’s relationship to Hegel is much more complex however, 
and though essential to understanding his work (Land acknowledges that Bataille’s writing is “steeped in 
Hegel” (1992, p. 4)), often suffers from a lack of attention. In the article by Kendall for instance, though 
professing to consider Bataille’s relationship with liberty we find only sparse mention of Hegel – which can 
present a skewed view of the relationship between the two.   
 
In Hollier’s article, titled ‘Beyond Hegel to Nietzsche’s Absence’, he puts forwards a line of argument which 
situates Bataille’s thought as caught between Hegel on the side of man’s possibilities, which is then placed 
                                                 
10 For instance in the work of Hollier and Kendall (to be discussed shortly) and others, amongst them are Land who tells 
us: “Nietzsche – accompanies Bataille throughout the entire length of his textual voyage, with an intellectual solidarity 
so great that it touches upon a complete erasure of distinction” (1992, p. 61). 
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into tension with a Nietzschean destruction.  For Hollier, a view which will be echoed within this thesis, Hegel 
resides upon the side of the subject, of reason, discourse and language.  Hegel, the structuralist par excellence, 
is aligned in Hollier’s argument with those structures which are on the side of Bataille’s notion of a restricted 
economy, against which he aligns a Nietzsche which embodies a “system of ruptures, of gaps and of everything 
which escapes Hegelian discourse.” (Hollier, 1995, p. 66)  To make sense of Hollier’s claim that Bataille must 
hide Nietzsche, we must understand that he seeks to align Bataille directly with Nietzsche, as Nietzsche, and 
contends that Bataille seeks to protect Nietzsche from becoming ‘actualized’ (by falling into the regulated 
discourse of Hegel), which would result in his succumbing to “irreparable misrepresentation” (p. 66). It is this 
desire that he attributes to Bataille and claims explains the fact that often, when speaking of Hegel or Nietzsche, 
Bataille uses a ‘double register’ where his writing “on Hegel and on Nietzsche do not obey the same rules… 
do not belong to the same zones of his writing” and establish a strict delineation between the places where 
both are treated. He continues; “he has almost never explicitly confronted them: from one to the other, the 
absence of a relationship, the strangeness of the zones prevent a meeting, an articulation in form.” (p. 65) In 
speaking of an absence of a relationship, is he here saying there is no relationship? The absence of a 
relationship is normally considered to allude to the lack of any interaction between a pair or group. Is Hollier 
here suggesting that Bataille’s interactions with Hegel and Nietzsche are independent of each other and that 
they belong to different spheres of concern?  In one sense this is correct, and yet at the same time he is alluding 
to a deeper plane of interaction over and above articulation.  Let us examine the differing registers that Hollier 
draws our attention to in Bataille’s writing: 
The essential – and the original – characteristic of Hegelian philosophy is to describe the totality of 
what is; and, consequently, at the same time that it accounts for everything which appears before our 
eyes, to give an integrated account of the thought and language which express – and reveal – that 
appearance. (Bataille, 1990, p. 11) 
 
Chance represents a way of going beyond when life reaches the outer limits of the possible and gives 
up.  Refusing to pull back, never looking behind, our uninhibited boldness discovers that solutions 
develop where cautious logic is baffled.  So that it was only with my life that I wrote the Nietzsche 
book that I had planned – a book in which I intended to pose and resolve intimate problems of morality. 
(Bataille, 2004, p. xxiii) 
 
It is plain to see here the different registers on which these two passages are operating.  The first on Hegel 
reads matter-of-factly, it is drier, more austere and more in keeping with what one would expect from an 
academic treatise.  This is in contrast to that on Nietzsche.  When reading Bataille talking on – or as – Nietzsche 
we feel the surge of energy, we can see the struggle to bring to enunciation that which he wishes to say with 
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Nietzsche.  Passages like these, and indeed many more like it, characterize Bataille’s writing upon them, and 
yet, such a divide between the treatments they seem to receive lends to the process of interpretation a potential 
problem: 
1) Such a disparity in approach can lead one (unsurprisingly given Bataille’s professed kinship with 
Nietzsche or his penchant for the excessive) to suggest his alignment with Nietzsche against Hegel.  
Conversely, one could also read the opposite into the difference of approach where Nietzsche, often 
erratically, deliriously evoked is placed in opposition to the serious Hegel, one which perhaps aligns 
itself better with the gravity of exposition one often finds elsewhere in his work. 
2) This disparity of registers gives rise to a certain ambiguity, one which, when Bataille’s work is 
approached in the piecemeal way that can characterize an academic paper, often precludes a treatment 
of his work sensitive to the complex interrelation between the two.  This tendency often leads to the 
establishment of different kinds of Bataille where, dependent upon the issue or passage at stake or (like 
those interpreters of James’s novella) on external prejudices, we see the evocation of a Bataille-Hegel 
or Bataille-Nietzsche, with one set up to argue for or against a given position.  Taking the lead from 
Felman we recognize that academics, like journalists seeking to get their ‘scoop’, must ‘find an angle’ 
on the story. 
 
So why actualize Hegel but hide Nietzsche? Let us now consider this issue in more depth.  We have already 
touched upon the notion of communication within Bataille’s literature and how this seeks to undermine the 
restricted notion of identity by a process of lacerating wounding which undermines this rigid structure. Hegel, 
as the author of the Phenomenology, established the dialectic of master and slave which Bataille felt to be 
fundamental to understanding how our self-consciousness is formed.  Indeed, we can recognize the importance 
of this notion when he tells us: 
(The dialectic of the master and the slave) is the decisive moment in the history of the consciousness of 
self and, it must be said, to the extent that we have to distinguish between each thing that affects us, no 
one knows anything of himself if he has not understood this movement which determines and limits 
man's successive possibilities. (1988b, p. 109) 
 
Nietzsche baulked at the poverty of the man of Hegelian self-consciousness (this will be dealt with in detail in 
Chapter 1.3), which despite the incisive nature of his critique, Bataille rightly recognized as lacking in 
sophistication. It was Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’ which held more importance for Bataille, and it is this notion 
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that evokes the loss of the possibility of any absolute guarantee for Identity:   
 
An extreme, unconditional yearning was expressed for the first time by Nietzsche independently of 
moral goals or of serving God... On my own, I'll have to face the same difficulties as Nietzsche – putting 
God and the good behind him though all ablaze with the ardor possessed by those who lay down their 
lives for God or the good. (Bataille, 2004, pp. xxvii-xix) 
 
We have already touched previously upon the relationship between language and Identity where words “make 
identities intervene” (Bataille, 2001f, p. 64), and it is this intervention that places language (rational language) 
firmly within Hegel’s dialectic. For Bataille, when a word is uttered, it is given voice and placed within a 
system of names and identities which result in its being actualized.  When I speak of an apple I have utilized a 
concept which enters into a relational framework with those between whom it is used.  This utilization further 
reinforces the concept of the apple and by its being shared seeks to disambiguate the referent object (a poor 
example perhaps given the everyday nature of an apple).  However, when we consider the work of Nietzsche, 
itself concerned with the destruction of the bonds that restrict our own conceptions of self, and transfer from a 
position of simply reading him and start to engage with his thought in a systemic (read philosophical) way, we 
run the risk of turning his thought from that of the free play of the dervish into the rigid one-two of the ballroom 
dancer.  What leads Hollier to make the contention that Bataille must hide Nietzsche is that when speaking we 
introduce the free-play characterized by Nietzsche’s vertiginous thought into the utilitarian realm of academic 
consideration.  In actualizing his notion of the ‘Death of God’ we reduce it to the level of argument, one 
proposition to be played against another which, when taken seriously, brings the speaker to ridicule in the 
marketplace.   
 
For Bataille, discourse is inescapably Hegelian, and even to introduce concepts which seek to threaten the 
structure which chokes does not result in the overturning of the system itself.  Hegel’s greatest philosophical 
trick was the creation of a system of subjectivity which, like a hungry spider’s web, catches everything which 
gravitates near to it.  To speak is in a way to ‘take up Hegel again’, and any discussion, any reasoned argument 
will be caught by the dialectic even when the greatest care is taken to avoid it: “Hegel’s discourse will always 
be taken up again by the fabric of this discourse” (Hollier, 1995, p. 71).  It is this that leads Hollier to state that 
Bataille must hide Nietzsche from actualization, for it is chiefly the Nietzschean experience that he grapples 
with, not the reasoned arguments.  Like his Madman, Nietzsche’s gift to Bataille was the experience of the 
radical loss of a guarantee of self that explodes following the death of divinity.  The radical dissolution of 
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Identity that Bataille felt in the wake of Nietzsche could not be enunciated or ‘argued’ for.  To do so, to try and 
explain the impact of this, would be to introduce it into Hegel’s game and to isolate, reduce and solidify an 
experience which in its experiencing leads to a dramatic rupture; “Nietzsche is ‘in’ Bataille; Bataille is ‘in’ 
Nietzsche or in Nietzsche’s absence which will then at the same time lead necessarily to Bataille’s absence.” 
(Hollier, 1995, p. 73) 
 
So, is Hegel the trap that Bataille seeks to avoid?  Is his work on transgression and sacrifice a move to 
undermine the Hegelian edifice which strangles the sovereign subject?  If Hollier is correct in his contention 
that Bataille must hide Nietzsche from the net of Hegelian actualization, we seem to have established a 
relationship between the two in which Hegel must be overcome to allow for Nietzschean experience to make 
itself felt.  Within such an interpretation, which is the upshot of Hollier’s analysis, Hegel becomes the 
figurehead of a suffocating and creeping logical structure which seeks to isolate (actualize) the free flowing 
effervescence of life.  I have already drawn attention to the potential pitfalls of such an analysis and in his 
paper we find the evocation of the Bataille-Nietzsche – albeit the dissolute, ruptured Bataille-Nietzsche – 
which is placed in opposition to Hegel.  By positioning Bataille in such a way between them, Hollier tacitly 
establishes a hierarchy of value into his analysis, where Hegel is portrayed as the stumbling block to the 
engagement with the experience of Nietzsche.  Beyond Hegel to Nietzsche’s Absence: what such a title evokes 
is that Hegel is the starting point while Nietzsche, despite his influence being destructive, ultimately is the 
point where Bataille really resides (albeit a residence in absentia). The structure of the title, starting from Hegel 
and going beyond him to Nietzsche establishes a directional movement and echoes the very movement of the 
Hegelian dialectic against which Hollier is positioning his Bataille-Nietzsche.  Therein lies the difficulty, for 
by bringing the two into a dialogue a reduction has occurred, one which in Nietzsche’s words “involves a vast 
and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization” (2001, p. 214) Such a process 
unavoidably levels the playing field, establishes common terms by which they can engage, and ultimately 
ensures that such re-organisation leads us back into Hegel’s web.  
 
This is not to say however that this interpretation will be free from such difficulties, indeed, it is after all only 
another interpretation and perhaps we will see that once again the emperor has no clothes. However, an 
interpretation sensitive to these difficulties will allow a critical acknowledgment of the limitations of its 
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argument, one which in the end, as will become apparent, is recognized by Bataille as constitutive of the ‘whole 
human being’ and central to the functioning of his traumatic literature.  Opposed to interpretations which 
segregate Hegel and Nietzsche or place them within a hierarchy of value, I will posit a paradoxical relationship 
between Bataille as Hegel and as Nietzsche, not separate or compartmentalized, but like Janus gazing out in 
opposite directions whilst still part of the same face.  It is this paradox that Libertson draws our attention to, 
one which he applies to Bataille’s work as a whole (but equally applies to Nietzsche and Hegel’s place within 
it) where, unable to let either go, Bataille wants to integrate what ultimately are mutually exclusive modes of 
thought: “To want to be all is to want to lose the limits of one’s particularity, and at the same time to want to 
enclose all within the limit of one’s particularity.” (Libertson, 1995, p. 216) 
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1.2: Absolute Relation 
Since to begin with they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into a unity has not yet been 
achieved, they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness 
whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature 
is simply to live or to be for another.  The former is lord, the other is bondsman. (Hegel, 1977, p. 115) 
 
Hegel’s ‘Absolute Idealism’ grew, like the idealism of Novalis, Holderlin and others traditionally encapsulated 
within the term of the German ‘Idealists’ or ‘Romantics’, from a revitalization of Spinoza’s absolute 
metaphysics in the wake of the problems made apparent through the philosophies of Kant and Fichte. What 
we will see through analysis of Hegel’s Phenomenology is that in his attempted synthesis of Idealistic and 
Epistemological thought into a revised ‘Absolute Idealism’ there exists an assumption that rests on the belief 
in a necessary restriction of energy which is required to establish the recognition that is fundamental to the 
Hegelian notion of the absolute. We will examine the development of this notion first hand from the 
Phenomenology and it will become apparent that the intense power that the thought of Hegel holds for Bataille 
constitutes one aspect of the contested human life of which Bataille sought to explore. 
 
Hegel sought an epistemological grounding to the transcendental metaphysics of Kant, in an attempt to avoid 
the apparent paradoxes of logic that arise within the antinomies of his Critique1 - what Beiser calls an 
establishment of an “immanent metaphysics” (2005, p. 177).  What Hegel wanted to show was that the apparent 
paradoxes of Kant’s antinomies, and more widely those of ‘Idealism’ and ‘Empiricism’, were in fact paradoxes 
that arise from a misunderstanding of the logic of Identity and non-Identity. For Hegel these apparent paradoxes 
arise from a misunderstanding of the nature of the development of self-consciousness.  Hegel indicates that 
the problem facing philosophers arose because they, rather than following the development of ‘Self-
consciousness’ from its initial ‘awakening’ in self-certainty through to the eventual establishment of self-
consciousness, instead placed the self-conscious subject as the grounding of metaphysics. What in essence he 
identified was that philosophers were mistakenly taking the self-conscious subject as the starting point of their 
systems, rather than recognizing it as the culmination of a journey that results in the establishment of Self-
consciousness as the absolute. 
 
                                                 
1 The apparent incongruous realms of the Noumenal and the Phenomenal, where the world of the subjective ‘I’ and the 
external world of representations are apparently in conflict.  
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The problem facing Hegel is this, how can the subject, when faced with the apparent Nihilism that results from 
the Transcendental Idealism of Kant and Fichte2, overcome the apparent paradox that exists between the 
individual and the external world?  As mentioned, rather than positing the self-certainty of consciousness as 
the starting point of philosophical enquiry (a philosophical heritage most readily recognizable in Descartes’ 
Cogito), he instead reverses the methodology and seeks to illuminate how this certainty is established through 
the experience of consciousness and its interaction with the world.   
 
Hegel, in the earlier chapters of the Phenomenology traces the development of the Self through the initial 
flowering into consciousness of the Non-Identity of the ‘self’ (the non-Identity of the self and the objects of its 
perception) through to the assertion that the ‘I’ (ego) is the grounding of the possibility of knowledge of the 
objects of its perception.  This conclusion is the gulf that apparently separates Dogmatic Idealism and 
Empiricism, and can be extended to the Transcendental Idealism of Kant and Fichte where, through the mode 
of perception, the objects which initially gave rise to the self-certainty of consciousness (that ‘I’ am different 
to the objects of my perception – Non-Identity) are shown as not being objects in-themselves but in fact, 
through reflection, are reliant upon the intuition of the subject. Hegel identifies that in the mode of perception, 
what is revealed about the object is not the object itself but a universal aspect or attribute (to borrow Spinozian 
terminology) of the universal or absolute nature of existence.  However, through refined analysis, these 
perceptions of the object are shown not to reveal a perception of an object in-itself, but only the certainty of 
the consciousness of the perception of these objects3. Hegel brings this to our attention when he notes: “In the 
previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is something other than itself.  But the Notion of 
this truth vanishes in the experience of it.  What the object immediately was in itself – mere being in sense-
certainty, the concrete thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force – proves to be in truth, not this 
at all; instead this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other.” (1977, p. 104) This 
leads the self-certain subject into a problem: either self-consciousness is the starting point and the objects of 
                                                 
2 This is the charge of nihilism that Jacobi levels against them, where the outside world becomes something outside of 
the limits of possible knowledge (Kant) or an invention of the individual ‘ego’ itself (Fichte) 
3 This is essentially the problem that Kant was unable to overcome and had to essentially concede.  That is that outside 
the modes of apprehension of the individual, knowledge of the objects of perception as they are in-themselves becomes 
impossible and all we can say with certainty through a transcendental logic is that the truth of these objects is only 
achieved through the faculty of understanding where the objects conform to given rules gleaned through the lens of 
the limits of possible reason. 
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perception are reliant upon this self-consciousness or the objects are not reliant upon this self-consciousness 
and this self-certainty is brought into question – this is essentially the crux of the problem identified by Kant 
in the Third Antinomy, and in a wider sense as affecting the Copernican Revolution as a whole.  
 
Through its interaction with the objects of its own desire (for Hegel, this is how the subject as consciousness 
interacts with its world) the subject encounters its own self-certainty by forcing the objects of its desire (food, 
tools etc) to confirm to its own self. Through the negative movement of desire the individual, in forcing these 
objects to conform to “its life-processes” (Beiser, 2005, p. 182), realizes that by subjugating the objects of its 
perception to its will, these objects can no longer be deemed distinct. Judith Butler, in her Subjects of Desire 
notes: “the satisfaction of desire is the transformation of difference into identity: the discovery of the strange 
and novel as familiar, the arrival of the awaited, the re-emergence of what has been absent or lost.” (1999, p. 
9)  In the negative appropriation of the movement of desire, Hegel indicates that the subject, in assimilating 
the objects of its perception, finds these objects become identical to itself. However, for Hegel, the subject 
soon realizes that as objects of desire continually appear that he is caught in a regress where, ultimately, all 
objects are revealed as the ‘I’, trapping him in the tomb of self-certainty and unable to establish the absolute 
nature of the ‘I’. 
 
However, when faced with an object that cannot be sublimated into the ‘I’, the subject is faced with another 
problem: either the object of desire is consumable within identity and as such becomes nothing more than the 
subject or an object is encountered that is unassimible into the subject and (as the object lies outside of its own 
control) proves that the individual is not the foundation of all existence. In this way, desire finds itself unable 
to reach satisfaction in this negative movement, and seems caught in a paradox that leads to the apparent 
contradiction of the Identity of Subject and Object and the Non-Identity of Subject and Object. Hegel identifies 
this when he states: “Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; 
it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well.” (1977, p. 109) Here 
is revealed an infinite regress; as objects of desire are assimilated into being, further objects present themselves 
to be again assimilated, and thus as desire continually represents itself, the subject is unable to transform its 
self-certainty into an absolute knowledge of its self-consciousness.  This means that the Subject’s ‘Identity’ is 
either based in a fundamental identity between Subject and Object or the Subjects ‘Identity’ (its self-
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consciousness) is founded upon a principle of non-Identity between Subject and Object. The infinite movement 
of desire does not establish the truth or falsity of either proposition, and as a result, the subject is caught 
between the movement of satisfaction and desire. 
 
Lordship and Bondage 
 
In Chapter’s IV and IVA of his Phenomenology Hegel attempts to overcome this issue through some astounding 
analyses.  What he seeks to show is that rather than an apparent paradox, there is in truth a fundamental unity 
of Identity as both Identity as Identity and non-Identity. The problem for Hegel is the tension between their 
mutual exclusivity, but, rather than forcing one into a decision between empirical and idealistic thought, Hegel 
wishes to show that this apparent paradox is in fact a misunderstanding, where the simultaneous Identity and 
non-Identity of the I is the truth of the Subject’s self-consciousness. For Hegel, this truth is revealed through 
the movement towards ‘recognition’ and is explored by him in the Phenomenology through the stages 
contained within the chapter ‘Lordship and Bondage’. 
 
The self-certain consciousness of the ‘I’ or ego, in order to assert its own independence and autonomy, that is 
its being ‘for-itself’, must according to Hegel proceed into the world through action in order to test the 
hypothesis and establish the certainty of its own independence and autonomy over the world.  It must act in 
order to establish that it’s ‘I’ (its self-certainty of its own independence) can be extended to encapsulate the 
objects of its own perception. As has been noted, it must engage with these objects in order to establish its 
primacy over them and prove that the self-certainty of its independence is not reliant on another object (that it 
is not in fact a dependent existence). Without acting to prove this self-certainty, the self-certainty of the ‘I’ 
could be in fact be a misperception, and as such, to establish the truth of the self-certainty of its own 
consciousness it must act out and sublimate the objects of its perception to the ‘I’.  For Hegel, this action 
becomes problematic when the self-certain individual finds itself in confrontation with another, which is in 
turn itself seeking to establish its own self-certainty. At this stage the Other is not recognized by the self-certain 
‘I’ as another rational being for it might be a mere automaton. This apparently independent Other stands in 
opposition to the self-certainty of the ‘I’, and as a result the ‘I’ is forced to do battle to raise it’s apparent self-
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certainty of consciousness to truth.  In the first meeting the Other presents itself as a threat that must be 
subsumed into the self-certain consciousness of the ‘I’ in order to elevate the perception of its of self-certainty 
to Truth. Hegel states that the ‘I’ must: “proceed to supersede the other independent being in order thereby to 
become certain of itself as the essential being” (1977, p. 111) 
 
For Hegel, the ‘I’ and the Other must “engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for 
themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case.” (1977, p. 114) This struggle eventually 
comes to a close and establishes a hierarchy of Lord and Bondsman after one of the combatants concedes 
defeat and the victor establishes themselves as having power over the other.  The defeated valued life more 
intensely in this struggle than their new master; it valued its own existence more highly than the promise of 
establishing the certainty of its independence, whereas the victor was willing to go further, risk more, risk it 
all, under the promise of establishing the truth of its independence. It is important to note here that this does 
not imply that the Lord would have risked his life totally but only that he was willing to go further in risking 
his than the other.  The Lord establishes his independence through the subservience of the Bondsman, with this 
subservience serving to confirm that the master is the truly ‘independent being’ as, having shown that it has 
the power over its own existence, it was willing, unlike the Bondsman, to conquer its desire for self-
preservation and able to establish the apparent sovereignty of its self-certain will.  The struggle has resulted in 
a relationship of dependence on the part of the Lord, where the ‘essentiality’ of self-consciousness (its 
independence) is achieved through the subservience of the Bondsman; “they exist as two opposed shapes of 
consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the 
dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another.  The former is lord, the 
other is bondsman.” (Hegel, 1977, p. 115) 
 
In this relationship, the Lord maintains his independence through a marriage of control and mercy, for the 
Lord, in establishing its essentiality over the Bondsman, must turn the Bondsman into an object ‘for-himself’.  
However, he must also maintain this object in a relationship of subservience - it cannot destroy the other totally 
- for it necessarily requires the other to ensure its own position of power.  For the Lord, his independent nature 
is maintained through the “unessential consciousness” of the Bondsman, which as an object under its control 
“constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself” (Hegel, 1977, p. 116).   
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The maintenance of the Bondsman under the Lord reveals for Hegel what will turn out to be the root of his 
great dialectical reversal; in requiring the Bondsman to continue to exist to establish its independence (after 
all, as Beiser identifies: “a corpse cannot salute” (2005, p. 188)) the Lord is shown to need the Bondsman to 
recognize its sovereignty.  It is this need for the master to have his slave that for Hegel undermines the apparent 
mastery of the Lord by unveiling his dependence on the Bondsman (he requires his slave for the reassurance 
of his mastery). The master is in essence dependent upon the slave; he is not free ‘in-himself’ requiring as he 
does the slave for his independence.  This is problematic, for it has revealed to the self-certain master that the 
forced recognition of the slave does not afford him the self-certainty of his independence that he fought for, 
for, in forcing the slave to acknowledge the master, the master becomes dependent upon the recognition of the 
subservient individual, with this power over the slave being mistaken for confirmation of his own autonomy.  
This for Hegel is not enough for the master to establish his own autonomy and results in a relationship that is 
“one-sided and unequal” (Hegel, 1977, p. 116) as the slave only acknowledges the master’s ‘power’, and as 
this forced acknowledgement needs to be constantly maintained, it reveals that this ‘recognition’ involves a 
dependence of the master on the slave. Richman tells us; “The master’s apparent autonomy masks the reality 
of his double dependence upon the slave for the production of the goods he consumes and for the recognition 
of the superiority he seeks” (1982, p. 61). 
 
Now, the master, relying upon the enforced acknowledgement of the slave has, through a dramatic reversal of 
fortune, revealed his dependence on the slave for his mastery.  However, as a ‘rational’ being4, in order to prove 
that it is truly independent and autonomous, the master requires the free recognition of the slave as to his 
independence, for the enforced acknowledgement does not confirm for the ‘rational’ individual that it is free, 
and at this stage, both the slave and the master are trapped in a relationship which, being based on coercion, 
does not afford to either participant the ability to fulfill their apparent potentiality of consciousness. Beiser 
indicates the degrading aspect of this relationship when he states: 
The master regresses back to the stage of his animal desires.  This is for two reasons: (1) he treats the 
slave only as a means to his own ends, and as an instrument to satisfy his desires; (2) he simply consumes 
the products of the slave’s labour; he does not gain independence over his objects through labour, like 
the slave who labours for him, but he depends on the slave’s labour for his idle enjoyment.  So if the 
slave is not worthy of giving recognition, the master is not worthy of receiving it. (2005, p. 189) 
 
                                                 
4 The master has proved its rationality through the life and death struggle which established this hierarchy as it proved 
that it had mastery over its own bodily desire for self-preservation. 
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The relationship of the Lord to the Bondsman has revealed to the former that rather than ensuring his own 
independence, it has in fact placed him in chains to his Bondsman and, in order to re-establish the independence 
of the rational individual, the collapse of the subservient relationship is required. As such, the masterfully 
subtle twist of the dialectic is now revealed where, in the movement toward recognition and establishment of 
the independence of the individual, the rational ‘I’ must be recognized as such, and in return recognize freely, 
the autonomous independence of the Other. Hegel states: “Each is for the other the middle term, through which 
each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate 
being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation.  They recognize 
themselves as mutually recognizing one another” (1977, p. 112) We must also note here, that it is this 
recognition which for Hegel forms the grounding of the possibility of the State and ‘Ethical Life’, for it is this 
mutual recognition, this need to be recognized by the Other that binds the individual and the Other in a 
relationship which forms the basis of civil society.  In his Philosophy of Right Hegel indicates this clearly when 
he analyses the implications of this dialectic on a societal level and finds that the drive towards the individual 
satisfaction (of individual desires) of needs is tempered, and in fact enhanced by, the need for recognition by 
and of the Other: 
That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular 
through the universal, with the result that each man in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own 
account is eo ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else.  The compulsion which 
brings this about is rooted in the complex interdependence of each on all. (Hegel, 1945, pp. 129-130) 
 
This ‘complex interdependence’ indicates to us that the individual has reached a point of understanding of the 
absolute nature of its own existence, as both finite and infinite. Autonomy is limited in that its essential nature 
involves the recognition of the autonomy and existence of a rational Other and, at the same time, through this 
relationship, its infinite nature is revealed; the autonomy of the other establishes the infinite nature of its 
existence as this mediation. In this manner, Hegel’s dialectic has seemingly overcome the apparent paradox of 
Identity as Identity and Identity as non-Identity.  Identity is established as existing as both Identity (the ‘I’ and 
the ‘Other’ as essentially the same) and as non-Identity (the ‘I’ and ‘Other’ being essentially different). It is 
here where Identity for Hegel is revealed as absolute; the Identity of the ‘I’ is contained both within the 
recognition of the non-Identity of the I and the Other, and at the same time, through recognition, the Identity 
of the I and the Other as rational free individuals. Both say to each other; “we are the same you and I, because 
we recognize each other as different”. Hegel’s dialectic could be summarized somewhat over-simply with the 
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dictum “We think, and thus I am”, and it is this dialectic of recognition that Hegel uses to escape from the 
regressive circle of consciousness that results from a separation of the I from the world. This method is, in 
effect, Hegel’s reply to the Transcendental Idealism of Kant and Fichte, where he uses the recognition of the 
Other to overcome the charge of nihilism5 that could be leveled against his predecessors without having to 
resort to some kind of faculty of intuition to bridge the apparent disparity between the ‘I’ and the world (for 
the subject already is this bridge, as mediation between the ‘I’ and the ‘world’). 
 
For Hegel, what is explicitly stated within his dialectic of recognition is a fundamental reserve to desire which 
is kept in check in order to allow for the recognition between the ‘I’ and Other. He has sought to illuminate 
through his dialectic a fundamental ‘communality’ to Being based upon the necessary recognition of individual 
consciousnesses with each other. It seeks to ensure the autonomy of the individual and overcome the regressive 
circle of consciousness that results from positing a self-conscious individual in opposition to the world. Hegel’s 
dialectic in this way brings the individual directly into the world as the world and indicates that the 
development and establishment of the self-consciousness of the rational ‘I’ necessarily results from its 
interaction with the world outside of its apparent limits. 
 
Restricted Mediation 
 
Hegel sought to show the essential nature of man as arising from a recognition of self-consciousness 
established through a necessary social interaction between two self-certain individuals. For Hegel, through the 
dialectical struggle, the two wrestle to elevate their own self-certainty to an understanding of the essential 
nature of their Being, which becomes apparent only through the mutual recognition of the ‘I’ and the ‘Other’.  
At the heart of the dialectic there is a requirement for a necessary reserve in the movement towards self-
consciousness of absolute being; only through a reserve that holds desire in check will the individual be able 
to elevate its understanding from the apparent self-certainty of its own existence towards the absolute 
knowledge of its essential nature as being as both the ‘I’ and the not ‘I’.  This for Hegel only becomes apparent 
                                                 
5 Nihilism here as, for Hegel, the self-conscious individual recognising the other is an ethical creature, and as such, a 
philosophy divorced from such a fundamental relation between the I and Other would be one which the solipsism of the 
isolated individual results in an un-ethical existence. 
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when the ‘I’ restricts its own desire to afford the other individual the same free autonomy it was seeking to 
establish for itself. It was previously acknowledged that in the moment of the life and death struggle between 
the Lord and the Bondsman, the Lord was willing to go further and risk more than the Bondsman. What 
however is not stated but implied is that whilst willing to go further, the question as to whether he would be 
willing to risk everything to the point of self-destruction is not tackled. We can assume that as the Lord also 
wishes to establish the essential truth of its self-certainty it would, like the Bondsman, only risk itself up to a 
point; it would not risk itself to the point of destruction, as the drive towards self-preservation is a necessary 
aspect of the mediated subject. Without this reserve, the self-certain subject would be unable to reach the point 
at which its subjectivity as mediation could be revealed. 
 
As we have seen implied, for Hegel this movement is involuntary and necessarily occurs as the individual, 
unable to conquer its object (due to it necessarily requiring the other for its recognition), effectively enters into 
an economy of equivalent exchange with the Other. “I recognize you as you recognize me”, the one says to 
the other, “and I you also” comes the reply.  In this moment they realized their worst nightmare, they needed 
each other but wanted the other dead. The reserve and safeguard against loss that is used by Hegel’s subject in 
order to guarantee his own independence, to prevent its loss in the life and death struggle towards recognition, 
necessarily eliminates a sphere of activity from incorporation into the greater understanding of the ‘essence’ 
of Being.  As we have seen, in the movement towards recognition, the individual’s desire to elevate its self-
certainty to Truth requires both the reserve against total loss of the self-certain ‘I’ and also the holding back 
from total annihilation of the ‘Other’ - that object of its perception - in order to establish the mutual recognition 
that for Hegel reveals the essence of Being in all its communal beauty. 
 
Shown to us in this way is a fundamental reserve in the formation of self-consciousness; in order to reveal 
itself as mediation, the ‘I’ is forced to recognize the ‘Other’ as essentially the same as itself. Neither can exceed 
the other, both participants have to ensure that they are equal if they are to give and receive the recognition 
required to reveal its essential Being.  Throughout the movement, there is only a semblance of risk; a calculated 
dance between them, where in order to establish their subjectivity neither participant can break the rules of the 
game. 
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In this way the movement of desire is revealed as being part of the dialectical movement towards the 
establishment of the absolute knowledge of being.  Desire is a fundamental part of the journey of the ‘I’ towards 
knowledge of itself and it is desire held in check, both on the part of the ‘I’ and the ‘Other’, that enables the 
establishment of absolute knowledge as recognized self-consciousness.  Yet for us, if we ponder for a moment 
the way in which desire manifests itself in the world, there may be certain situations which seem to present 
themselves as a direct challenge to the restricted relationship between individuals, and serve to question the 
hierarchy of Being that Hegel brings into play through his dialectic. 
 
What we must keep in mind is that Hegel’s dialectic should not be misconstrued as an exposition of how the 
‘I’ becomes conscious of itself as an absolute relation, but is used in order to show how, through reason, we 
can overcome the apparent incongruities between reason and the world and bring to light the absolute self-
consciousness of Spirit (self-consciousness through recognition) that man already is.  In other words, the 
phenomenological analysis that Hegel submits the ‘I’ to is carried out in order to illuminate not how man comes 
to ‘be’ but rather to elucidate, through the dialectical movement, an understanding of the absolute knowledge 
of man as his relation to the world. 
 
Now, as just mentioned, Hegel’s dialectic is used to explicate through reason an understanding of how man 
already is absolute knowledge. Hegel’s thoughts upon the development of humanity and self-consciousness 
must be viewed in this light, and it would be a mistake to misconstrue Hegel’s analysis on the dialectical 
development of the understanding of 'spirit' as a metaphysic based in a chronological development.  Man for 
Hegel is already in the position in which the absolute knowledge of his relative nature can be revealed through 
reason.  His faculty for understanding his position develops through the dialectical movement, but the position 
towards which understanding seeks illumination is always already there.  Man is always a restricted relational 
consciousness, and it is only through the faculty of dialectical reason that this becomes incorporated into the 
understanding as self-consciousness.  Being always is as it is, being by its very nature absolute, and it is only 
the Knowledge of the Truth of this Being that develops through Hegel’s dialectic. We should note that it is 
through the knowledge of this Truth that the ‘ethical disposition’ is created in man, compelling him to “make 
oneself a member of one of the moments of civil society by one’s own act, through one’s energy, industry, and 
skill, to maintain oneself in this position, and to fend for oneself only through this process of mediating oneself 
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with the universal, while in this way gaining recognition both in one’s own eyes and in the eye’s of others.” 
(Hegel, 1945, p. 133) 
 
Mediation is the watch-word of Hegelian philosophy, where the grounding of his entire thought, formed within 
the Phenomenology, is created through the mediation of the contradiction between the identity of the ‘I’ and 
the ‘Other’ and their apparent non-Identity.  It is revealed that the ‘subject’ is no longer typified as a distinct 
entity, it is no longer simple subsistence, but is in fact illuminated as a knowledge which results from the 
dialectical mediation of this contradiction.  The subject is no longer the subject ‘in itself’, nor simply ‘for 
itself’; in the movement between the master and slave the subject is revealed as a point of mediation during 
the process of movement that it itself is. Nancy indicates this to us in his seminal Hegel: The Restlessness of 
the Negative when he states: 
It is thus that the subject is, and nothing other than the act of going into movement as the movement of 
this being-affected and this passing-into-the-other. ‘A being which is capable of enduring its own 
contradiction is a “subject”, this constitutes its infinitude’. (2002, p. 42) 
 
The subject is formed at a given point as a manifestation into sense (knowledge) of the movement of the 
dialectic that it itself is, coming into knowledge through the understanding of its own being-affected by and as 
the Other. This subject proves itself as the continuous mediation between the seemingly contradictory logical 
possibilities that make up man, and the subject as such is revealed as only a momentary respite, a conciliatory 
moment in the movement of the dialectic. The subject is thus shown to be a moment of reserve, a fragile 
balance, where the conflicting drives towards self-certainty and self-preservation (typified by the Lord and the 
Bondsman) are revealed as aspects of a continuing movement between the I and the Other. In this way, the 
subject is revealed not as a distinct substance, as either the originator of or the result of its interaction with the 
world, but as the moment of knowledge of mediation. The absolute, when brought into knowledge as being, 
is revealed as the moment of conciliation, the mediation of conflict and the amalgamation of these desires into 
and as the subject. Nancy tells us: 
Sense is not ‘the meaning of being’, as if it were a property of being, or an ideal signification floating 
above it, more or less perceptible to the minds of men.  Sense is being as sense, being torn away from 
subsistence and away from fixed determination, and it is the appropriation of being by the subject, as 
subject… the restlessness of the negative is the agitation, the tension, the pain and the joy of this 
appropriation. (2002, p. 50). 
 
As we can see, in the mediation which is revealed as the manifestation of the subject, there is involved a 
restriction, mediation itself requiring the temperance of the apparently contradictory elements in order to 
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establish its ‘unity’ (however fleeting or momentary this proves to be). This restriction, when elevated to the 
level of the truth of the subject, is made manifest as mediation of conflict, and as a result becomes the 
problematic and also the terrifying power of the Hegelian Dialectic. The subject as mediation, when called into 
question by the idea of un-knowable excess, opens up a space in which the subject as restrictive mediation is 
brought into question, but, in tackling this excess through the syntax of language and attempting to bring this 
challenge into discourse, the only thing that escapes is a stifled scream, a rebellion against the suffocating logic 
of the subject as restrictive mediation. It is here that a further problem arises; if the subject always is this 
mediation, what happens if we seem to uncover a moment of existence without reserve? 
 
In order to tackle this question we will need to turn to Bataille's encounter with Nietzsche. We must, however, 
hold in our minds the notion that Hegel makes present in his Dialectic; that the subject, the 'I', is always a 
manifest knowledge of the mediated relation that is itself. It is counter to Hegel's suffocating logic that 
Nietzsche enters as a defiant scream against the dialectic: 
Knowledge is in no way distinct from me: I am it, it is the existence which I am.  But this existence is 
not reducible to it; this reduction would require that the known be the aim of existence and not existence 
the aim of the known. (Bataille, 1988b, p. 110) 
 
Nietzsche becomes present for us in this dialogue at the point of the 'completion' of the Hegelian dialectic, 
where the development of the self-conscious subject (as absolute knowledge) becomes manifest as man's 
existence.  However, what Bataille wants to tackle is the nature of human experience following this revelation 
where, at the close of the system, as knowledge and existence converge (being absolute, there is perfected 
symmetry between the knowledge of existence and existence as it is), existence as such, in all its meandering 
movements, reveals the limitations of Hegel's dialectic (Hegel's subject becomes abstract following the 
establishment of the absolute subject, for the absolute knowledge that is the subject is effectively a truth 
abstracted from life). Bataille will find the apparent counterfoil to Hegel in the Nietzschean 'Death of God', 
and the revelation that this shows of the apparent insufficiency of any absolute. 
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1.3: Killing God 
 
Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’, as we have intimated, is intended not as a simple atheistic rejection of the 
personified God of theology. Indeed, Nietzsche was not the first to reject God but, for Bataille, his notion of 
the impact of this attack upon the foundations of a self-assured identity proves devastating. The impact of the 
'Death of God' is illuminated perhaps best in Nietzsche's writing in his Gay Science, in the section entitled 'The 
Madman'.  The scene centres on this 'madman' careering around a marketplace berating all he meets with 
desperate shrieks, imploring them to bear witness to his proclamation of the murder of God.  In this passage, 
the focus of the parable is not a critique of a theistic belief in God, but in truth is, as Land identifies1, an 
illumination of the gravity of the crime that has been committed by our consignment of the idea of God to the 
scrap heap: “'Where is God?' he cried; 'I'll tell you! We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers.” 
(Nietzsche, 2001, pp. 119-20).  Now, it is important for us here not to confuse the madman's ramblings with 
those of one racked with guilt (those of the ravings of a man who, having broken a moral imperative, has been 
driven out of his wits). Instead, we need to recognise that what has driven the man mad is the effect that the 
death of God has had upon his Identity.  As such, we need to examine what the image of God represents in this 
section and what it is about this murder that causes the man to descend into madness. What will become 
apparent is that in Nietzsche, Bataille found a teaching which embodied “the most violent of solvents” 
(Bataille, 2004, p. xxi), a solvent which drives man to 'madness': 
How were we able to drink up the sea?  Who gave us this sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?  What 
were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is it moving now? Where are we 
moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, 
in all directions... Do we still smell nothing of the divine decomposition? – Gods, too, decompose, God 
is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him.  (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 120) 
Nietzsche’s Madman, in announcing the death of God, is alluding to the impact that the death of the absolute 
as a concept has in general.  If we recall the rise of the Olympian edifice in his Birth of Tragedy, we note how 
the Apollonian dream-world was created in response to the swelling meaninglessness threatening man so as 
to; “afford him an interpretation of life, and it is by these processes that he trains himself for life” (1995, p. 2). 
It is in this sense, of God as “guarantor of the good” (Land, 1992, p. 59), that Nietzsche is proclaiming deicide. 
                                                 
1 Land notes that the ‘Death of God’ as conceived of by both Bataille and Nietzsche is perceived as a criminal act: 
“Amongst the diseases that Bataille shares with Nietzsche is the insistence that the death of God is not an epistemic 
conviction, but a crime” (1992, p. 63) 
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God serves to be the figurehead for the absolute, and we can infer that any absolute, such as an absolute good 
or law of morality, the divinity of man in atheistic socialism, or the state or nation in fervent nationalism, share 
too these aspects of the divine illustrated in the figure of the theistic God.  What this absolute indicates is the 
ultimate and unchanging frame of reference in which a given system of thought or ‘world-view’ finds its locus 
and foundation.  For instance, in the Christian faith, the eternal and infinite good of God is the guarantor of the 
Christian ethical conception of existence, and it is without God as frame of reference, that this system flounders 
without the premise of its ‘world-view’.  The ethical command to do good with a view to either cleansing the 
soul of sin or of ensuring access to an afterlife in heaven, without God, as the judge and guarantee of their 
being an afterlife, finds its premise to have been uprooted. Bataille indicates the impact of this deicide as 
follows: 
The atheist is satisfied with a world completed without God; the one who sacrifices is, on the contrary, 
in anguish before an incompleted world, incompletable and forever unintelligible, which destroys him, 
tears him apart (and this world destroys itself, tears itself apart) (1988b, p. 153) 
However, this is not a problem that is exclusive to the theistic conception of God, and it is by extrapolating 
this impact and applying it to existence in general that we will see how the proclamation ‘God is Dead’ becomes 
a solvent in which Bataille struggled with his own impression of man.  It is not a question of killing 'God' to 
raise another, for as Bataille indicates, the 'atheist is satisfied with a world completed without God'. 
  
Without the horizon of 'God' as the frame of reference (as the “the ideal instrument of human reactivity, the 
numbingly anti-experimental principle of utilitarian calculus” (Land, 1992, p. 59)), then a fixed or restricted 
Identity - such as in Hegel’s Phenomenology – loses the basis from which its Identity is constructed.  For 
Nietzsche, this destruction of guarantee for identity is a herald of madness, it destroys the fragile construction 
around which a false identity is produced (we will tackle this statement in more detail in Part 2) and reveals 
for Nietzsche a ‘poly-theistic’ aspect to humanity in opposition to a ‘mono-theistic’ conception that he sees as 
supporting a restricted identity.   Now, as we have seen, this restricted identity finds itself for Bataille illustrated 
par excellence in the construction of the Hegelian ‘Absolute Knowledge’ and it is through analysis of the 
impact of the deicide on this conception that we will perhaps see more clearly the basis from which Bataille 
presented his 'impression' of man. 
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As noted, the basis of the Hegelian conception of man rests upon his identification of the necessity for 
recognition that arises from the ‘I’ and its attempt to establish its self-certain autonomy.  In this analysis, what 
is discovered is that man is always enmeshed within an economy of being whose frame of reference for the 
establishment of Identity rests upon the relationship of recognition that exists between the ‘I’ and the 
‘Other’.  This relationship of recognition forms the absolute basis for Identity, and indeed it is the identification 
of this relationship that forms its fundamental locus. As such, being the basis of the ‘I’, this recognition which 
proves the fundamental grounding of man in social existence (for Hegel, man is never anything but social) is 
extrapolated outwards from the individual relationship between ‘I’ and ‘Other’ to society at large.  Recognition 
becomes the absolute by which ethics, law, politics and all society finds its metaphysical basis (as we have 
seen, it is the need for recognition for Hegel that proves the basis of ethical and social life as laid out in his 
Philosophy of Right).  The concepts of right and wrong, true and false, are all then judged against the referent 
of the absolute, and it is in the shadow of this absolute that desires; animal, sexual and political are necessarily 
tempered in order to abide to the rules of Hegel’s economy of Identity. 
  
As previously intimated, it is through the intellectual faculties that this absolute comes into self-consciousness, 
where through the process of Dialectical advancement, the ‘I’ overcomes the apparent towards an 
understanding of the true nature of recognition as the absolute.  Similarly, any posited absolute, whether 
Hegelian, Christian, Marxist or Fascist, proclaims the primacy of a given apprehension or aspect of existence 
(its Truth) to the exclusion of other aspects which (depending upon the grounding of a particular system), 
precluding their validity, often consider them base, perverted or plain evil.  It is the equivalence of what has 
been deemed true, right, or good with what has been deduced through the intellectual faculties (phenomenal, 
rational or empirical amongst others) that is the ‘God’ that is murdered by us all in Nietzsche’s ‘madman’, the 
‘sponge’ being the deicide and the restricted identification of what Nietzsche essentially claims as a falsity – 
that of the True – being the ‘entire horizon’ wiped clean in murder. 
  
57 
 
What Nietzsche is rejecting in his ‘Madman’ is a conception of man which finds in its basis some absolute by 
which existence is put to task, made to line up against the judging post of Truth and, for those that do not 
measure up, are rejected as not forming part of man’s true nature or existence. Pierre Klossowski reminds us 
of the pitfalls of equating that which has risen to knowledge within consciousness to Truth when he writes; 
“since only the last scenes of reconciliation and the final accounting at the end of this long process rise to our 
consciousness, we suppose that intelligence must be something conciliatory, just, and good – something that 
stands essentially opposed to the instincts, while it is actually nothing but a certain behaviour of the instincts 
towards one another” (2007, p. 107).  For Nietzsche, it is these ‘last scenes’ and the ‘final accounting’ that 
creates a fixed consciousness in opposition to the free play of forces that constitute human existence, and it is 
in the shadow of Hegel that he is thinking this, where the ‘knowledge’ that arises from this conciliatory 
movement is framed by the need for recognition between men.  Nietzsche states: 
My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as an individual but rather 
to the community and herd-aspects of his nature; that accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation 
to its usefulness to community or herd; and that consequently each of us, even with the best will in the 
world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, ‘to know ourselves’, will always bring to 
consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is ‘non-individual’, that which is ‘average’. (2001, p. 
213) 
 
Poor Man’s Consciousness 
 
If we recall Hegel’s movement of the individual in the Phenomenology we will note that the desires and actions 
of the individual are tempered by the existence of and need for recognition from the Other.  From this restriction 
arise morality, politics and all social interaction that is considered ‘true’ (true as it is based in an understanding 
of the absolute) Yet potentially, to extend to knowledge the insights that arise from this restricted Identity 
serves only to undermine the heterogeneous aspects of existence which are explicitly restricted or rejected in 
a system such as this (such as the erotic or an excessively violent desire for power). For Nietzsche this operation 
of generalisation serves to illuminate the false truth that is ascribed to the absolute; it being universally absolute 
at the expense of individual excess. Existence’s ‘absolute’ is obtained through a movement that produces a 
truth based in the lowest common denominator; for what is absolute for one has to be, to retain its attribute of 
universality, shared in common with the other. Within this moment, an opposition emerges, not between subject 
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and object, or freedom and autonomy, but between the absolute as average, and existence that is excessive: 
At bottom, all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, 
there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they no longer seem to be… This 
is what I consider to be the true phenomenalism and perspectivism: that due to the nature of animal 
consciousness, the world of which we are conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world turned 
into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator, that everything which enters 
consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all 
becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and 
generalization. (Nietzsche, 2001, pp. 213-4)2 
Identity formed in the shadow of the absolute, or indeed, as the absolute, arises from the exclusion of certain 
aspects owing to their nature as contradictory to a given system; the kind of Identity that arises for Nietzsche 
in this situation can be termed monotheistic.  For in the shadow of an absolute, the ‘boundlessly individual’ is 
reduced through ‘corruption’ to produce an Identity that is general, average and superficial. For Nietzsche, 
Identity formed in this way is monotheistic due to its orientation towards a truth or an apprehension of 
existence, an orientation which, in the light of its absolute becomes orientated towards this given; life sets itself 
a goal or a truth from which its value is gained and Identity, through the process of its relation to its absolute, 
sheds the aspects of its existence which are deemed contradictory or conflicting with its conception of Truth.  In 
the shadow of the absolute, life itself becomes accountable to a singular conception of existence or Truth, and 
life, actions and meaning gain or lose their value in accordance to the economic accounting that takes place in 
its formation.  For Nietzsche, at the point that life as will is translated into consciousness through language, 
the essential individuality that is an individuals Will becomes lost, distorted in the establishment of the 
relational movements of language and, in its drive to be communicable, existence is reduced to the lowest 
common denominator through the necessary constraints imposed through language. 
  
This calculation, which Nietzsche criticizes, is the same issue that Bataille takes with Hegel. It is the 
accountability (the calculation that is involved in a monotheistic conception of Identity for Nietzsche, and the 
equation of knowledge of the absolute as existence for Bataille) that, when faced with life as excess, finds 
itself caught short against existence which exceeds the possibility of accumulation into the system of absolute 
                                                 
2 This comment is reminiscent of Dostoyevsky’s ‘Underground Man’ who states: “All the same, I’m firmly convinced 
that not only a great deal of consciousness but even any amount of consciousness is a disease” (Dostoyevsky, 2009, pp. 
6-7) 
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knowledge.  The problem that Bataille is grappling with is not to try to uncover the true nature of man and 
gain knowledge of what he essentially is (as if there were aspects to him which were not true, or actions which 
held a merely phantasmal quality to be excised in the cold light of knowledge), but instead to try to evoke in 
language “The problem of the whole human being” (Bataille, 2004, p. xxii). 
An individual’s limit is not represented simply by the rights of another individual but even more by the 
rights of the masses. We are all inextricably bound up with the masses, participating in their innermost 
sufferings and their victories.  And in our innermost being, we form part of a living group – though we 
are no less alone, for all that, when things go wrong. (Bataille, 2004, p. xxii) 
Entirety exists within me as exuberance. (Bataille, 2004, p. xxiv) 
Bataille’s On Nietzsche is a meditation on the personal experience of life lived through the Nietzschean ‘Death 
of God’. It seeks to elucidate the impact that the destruction of the absolute has on Identity, with moments of 
exuberance having a fortuitous impact through chance moments of ecstasy.  These moments find themselves 
placed in opposition to a restricted Identity formed through action (for example, as in Hegel’s Phenomenology), 
which although founded on the illusion of the harmonious individual, is unable to be permanently overcome 
by the chance moments of excess.  
 
We will focus here on the second chapter in On Nietzsche, in which we find the central theoretical discussion 
of the tension in humanity that reveals an inconsistency at the heart of ‘being’. Bataille lays the ground of his 
investigation when he states: “Good is given first as the good of the individual.  Evil seems to be a bias that 
obviously acts against this or that given individual.  Possibly, good is respect for individuals and evil their 
violation.” (2004, p. 15) Bataille is taking the general moral view of existence – similar to that of Hegel - 
where the absolute (the good) is aligned with recognition (respect) for the Other.  However, through recourse 
to Nietzsche and the death of the absolute, Bataille will re-evaluate the meaning of evil which in turn opens 
the possibility for the positing of his idea of a summit morality in contrast to a morality of decline. 
 
Like Nietzsche before him, Bataille recognised that within the general conception of good and evil (whatever 
the parameters) grounded in the idea of an absolute, there is a general contempt for the individual, with an 
antinomy arising through this conception. He states; “On the contrary, good relates to having contempt for the 
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interest of beings in themselves. According to this secondary conception (secondary, though remaining part of 
the totality of emotions) evil would be the existence of individuals – insofar as this implies their separation.” 
(2004, p. 15)  Like Nietzsche however, he does not want to merely oppose a social conception of existence 
which gives primacy to others, with a conception which places the individual as the sovereign in a competing 
system.  This would be unsatisfactory for it would be merely to topple one God with an eye to crowning 
another, to replace the absolute responsibility for the Other with the sovereignty of the individual, and as such 
would exclude the recognition that in man there is a social aspect to his existence. ‘We are all inextricably 
bound up with the masses’ Bataille reminds us, and it is the inconsistency in existence that he wishes to examine 
further. We are, for Bataille both, ‘incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual’ but, 
at the same time, we cannot escape that generalization, that ‘herd-mark’ which is also fundamental to our 
nature as human beings. 
 
For Bataille, his notion of summit morality and the morality of decline are both marks of “humanness taken as 
a whole”, a humanity marked specifically by its “inconsistency” (2004, p. xxvii).  This inconsistency makes 
itself manifest for Bataille as a desire for totality and for loss, both paradoxically linked as aspects of individual 
existence, but although present within life necessarily, are not involved in a relationally contradictory existence 
with one another. 
 
Now, in looking at the way in which Bataille outlines his 'summit morality' and his 'morality of decline', we 
will see how through this conception Nietzsche and Hegel are made manifest as conflict within his thought.  
We will see that it is not a case of simple opposition or synthesis of the two in a more 'complete' composition.  
For Bataille the two necessarily coexist with each other whilst cancelling each other out, where the desire for 
totality will inevitably lead to the loss of totality at the summit, and yet, following this loss of self, the desire 
to understand and reduce this transgression to knowledge remains strong; “The summit isn't 'what we ought to 
reach'; nor is decline 'what ought to be done away with.' Just as in the last analysis the summit is simply 
inaccessible, from the start, decline is inevitable.” (Bataille, 2004, p. 39)  
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1.4: Summit and Decline 
The summit corresponds to excess, to an exuberance of forces. It brings about a maximum of tragic 
intensity.  It relates to measureless expenditures of energy and is a violation of the integrity of individual 
beings. It is thus closer to evil than to good. The decline – corresponding to moments of exhaustion and 
fatigue – gives all value to concerns for preserving and enriching the individual. From it come rules of 
morality. (Bataille, 2004, p. 17) 
The 'summit' for Bataille is the moment at which an individual risks itself, where the integrity of the separate 
human being is pitted against the chance of total loss in a moment of expenditure.  This moment for Bataille 
allows individuals to be brought to the limit of their individual existence in the face “of death and nothingness.” 
(Bataille, 2004, p. 19) For Bataille, this summit is only encountered through chance, and comes about from an 
excess of energy which leads the 'subject' to and beyond the limit of its own subjectivity – the moment that 
illuminates this par excellence being the sacrificial or erotic moment.  This he contrasts with a morality of 
decline, in which the 'morality' is not one based upon the foundations of some rational or empirical imperative, 
but is in fact, for Bataille, a 'morality' that arises from exhaustion. As the individual expends energy, he finds 
himself outstripped (as in the erotic moment, the exuberant movement of bodies can only sustain itself to a 
point; at the zenith of the movement comes an explosion and with it, exhaustion, decline, rest, sleep) and must 
subordinate his desire for the future preservation of his existence.  This decline Bataille sees as inevitable for, 
when brought to the limit of its own possibilities through chance excess, the individual exhausts itself, 
following which the concern for 'preserving and enriching the individual' is restored. 
 
Driving Bataille's thoughts on the Summit and Decline is a complex 'corruption' of the thought of Nietzsche 
and Hegel.  In the movement between Summit and Decline we see elements of the Hegelian Master/Slave 
dialectic and Nietzsche's critique of 'consciousness' combine in such a way as to highlight the interdependence 
of Hegelian ‘communality’ and Nietzschean rebellion within the ‘whole human being’.  Bataille uses the 
phenomenon of 'communication' to portray this complex interdependence, stating that within man there exists 
a necessity to 'communicate' with the Other outside of the limits of individual integrity. Bataille notes: 
Being under the necessity to communicate, they're compelled to will 'evil' and defilement, which by 
risking the being within them, renders them mutually penetrable to each other. (2004, p. 25) 
For Bataille, the term 'evil' does not refer to the transgression of a set moral code nor implies that the actions 
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are necessarily 'harmful' in the way that the term evil would normally suggest.  As with many of his concepts, 
he intentionally uses one laden with a pejorative edge, whilst simultaneously attempting to strip this term of 
its moralising connotations.  For Bataille, 'evil' is indicative of an intentional 'wounding' of the integrity of 
another individual in the movement to communicate outside of the integrity of the isolated individual. He 
states: “'Communication' cannot proceed from one full and intact individual to another.  It requires individuals 
whose separate existence is risked, placed at the limit of death and nothingness; the moral summit is the 
moment of risk taking, it is a being suspended in the beyond of oneself.” (2004, p. 19)   
 
If we recall Hegel's Master, we will see a correlation between the way the master needs to exceed the limits of 
his own self-certainty (to attempt to establish the absolute nature of his being he must encounter the other and 
make him his slave) and Bataille's notions of communication and evil.  As we have seen, within this process a 
necessary risk is involved in which the master and the eventual slave engage in a life/death struggle to bring 
their own self-certainty to absolute knowledge. Now while Hegel's master must do this in order to elevate its 
own self-certainty, Bataille is already coming from the position in which the 'absolute relation' of self-
consciousness has been established.  For Bataille, the risk involved in the relation between master and slave 
and its overcoming in the absolute is not the end of the movement of risk.  For Bataille, as can be seen in his 
‘The Notion of Expenditure’1, there will always be an oscillation between excesses of and conservation of 
energy without end, and it is this which drives him to posit that there will be a constant desire to 'communicate' 
between individuals which necessarily involves risk.  Now this constant fluctuation for Bataille necessitates 
evil due to the fact that the desire to communicate involves a transgression of the integrity of the 'absolute self-
consciousness', in which, akin to the master and slave, the 'I' and the 'Other' will need to pierce the individual 
integrity of one another.   
 
                                                 
1 Bataille states: “Human activity is not entirely reducible to processes of production and conservation, and consumption 
must be divided into two distinct parts.  The first, reducible part is represented by the use of the minimum necessary for 
the conservation of life and the continuation of individuals’ productive activity in a given society; it is therefore a question 
simply of the fundamental condition of productive activity.  The second part is represented by so-called unproductive 
expenditures; luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse 
sexually activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality) – all these represent activities which, at least in primitive 
circumstances, have no end beyond themselves.” (Bataille, 1985c) 
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Could this however be construed as a revised version of Hegelianism? Is this transgression as part of the desire 
to communicate just another element within the establishment of the 'absolute relation' of the 'I' and the 'Other'? 
Could communication in this way be incorporated as part of the developmental phase of the dialectic of 
mediation?  Bataille, in order to address these questions, where risk would be ultimately reducible to the 
establishment of the 'absolute', places into the equation the idea of 'consent'.  This is so for as we will recall, 
the idea of consent only appears in the dialectic at the moment of reconciliation, where the master had to 
acknowledge regretfully the autonomy of the Other in the need to establish his own. Bataille instead is 
indicating that in the movement towards communication, a consensual willing to risk takes place, in which 
caution is abandoned in order to attempt to bridge the gap between the restricted 'I' and 'Other': 
But these burning trajectories only replace isolated humanness if there's some consent, if not to 
annihilation, then to risking yourself and, in the same impulse, risking other people. All 'communication' 
participates in suicide, in crime. Lethal horror goes with it, and disgust is its sign. And in such a light, 
evil appears – as a life source! By destroying the integrity of existence within myself and in others, I 
open myself to communion – I attain a moral summit.  And the summit isn't a submission to but a willing 
of evil.  It is a voluntary pact with sin, crime, and evil. A pact made with a relentless fate that requires 
that while some live, others die. (Bataille, 2004, p. 26) 
Now, we must not confuse the notion of 'consent' given here with that of a self-conscious decision to risk 
oneself, that is, a calculated decision in which a risk is taken following the weighing of the pro's and con's 
before the transgression.  If we recall Nietzsche at this point, we will see how Bataille inherited his belief that 
under the assured self-consciousness of identity there exists a swelling undercurrent of willing from which 
arises only a residue into consciousness.  This 'consensual' movement towards risk has, for Bataille, more in 
common with the idea of expenditure he expresses elsewhere, where the risk is one that is driven by an 
unconscious willing and forms a necessary part of the existence of the 'whole human being'. Bataille in this 
way sees the risk and the drive to communicate as momentary excesses or expenditures which are not a product 
of self-consciousness, but instead indicative for him of the moment of sacrifice that is encountered through 
chance; it is unconsciously willed, arises from an excess of energy, and will inevitably lead to exhaustion and 
the morality of decline. 
The Antique Wardrobe 
I will now turn to Bataille's treatment of the notion of sacrifice within excess as exhibited in his Story of the 
Eye where, within the character of Marcelle, we will see writ large the relationship that occurs between 
expenditure and conservation, excess and exhaustion, the summit and the decline. 
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And all at once, something incredible happened, a strange swish of water, followed by a trickle and a 
stream from under the wardrobe door: poor Marcelle was pissing in her wardrobe while masturbating. 
(Bataille, 2001a, p. 17) 
Poor Marcelle indeed, for she was the ‘purest and most affecting’ of the protagonist’s associates in Bataille’s 
‘Story of the Eye’, a girl who, when caught in a swirling orgy of chilled champagne, dancing and 
licentiousness, owing to her ‘unusual lack of willpower’ was overcome by her carnal urges. Once the descent 
into sensuality occurs (heralded by the character Simone’s request to a boy to “piss on my cunt” (2001a, p. 
16)), she is caught in a whirlwind of anguished sexuality in which she debases herself in a wardrobe.  Marcelle, 
defined by her purity, finds herself in the face of her own evil that comes from within; the sexual urges serve 
to destroy her ‘pure’ identity and her ensuing descent into madness illustrates the impact of the erotic summit 
in tension with the inevitable morality of decline. 
 
In the chapter titled ‘The Antique Wardrobe’ we see a group of 'libertines' engage in a frenzied orgy of 
bewildered sexuality, and through this Bataille attempts to illustrate that within the rising erotic delirium, the 
arbitrary distinctions between the participants are ruptured through the ‘wound’ of their sexuality; their 
everyday existence becoming lost in a “debauche of tumbling bodies, lofty legs and arses, wet skirts and come” 
and a “brutal onslaught on cunts and cocks” (2001a, p. 17). 
  
Now the turmoil in which Marcelle is engulfed is indicative of the destruction of the ‘restricted’ identity which 
cannot assimilate this violent desire (a desire which destroys) into itself. In surrendering to her 'animal' desires 
we see Marcelle’s identity ruptured (her ‘identity’ being defined by her piety and morality), unable to come to 
terms with that which came almost from under her, was of her, and yet wounded the integrity of her identity 
as she was conscious of it. Marcelle attempts to contain the dual transgression of public sexuality and 
excremental loosing; she shuts herself in that ageing wardrobe in an attempt to hide her defilement. Yet, the 
trickle of water and her audible masturbation betrays to those present the laceration that she is subject to, and 
we see Bataille portraying this destruction through the sobs emanating from this “makeshift pissoir that was 
now her prison.” (2001a, p. 17)  Whilst she is alone she is able to shut out the world from viewing her but, 
once she is let out from her prison, she is revealed in all her nakedness (that is her ‘Being’ as it is in its excess 
and defilement) and, when confronted with her associates in indecency, finally loses her grip on stability to 
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which she clung to so desperately:  
Marcelle, staggering wildly across the room with shrieks and snarls, looked at me again. She flinched 
back as though I were a hideous ghost in a nightmare, and she collapsed in a jeremiad of howls that 
grew more and more inhuman. 
  
And yet, what an atrocity!  It seemed as if nothing could terminate the tragicomical frenzy of these 
lunatics, for Marcelle, still naked, kept gesticulating, and her agonising shrieks of pain expressed 
unbearable terror and moral suffering; we watched her bite her mother’s face amid arms vainly trying 
to subdue her. (2001a, p. 18) 
  
This orgy of sexual violence presents a rupture of the order of utility through a summit of exuberance. There 
is no usefulness here; indeed the participants lost all reserve at the moment when Simone, after removing a 
boy's trousers, proceeds to remove his shirt “to keep him from looking ridiculous” (2001a, p. 16). The shedding 
of clothes appears symbolic of a destruction of order; in becoming naked, the participants are undertaking an 
overturning of imposed ‘servility’ and ‘work’ and giving free reign to their animal urges.   This erotic desire 
for the Other necessarily involves letting loose evil desires for debasement and defilement, ‘evil’ here in the 
sense that they do harm to the integrity of the self-conscious Identity.  The expulsion of fluid and energy in the 
orgasm, coupled with the frenzy of the participants, announces the departure of morality, the departure of 
reserve.  It is a moment of expenditure in which the concern for the future which typifies moral existence is 
led to its own destruction and is subject to “an experience or event, of negation of limits” (Guerlac, 1990, p. 
92) by the object of its desire.  The fleeting moment that passes without concern for itself, the moment at which 
existence is exceeding itself, is unable to be subdued. The animal cries of pleasure that accompany this moment 
as its tortured overture, signal the rupture in existence in which desire has followed an object that has led itself 
to shipwreck, plotting a course to an excess without reserve. 
 
As the desire which outstrips the subject, with no future goal or end to its movement other than expenditure of 
energy, the subject caught in erotic desire momentarily revels in their crime, the different participants engaging 
each other through their evil desires. These desires are ‘evil’ in the traditional sense to the extent that they run 
counter to the established morality; excess and sexual licentiousness are seen at the least as 'a bit of fun' 
(excised from the true world of work and life), and at worst, base, reprehensible, and at times, harmful to 
human beings and society. It is apparent that sexual desire forms an inescapable part of the whole human being, 
66 
 
and whilst individuals may not indulge to the same extent as those in Bataille's 'Story of the Eye', it will be 
difficult to deny that sexual desire itself forms part of the makeup of the human story; to ignore or to downplay 
the importance of this aspect of existence is to ignore the fundamental place that this summit of desire occupies 
within humanity. Bataille is opposing, in much the same way as Nietzsche in his critique of morality, the base 
aspects of existence against a conception of the essence of man that excludes or nullifies this aspect.  In On 
Nietzsche, Bataille draws parallels between sensuality and the crucifixion of Christ to bring to light the 
importance of evil in human existence.  He brings to our attention the fact that, in the crime that was the 
crucifixion, humanity and God communicated through the wound caused by the death of Christ.  God, in his 
perfection, is eternally wounded by the death of himself as his son, and human beings share or communicate 
in and through this wound with God and each other.  For Bataille, as we have seen, human beings are essentially 
'bound up with the masses', and what he gives as the basis for the relation between them is crime2: 
In the elevation upon a cross, humankind attains a summit of evil.  But it's exactly from having attained 
it that humanity ceases being separate from God. So clearly the 'communication' of human beings is 
guaranteed by evil.  Without evil, human existence would turn in upon itself, would be enclosed as a 
zone of independence: And indeed an absence of 'communication' – empty loneliness – would certainly 
be the greater evil. (2004, p. 18) 
 
This summit of 'evil' which leads to communication is illustrated in Story of the Eye when, following the 
debauchery of the initial orgy, the protagonist and Simone find themselves unable to indulge fully with each 
other without the presence of Marcelle. She becomes for them their Christ, her lacerated being becoming a 
corrupted image of the crucified, sacrificed son: “But we no longer thought it could be done without Marcelle, 
whose piercing cries kept grating on our ears, for they were linked to our most violent desires” (Bataille, 2001a, 
p. 21). The destruction of Marcelle, and the community felt by the protagonist and Simone with her, binds her 
tragic fate to theirs, sharing in her misery and destruction. Through the repeated recollection of the moment 
that bound them in crime they descend into a delirious existence: “Thus it was that our sexual dream kept 
changing into a nightmare” (Bataille, 2001a, p. 21).  Further on in the novella, following Marcelle's 
incarceration in a mental institution, the two libertines cannot fully explore their desires through their 
                                                 
2 This is reminiscent of Freud’s hypothesis in his Totem and Taboo of the binding power of crime.  Freud posits that 
human society originated through the primordial patricide of the father by his sons.  In conspiring to commit this murder, 
Freud argues that their complicity ensures that social cohesion is maintained through guilt: “Society was now based on 
complicity in the common crime; religion was based on the sense of guilt and the remorse attaching to it; while morality 
was based partly on the exigencies of the society and partly on the penance demanded by the sense of guilt” (Freud, 2007) 
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imaginings only, and as such are forced to go to Marcelle, find her, rescue her, and defile her and themselves 
in an act of destructive sensuality. Their first meeting with Marcelle following her incarceration finds her in 
the window of her cell, masturbating in tandem with Simone, the only distinction between the two being the 
contrasting colours of their meagre clothing; the 'pure' Marcelle “wearing a white belt and white stockings” 
with Simone, “wearing a black belt and black stockings”.  Both are contrasting mirrors of each other, face to 
face and “masturbating with terse, brusque gestures... nearly motionless, and tense, and their eyes gaped with 
unrestrained joy” (2001a, p. 27). Unable to reclaim Marcelle from her prison at the first attempt, the duo return 
later to try again (and this time succeed), but find her mind altered. The shock of the event that put her in the 
asylum has rent her mind and she is no longer aware of her surroundings, oblivious to Simone “pressing her 
lips to the cunt, which she greedily devoured.” (2001a, p. 39) Nevertheless, they bring her back to Marcelle's 
house, back to the scene of the debauch that led her to madness, and face to face with the cardinal. 
 
Caught by the Cardinal 
 
Poor Marcelle, unable to control her urges and yet unable to succumb fully to them, descends into a delirium 
of terror; her self-consciousness is shattered by her actions as she is unable to justify them yet cannot deny 
them either.  The result for her is a destruction of her sanity, she is dragged away and placed in an asylum, her 
grip on reality tentative, haunted by the ghost of her desires in the form of the ‘the Cardinal’.  In the 
protagonist’s attempt to reclaim Marcelle from the ‘Haunted Castle’ in which she was placed by her parents, 
we can see a device orchestrated by Bataille to show that the retreat into the castle of self-consciousness, 
protected from the diffusion announced by the erotic, will inevitably result in the erotic desire coming back to 
claim its ‘victim’. Unfortunately for Marcelle, the erotic does indeed return (in the form of the protagonists of 
the story) and, when confronted by the return of ‘the Cardinal’, what little grip she has left upon reality slips, 
she is unable to reconcile the erotic excess with her 'pure' identity, and ultimately hangs herself. 
 
In the character of Marcelle, we can see a direct illustration of the nature of the Summit and Decline, and we 
see that in this character, a co-existence is present between Hegel and Nietzsche as Bataille's writing.  It is the 
irresolvable tension that Marcelle exhibits, the violent rupture of self that arises from the direct conflict 
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between her unconscious erotic desires and her self-conscious identity, and the impossibility of reconciling the 
two contradictory aspects into a single harmonised self. The tension between the two is effectively the tension 
between the desire to assimilate all into identity and those phenomena which, being at odds with calculated 
consciousness, put this constructed identity at risk.  Bataille here is bringing both Hegel and Nietzsche together 
in a paradoxical system; he goes with Hegel, acknowledging the fundamental desire to bring into self-
consciousness all that man is, while at the same time, in the face of excess, follows Nietzsche in recognising 
that what is brought into consciousness 'involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, 
superficialization, and generalization'. In his French Hegel, Baugh identifies this contradictory attempt when 
he states: “Bataille tries to develop a 'heterology and a theory of expenditure', a non-science of those elements 
not assimilable into systems, and a paradoxical system of non-knowledge” (2003, p. 73) 
 
Marcelle and her sufferings are a direct portrayal of the contested place in which man finds himself caught 
between summit and decline, where excess of energy leads to expenditure through the erotic and outstrips 
established 'pure' self-consciousness.  Following the orgy and her experience in the ‘Antique Wardrobe’, 
Marcelle is forced to retreat to the asylum (indicative here of the decline following the summit), where her 
parents place her in order - we presume - to restore her sanity, or at best, protect her from the excessive aspects 
of her desires. What Bataille is attempting to show here is that these two conflicting aspects of the 'whole 
human being' (assured self-consciousness and the elements which exceed it), find themselves unable to be 
reduced into a developed, heightened or more refined consciousness of existence. When Marcelle ultimately 
dies by her own hand, we see Bataille attempting to illuminate how the desire to exceed limits which is found 
within the erotic sacrifice can be at odds with the calculated reserve of self-consciousness.  Marcelle must die 
by her own hand for she is unable to let go, unable to let the movement towards excess run its course and 
indulge in the momentary sacrifice of her own identity, and as such, in being unable to reconcile the debauchery 
that was her own defilement, she is forced into a situation in which she must commit suicide. 
 
Marcelle must force her own hand as the summit of erotic frenzy in which she was caught reveals a baseness 
to her humanity, an excess and a desire to will evil (as we have seen Bataille indicate the nature of the 
movement towards the summit to be), which is alien to the identity of that “blond girl, timid and naively pious” 
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(Bataille, 2001a, p. 15). Her experience leaves her “trembling and shivering feverishly” (p. 17) producing 
“agonizing shrieks” (p. 18) and expressing “unbearable terror and moral suffering” (p. 18). Her naïve piety, 
her life ordered around the absolute of God and the Good is directly at odds with the sensuous excess which is 
also of her, an excess which, once encountered, is then unable to be reconciled within a greater understanding 
or self-consciousness. Marcelle, when faced with her own wilful defilement, is caught in an inescapable 
paradox from which she cannot escape and live, and as such, she has only one remaining option, that of suicide.  
It would be wrong however to assume that Bataille would have insisted nihilistically that a recognition of this 
would always result in death. We will see that what is the truly terrifying and laughable aspect of the summit 
and the decline is the recognition of the inescapable irony of being trapped between a desire to know all and 
the recognition of those elements which outstrips knowledge: 
Essentially the summit is where life is pushed to an impossible limit. I reach it, in the faint way that I 
do, only by recklessly expending my strength.  I won't again possess a strength to waste unless, through 
work, I can gain back the strength lost.  What am I moreover? Inscribed in a human context, I can't 
dispossess of my will to act.  The possibility of giving up work forever and in some way pushing myself 
definitively to some goal, which in the long run is illusory: this isn't conceivable... But I can't give up 
the summit! I protest (intending to put lucid, dispassionate ardour into such protests) against anything 
that asks us that we stifle desire. Though I can only contentedly resign myself to the fate compelling me 
to work: I'd never dream of doing away with moral rules, since they spring from inevitable decline. 
(Bataille, 2004, pp. 39-40) 
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1.5: Twin Lovers Entwined 
 
In Sacrifice, the victim is divested not only of clothes, but of life (or is destroyed in some way if it is an 
inanimate object). The victim dies and the spectators share in what his death reveals. (Bataille, 2006, p. 
22) 
 
As in tragedy, the fundamental aspect of the sacrificial act is revealed in the sundering of an economic world 
based in 'potentially' useful things, where the sacrifice irrupts into the world and violates the boundaries - albeit 
only momentarily - that exist between isolated, distinct individuals.  In this sacrificial movement, an individual, 
group of people or entire community engage in a practice which involves the necessary removal of a given 
object or person from its normal useful role around which the I, the Other and Society at large is constructed 
to aid the goal of continued self-preservation.  It is important to note here that Bataille's conception of an 
overall excess of energy as the rule for life holds fast not only in the case of the individual, nor just between 
the individual and the Other, but also again for society as a whole.  Indeed, as Richman identifies, excessive 
elements within Bataille’s economic structure reinforce and underpin restricted economies as “the substrate 
uniting specialized systems” (1982, p. 40).1 In all cases, and in all manifestations of life, Bataille sees a drive 
to expend, this expenditure being necessary for more energy is accumulated than is required to sustain life, 
and as an excess is, in certain circumstances, wasted.  We have already seen how Bataille sees restricted 
Identity, based in the restriction of desire and the Hegelian 'economy of equivalence', insufficient to capture 
all necessary facets of that elusive whole human being, and it is in this light that he views the event of sacrifice 
as providing an essential 'outlet' for the removal of excess energy from the economy which is unable to sustain 
it.   
 
If however, we remember that for Bataille the movement of energy and its expenditure is only ever a 
momentary flash and that following this life will attempt to recover energy (to relieve exhaustion and conserve 
further life), then a question is raised.  If, ultimately, the expenditure of energy is only ever fleeting and the 
return to restriction is inescapable, then what function do these sacrificial phenomena serve, and indeed, what 
significance do these activities hold if they are nothing more than a release of excess energy?  In this way, does 
                                                 
1 We will see a parallel between this aspect of Bataille’s thought and Freud’s conception of the relationship between the 
Ego and Unconscious in the coming chapters. 
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the release of energy at the summit and the eventual decline in exhaustion, simply have for us a physical or 
biological explanation?  Are the notions of excess, sacrifice, summit and decline understandable in this 
manner, and as such, does the importance that Bataille gives to such actions reveal a desire to mystify an 
experience which at end, is readily incorporable into an understanding of man?  In order to explain this more 
fully, and see what is really at stake in such a question, we must delve deeper into the nature of eroticism, that 
manifestation of sacrifice that was Bataille's obsession, and its relation to death that will allow us to tackle this 
question. 
 
It is important for us to dwell momentarily on the notion of the contested individual. As indicated before, man 
for Bataille cannot live in the moment of excess, it is not a possibility for man as the act of excess cannot be 
sublimated into self-consciousness – man cannot be erotic, this not being a path that he can choose.  Eroticism 
is far removed from the sexual act of reproduction, and we will in fact see that the erotic movement has more 
in common for Bataille with the act of sacrifice than it does with a biological sexual function.  The character 
of Marcelle, whilst indeed providing for us an extreme illustration of the destructive energy that Bataille was 
attempting to show, does not reveal why the erotic act is so destructive to her identity. To bring this to light, if 
we are to understand the central role that eroticism plays within Bataille's thought, we must draw some parallels 
between the notion of Sacrifice and that of the Erotic. 
 
Bataille sees desire as the fundamental orientation of man, with desire shaping our consciousness, our society, 
our interaction with others and our own identity, and yet, this very desire which constructs, also de-structs at 
the same time.  For him, the lack or surplus of energy proves to be the determining factor in human activity.  
In the formation of society, the construction of economies, families, and the continuation of life, there is a 
necessary conservation of energy, which furthers the preservation and extension of life.  Within this type of 
economic calculation is presupposed a restriction of desire (necessarily so), for in order to maintain life man 
cannot consume the entirety of his resources, that is, squander them, lest he risks losing the very resources 
required for the continuation of his own life.  In this way, potentially useful resources need to be 'reinvested' 
into activity which finds its core in the continuation of life. Indeed, one cannot consume the entire harvest in 
one night if one wishes to see through the winter.  This 'restriction' for Bataille, and it would be hard to disagree 
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with this, is a necessary facet of human activity, for one must 'work', eat, and sleep, and to not do these things 
will inevitably lead to exhaustion, resulting ultimately in death. 
 
We see here parallels with the Master/Slave Dialectic as contained within Hegel's Phenomenology, where the 
relationship between the two (in order to maintain both parties necessary existence) requires a restriction of 
the master's desire to allow for the eventual establishment of the self-consciousness of the individual, bound 
up as they are with the continued free existence of each other.  Human existence is necessarily tempered by 
such restrictions which are set in place in order to maintain this existence itself.  The master has to allow the 
slave the autonomy to recognise him to prevent the self-certainty of its own consciousness from remaining 
meaningless. Without the restriction of the desire towards the Other, human beings, for Hegel, would not be at 
all. For Bataille however, human activity is not solely constituted of factors rooted within the sphere of 
restriction, and it is here where we can perceive a place of tension between Hegel and Nietzsche in Bataille’s 
thought: 
The imposition of interdiction upon the violence of nature inaugurates a human world of work, 
consciousness of death, and restricted sexual activity. It marks the passage from the animal world to the 
human order. However, just where Hegel would place his anthropogenic scene of the struggle for 
recognition, Bataille’s theoretical elaboration splits in two. (Guerlac, 1990, pp. 94-5) 
Like Nietzsche, who when critiquing the idea of 'consciousness', pointed towards the Will churning underneath 
existence (of which only a residue would rise into consciousness), so Bataille after him recognised that outside 
of the sphere of human activity based within restriction there exist aspects of human activity which, rather than 
restricting desire, actively follow desire to its limits; that is to the destruction or loss of its object without an 
eye towards its potential utility.  In this sense, rather than tying desire to its 'satisfaction' (in the sense of its 
satisfaction in its restriction in the creation of identity as in Hegel), Bataille is looking at the function of desire 
as something rather different.  For Bataille, the movement of desire leads not always to a 'fuller' subject which, 
upon incorporation of the object of its desire into the subject (or in relation to it) leads to the satisfaction of a 
desire through the destruction of its object (as in hunger, tiredness or cold, where through its satisfaction, the 
hunger is quelled through food, the tiredness through sleep, and the cold through warmth). Instead he is seeking 
to illuminate that, when desire is not embraced within a strictly utilitarian sphere of activity, and is allowed to 
run rampant, it can lead to the destruction of the subject itself.  Now this does not always mean that when 
desire is allowed to run its course without restriction the subject itself will suffer physical death. Instead, he is 
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pointing us towards the potential loss of the self-conscious subject which, through desire, is torn from the 
economic restrictions which were the grounding of the possibility of consciousness itself. 
 
It is important here to remember that Bataille does not refute that man, by necessity, lives a 'restricted' life. 
But, as we have seen, it is the elevation and conflation of this restricted identity with an ‘absolute’ nature of 
man that he takes issue.  He sees it as a mistake to attribute to man only those restricted, useful aspects at the 
expense of those that are excessive.  In On Nietzsche, we have seen how he identifies an alignment between 
morality (Good and Evil) with actions which abide to this rule of utility. Further to this, he has shown that not 
all action falls under this structure, and instead of discounting these actions (excluding them through an 
alignment with 'Evil'), he instead insists that these evil acts are a fundamental part of the makeup of human 
activity, and moreover, that these constituent parts are not a part of humanity that is to be shunned, excised or 
repressed as at odds with the true nature of humanity.  In his treatment of morality we have seen that actions 
normally describable as 'good' are those that serve to reinforce and respect the integrity (separate, isolated and 
inviolable) of the other human being, with evil on the other hand being that which violates (or risks violating) 
that same integrity.  For Bataille, what risks isolated integrity most is the fact of Death, and what interaction 
with death makes manifest.  It is this inescapable destiny, this death that I will die, that proves most horrifying 
and yet simultaneously desirable, and for him it is at the root of the drive towards Sacrifice and Eroticism.  
Eroticism allows for the separate, discontinuous, integrated subject to touch the limits of their own integrity 
by sharing in the violation and dissolution of self that Death promises, and that its partner, sexuality allows to 
make present: 
The whole business of eroticism is to destroy the self-contained character of the participators as they are 
in their normal lives. (Bataille, 2006, p. 17) 
Eroticism always entails a breaking down of established patterns, I repeat, of the regulated social order 
basic to our discontinuous mode of existence as defined and separate individuals. (Bataille, 2006, p. 18) 
 
The act that is undertaken in the moment of eroticism is not erotic in and of itself. There are not acts for Bataille 
that are more 'Erotic' than others, for what makes something erotic is not some objective quality inherent within 
the act. Indeed, it is possible, as Hollier argues (1992, p. 67), that Bataille’s literature constitutes an erotic act, 
a contention which will be examined shortly. What is of cardinal importance, indeed what makes something 
erotic, is the way in which the participants engage with the act itself which provides it with its erotic character.  
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At this stage it will be merely sufficient to note (but important to make the distinction between) what makes a 
given phenomenon erotic, and those acts which are portrayed within Bataille's literature.  Indeed, we must not 
conflate the two with each other, for whilst in the way that they are used (and abused) within Bataille's work 
indeed brings them into the realm of the erotic as he saw it, it in no way means that the acts he describes, those 
that would be classically termed 'obscene' are the only inhabitants of the erotic sphere. 
 
As in the realm of sacrifice, Erotic acts are not only those which are identified with what the word conjures for 
us. Indeed, Bataille pulls together acts of gambling, art and lavish expenditure with those involving the 
sacrificial knife.  It is what these acts share in common; the squandering of useful objects and resources, which 
removes the given object from an order of utility and their giving over to a realm of waste that provides these 
disparate acts with their sacrificial flavour. But it is not just the removal of the given object from its potential 
that makes a particular activity sacrificial, what is of utmost importance for the phenomenon is that when it 
takes place, it is witnessed. In the moment of sacrifice, as in Tragedy, a leap is taken that attempts to exceed 
the boundaries of restricted identity: 
Erotic activity, by dissolving the separate beings that participate in it, reveals their fundamental 
continuity, like the waves of a stormy sea. In sacrifice, the victim is divested not only of clothes, but of 
life (or is destroyed in some way if it is an inanimate object). The victim dies and the spectators share 
in what his death reveals. (Bataille, 2006, p. 22) 
 
The erotic act in this way is synonymous with those other acts which are grouped together in sacrifice; indeed, 
as indicated above, Bataille himself sees direct parallels between the two.  In sacrifice, an object is divested of 
its potentially useful character and is delivered over into waste, in effect, to death.  In Eroticism, two or more 
people engage in activity which grows from an excess of energy and, unable to be contained, is finally let 
loose. They find themselves engaged in an activity in which it is not some distinct, separate object which is 
sacrificed, but instead enter into a dance in which that which is put at risk is the very participants themselves. 
In the erotic act (and what for Bataille would define an act as erotic) it is the laying bare of the I and the Other 
in an excessive reaching, one where participants seek to exceed the boundaries of a self defined through 
restriction, that is as a discontinuous individuated existence.  In effect, eroticism inhabits a realm of “violence, 
of violation” (Bataille, 2006, p. 16), it is the realm of evil as willing laceration that Bataille outlines for us in 
On Nietzsche, where distinct, individual beings seek to communicate with each other and recognise some kind 
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of communion with one another, albeit one based in violation. Here, Nakedness and Obscenity are key: 
Stripping naked is the decisive action.  Nakedness offers a contrast to self-possession, to discontinuous 
existence, in other words.  It is a state of communication revealing a quest for a possible continuance of 
being beyond the confines of the self.  Bodies open out to a state of continuity through secret channels 
that give us a feeling of obscenity.  Obscenity is our name for the uneasiness which upsets the physical 
state associated with self-possession, with the possession of a recognised and stable individuality. 
(Bataille, 2006, pp. 17-18) 
 
Nakedness/Obscenity 
 
Nakedness and obscenity leads to a stripping bare of the layers of restriction around identity – the clothes that 
maintain our modesty – and allows for the I to come face to face with the challenge that is its own body and 
that of the Other.  Nakedness forms a challenge as it is the presentation of flesh, ultimately seductive, which 
drives desire to lose itself ultimately through the violation and desecration of the 'sacred' individual. In this 
violent space where integrity is ruptured, those involved engage with each other through a 'criminal' desire 
towards reciprocal desecration which, for Bataille, revealing the illusion of the sanctity of the I, creates 
something properly sacred, a moment of excess which itself, unlike the sacred 'I', cannot be put to work: 
Men in the past represented themselves as an indivisible reality.  Some animals can be cut into two 
sections; after a certain length of time these two sections form two complete animals, distinct from each 
other.  But nothing could be more shocking to those who limit themselves to a classical conception of 
the human soul than conducting such an experiment on man.   Habits of thought are so well established 
that it remains difficult for each of us to see himself doubled, one side seeing, loving, or fleeing the 
other. (Bataille, 1985b, pp. 248-9) 
 
This is a familiar idea for us to grasp; man as embodied individual (a self-conscious 'I'), requires a kind of 
unity to maintain its existence.  The body physically torn in two results in the death of the person, and yet, to 
conflate this physical necessity for 'unity' with an absolute unity of man is mistaken.2  We have seen through 
Bataille’s interactions with Hegel that he feels such a conception to be insufficient, recognising as he does the 
contradictory drive to violate or exceed this very necessary integrity.  It is in the realm of sexuality that Bataille 
find this desire towards violation most apparent, seeing in the reproduction of life a violence against the 
individual involved in the sexual act.  In the introduction to his Eroticism he traces for us the nature of this 
inherent violence from the asexual division of single cell organisms through to the sexual lives of those that 
require intercourse: 
                                                 
2 This notion of the conflation between the physical and the ‘psychic’ unity of man as knowable shares similarities with 
the work of Lacan on the ‘Mirror Stage’ of childhood development.  This notion will be addressed in Chapter 2.4 
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It is my intention to suggest that for us, discontinuous beings that we are, death means continuity of 
being. Reproduction leads to the discontinuity of beings, but brings into play that continuity; that is to 
say, it is intimately linked with death. (2006, p. 13) 
 
Beings which reproduce themselves are distinct from one another, and those reproduced are likewise 
distinct from each other, just as they are distinct from their parents.  Each being is distinct from all 
others.  His birth, his death, the events of his life may have an interest for others, but he alone is directly 
concerned in them.  He is born alone, he dies alone.  Between one being and another, there is a gulf, a 
discontinuity. (2006, p. 12) 
 
Man, is born and dies alone. But does this preclude any deeper connection between beings above them merely 
having ‘interest’ in each other’s affairs?  If this were the case then it would be a cause of great sadness and 
would seem to cheapen the closeness that is often the valued tie between one and another, so tentatively we 
must answer negatively to this question. However, we do risk jumping ahead of ourselves here and before 
coming to a point at which we can engage with this question, we need to be clearer about the relationship 
between sexuality and discontinuity.  Bataille starts his analysis with a look towards simple celled organisms, 
those who 'reproduce' asexually through a process of cellular division, seeking to show how in the movement 
from the initial cell which divides into the resultant cells, death lurks and goes hand in hand with growth as a 
necessary constituent of sexuality. 
 
To illustrate his point we will examine the division of the cell 'A'.  After a certain period of growth the cell will 
reach a point at which it will split and divide into a number of resultant cells, in our example, the two cells 
'AB' and 'AC'.  Now whilst cells AB and AC are the product of, and identical copies of, the original cell A, the 
resultant cells themselves were not 'given birth to', their existence being a direct result of the division and 
resulting destruction of cell A.  However, whilst there are chemical and physical similarities between the three 
cells; A, AB and AC, despite this, for Bataille there is always a stark distinction between the three entities.  In 
the division from A to AB and AC, the original cell A as a distinct entity has 'ceased to be': “the first being has 
disappeared. It is to all intents and purposes dead, in that it does not survive in either of the two beings it has 
produced... It ceases to exist in so far as it was discontinuous.” (2006, p. 13)  Herein lays the crux of Bataille's 
argument; whilst AB and AC are the product of A, in the creation of AB and AC, the original cell A is destroyed.  
A is neither AB nor AC, and AB and AC are not identical either.  Whilst they may share the same chemical 
composition and they may be physically identical when observed, they do in fact occupy distinct spheres of 
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existence, they are all three separate, distinct instances of matter or, in Bataille's terminology, they are 
discontinuous. There lies a moment however, in this violent move from distinct entity to distinct entity, where 
for a fleeting instant, a moment occurs at which there is continuity between all three: 
There is a point at which the original one becomes two.  As soon as there are two there is again 
discontinuity for each of the beings.  But the process entails one instant of continuity between the two 
of them.  The first one dies, but as it dies there is a moment of continuity between the two new beings. 
(2006, pp. 13-14) 
 
At this point of continuity, at the point of division, the original is no longer really itself, just as the new have 
not yet come to be.  Then, at that fleeting juncture, none of the cells have a distinct integrity; at the point which 
Bataille draws our attention to, there is rightly no A, no AB, nor AC, for there is only the moment of continuity.  
This, however, is not a point of stability. Indeed, it would be wrong to state that there, at that moment, any 
form of identity persists for, like the summit, it is a point that exists as movement. There is no middle entity 
between the three, no transitory being which we can identify and attribute the property of continuity to. There 
is no ‘missing link’ for, the link itself, the continuity that binds the three is only a moment of movement, a 
moment in which, properly speaking, there is no Identity.  In this movement from one being to its duplications, 
we can begin to see why death is intrinsically linked for Bataille to sexuality, where contained in the death of 
the original is already the creation of the new.  Death in this way is fundamentally connected to the notion of 
sexuality as creation relies upon destruction. It is the link between the two that reveals the continuity that is 
the tie that binds distinct entities in a moment of unity.   
 
Bataille insists that this link between reproduction and death that is present in simple cell asexual reproduction 
holds true for more complex sexual beings. Yet, problematically, in sexual reproduction neither participant is 
annihilated physically as a necessary pre-requisite for the creation of new life.  Unlike cell A which is destroyed 
in the creation of AB and AC, two sexual beings which reproduce remain 'alive' during and following the 
reproductive act (with a few notable exceptions).  The question then remains: if death is still intimately linked 
for Bataille to sexuality in the reproduction of sexual creatures, then why is this the case if the act itself does 
not involve the destruction of the participants? For Bataille the answer here rests in the fact that sexual 
reproduction maintains this link with the destruction and mortality of its participants through an inversion: 
Sperm and Ovum are to begin with discontinuous entities, but they unite, and consequently continuity 
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comes into existence between them to form a new entity from the death and disappearance of the separate 
beings.  The new entity is itself discontinuous, but it bears within itself the transition to continuity, the 
fusion, fatal to both, of two separate beings.  (2006, p. 14) 
 
Rather than being a question of division which provides continuity in asexual beings, in the reproduction of 
sexual beings it is rather instead a movement of fusion which results in the creation of a third discontinuous 
being.  What joins the asexual with the sexual most deeply for Bataille however are not the notions of division 
and fusion. Indeed, as he notes: “it is a far cry from ourselves with our self-awareness to the minute organisms 
in question.” (2006, p. 14)  What is important here, and proves fundamental for Bataille, is that whether 
reproduction is asexual or sexual, both entail a movement from an individual or pair of individual existences, 
through a moment of fleeting continuity, to the establishment of a new discontinuous existence.  Discontinuity 
for Bataille is the 'normal' state of affairs; we are separated from each other, never able truly to step outside of 
this and into communion with others, for him, we exist as: “discontinuous beings, individuals who perish in 
isolation in the midst of an incomprehensible adventure, but we yearn for our lost continuity.” (2006, p. 15) 
 
It is important to note here that Bataille's notions of continuity and discontinuity differ from Hegel's creation 
of a self-consciousness that exists in a state of absolute relation.  As we have seen, for Hegel, the 'I' is formed 
as part of and in relation to the world, where the apparent distinction, between the ‘I’ and the Other, is only a 
mistaken recognition of the state of affairs.  In Hegel, the ‘I’ is part of the universal whole by dint of the fact 
that it is only ‘I’ through its relation to other distinct self-consciousnesses and the world at large.  Where 
Bataille differs is that he does not posit the idea of the discontinuous and the continuous in opposition to Hegel's 
schemata, indeed, the notion of absolute relation as seen in Hegel is not affected by the problem that Bataille 
identifies.  As in Hegel, man's 'I' is born in relation to the Other, but for Bataille, even in a state where man 
recognizes his identity as formed in an absolute relation, the fact still stands that the 'I' and the 'Other' are still 
fundamentally distinct from each other. What Bataille was seeking to illuminate here as the moment of 
continuity differs fundamentally from the notion of the absolute, for whilst in the latter the ‘I’ is present as part 
of the absolute, in the former there is a point at which there is no real 'I' to speak of properly as the 'I' is no 
longer present.  In contrast to Hegel, where I and Other remain distinct self-consciousnesses in relation, the 
moment of continuity is the point at which two beings - two distinct identities - come together in a movement 
which leads to a point at which the distinction dissolves, where the I and the Other no longer stand apart and 
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are conjoined in a fleeting moment of communion.  This notion of eroticism, based in the movement between 
discontinuity and continuity, draws heavily upon and shares stark similarities with his ideas on the general and 
restricted economies.3  What lends eroticism its power, along with other forms of action that can be termed 
sacrificial (for in the movement between the discontinuous and the continuous, the participants sacrifice 
themselves), is its ability to upset and interrupt our calculated, restricted identities or, as Guerlac acknowledges, 
the challenge of eroticism lies in the fact that it “is a question of losing oneself knowingly it seems, and not 
too completely after all” (1990, p. 91).  It is an interruption which torments at the same time as it fascinates, 
pushing us closer to the brink as it draws us closer together: 
We find the state of affairs that binds us to our random and ephemeral individuality hard to bear.  Along 
with our tormenting desire that this evanescent thing should last, there stands our obsession with a primal 
continuity linking us with everything that is. (Bataille, 2006, p. 15) 
 
The concern is to substitute for the individual isolated discontinuity a feeling of profound continuity. 
(Bataille, 2006, p. 15) 
 
Nakedness and Obscenity are fundamental to eroticism; the erotic act inhabits that realm of the summit which 
we saw Bataille discern as evil. The desire that moves one to the Other or some object in erotic frenzy precludes 
a necessary violation of the integrity of both involved.  Nakedness here does not mean solely the removal of 
clothing and baring of the body, though this act is in itself important.  What is meant here by nakedness 
becomes a laying bare of the individual, an opening which penetrates the integrity of the person.  It is important 
here to place emphasis on the difference that is apparent between 'reproduction' and 'eroticism'.  The destruction 
that makes itself known in the sexual fusion is 'offset' by the resultant entity.  The arrival of the child in this 
way is seen commonly as a 'blessing'; the product of the communion of two intermingling distinct entities.  
The birth and creation out of the loss and exhaustion of the two is the 'natural' outcome of sexual reproduction 
– biologically speaking – just as, in the most simple of cells, their death signals the birth or creation of the new.  
The destruction of the individual and the threat that sexuality poses to it is mitigated by the ensuing creation.  
In this way, the discontinuity of the individual seems negated through the birth of the new, indeed, the 
individual in this way 'lives on' in its offspring.   
 
                                                 
3 C.F Accursed Share, Theory of Religion ,The Notion of Expenditure 
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Reproductive sexuality, as opposed to erotic sensuality, serves a defined purpose, with reproductive sexuality 
being an action with a perceived and calculable end (and it is indeed no surprise that this form of monogamous 
reproductive sexuality is the kind most commonly enshrined in law), with the resultant offspring being often 
the justification of, or motivation behind, the carnal act.  However, what reproductive sexuality does, with its 
eye towards the future, is to nullify the power of sexuality itself.  It reduces the erotic act to a function, a means 
to an end; the nod to the future serving to negate the power and importance that death plays within the sexual 
act.  Now, I feel the need to make plain here, although I feel it hardly needs stating, that I am not insisting upon 
two notions of sexuality here, a 'natural' heterosexual reproductive sexuality as opposed to an erotic effusion 
divorced from reproduction.  The biological function highlighted here, which is in truth an act of production 
in the sexual act, is opposed to the erotic as a movement which undoes the productive sublimation of eroticism 
to Identity.4  Within the first category, I would include non-biologically reproductive sexual acts as acts which 
attempt to wrestle some kind of product, or effect from sexual desire.  The distinction between the two here 
reduce to a simple delineation; the former, reproductive sexuality centres around the notion of obtaining some 
form of mastery over the debilitating effects of the sexual effusion, whereas in the second (which we will 
examine in more detail presently), does not seek to glean any result or product from the movement itself, the 
object in question for the erotic, being nothing other than the movement itself. 
 
To illustrate more clearly what differentiates eroticism from other forms of sexuality, it will serve us well to 
examine a situation in which the biologically reproductive aspect of sexuality is not present.  Let us take that 
sexual order to engage with and gain mastery over one's own sexual potential, most often associated with 
liberation movements.  A movement such as this would insist upon the mastery of one’s sexuality as a means 
towards sexual or political liberation (to free one's politically dictated identity through the re-appropriation of 
one's own sexuality). In seeking to free oneself from the shackles of political oppression, a person would seek 
to gain mastery over their own body and desires, refusing to align themselves with the dictated norms or 
expectations of society. Such an act however is divorced from what Bataille is pointing us towards when he is 
                                                 
4 An interesting study would be to draw together the notions of the performativity of sexuality/gender (Butler) with 
Bataille’s notions of erotic diffusion.  This would potentially lead one to be able to establish a critical discourse that 
engages with the heterosexual ‘phallologocentrism’ identified by Butler but allow one to remain conscious of the 
paradoxical relationship that such political critiques of  power structures have with the very identities they seek to free. 
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talking of the erotic.  To explain more fully, and to draw the delineation between sexuality and eroticism, the 
following example will suffice. In the example of the person attempting to gain mastery over their individual 
identity to gain political freedom, they perform an act of sublimation.  Their sexual actions and desires are 
sublimated as the actions that are performed are carried out with a view to being able to establish (through 
rebellion against established sexual norms) a more authentic Identity in line with their own desires.  The actions 
themselves, whatever they may be, are in this sense not erotic, but political, for, just as in the reproductive act, 
what is of prime importance in the act itself is the future result of the action, not the action itself.  This is not 
to lessen the power or importance of utilising sexuality as a politically subversive activity, and indeed, such 
actions can be used in opposing proscribed forms of sexual identity and are important in reshaping pre-existing 
societal impressions and values.  However, it is important to highlight that sexuality used in such a fashion 
would not for Bataille fall into the realm of erotic action for, at base, no matter how deeply at odds with existing 
conventions regarding sexual 'normalcy' (hence why an act does not either have to be 'extreme' or obscene to 
be erotic), a sexual act only becomes erotic when it has as its aim nothing.  A potential positive result or 
outcome that is aimed for through sexual action is at odds with Bataille's conception of the erotic. What gives 
the erotic its particular flavour is that it has no end, it is only the movement of desire to the summit, and 
following the act itself, all that is left is an anguished residue that brings to the fore the limit of the individual 
that is its inevitable death. 
 
Face to face with you, naked, gleaming flesh radiates, part seductive, part ridiculous. Removed from desire, 
what reaction would the genitals provoke but laughter? Without the creation of a new being, without potential 
and without that which legitimises the desire for the body (a machine of effluence and excreta) what are we 
left with? Without the promise of ‘new life’, when the sexual act becomes devoid of a future what does this 
willed violation of integrity provoke? 
Two beings communicate with each other through their hidden rents.  There is no communication more 
profound: two beings are lost in a convulsion that binds them together.  But they only communicate 
when losing a part of themselves.  Communication ties them together with wounds, where their unity 
and integrity dissipates in fever. (Bataille, 1985b, p. 250) 
 
Communication, wounds, nakedness and obscenity.  These are essential to understanding Bataille's notion of 
eroticism.  The distinct individual, faced with the Other, when engaging in frenzy, interacts in a way which 
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does 'harm' to the other, Evil is the necessary outcome, the integrity of the self-conscious 'I', in relation to the 
Other as a distinct self-contained identity is violated in the erotic movement, the erotic union requiring that 
they do not respect the integrity of each other.  The erotic act, tied as it is to death, requires the violation of its 
participants (as in reproductive sexuality, where within the resultant offspring is contained the traces of its 
parent's demise).  Yet, without the promise of offspring (either physical or metaphorical) which negates death 
through its sublimation to the future, sexuality without future remains caught within the moment of excess 
which, subordinate to nothing, is what Bataille would deem Sovereign. 
 
Sex, involving as it does a fundamental link with death, when devoid of a product (a useful outcome), remains 
as a wounding of integrity, an intentional violation resulting in a moment of communion that is insubordinate 
and sovereign.  This moment, however, as at the point of division, does not exist. The point of communion, 
being movement but never truly being, is only a fleeting moment stretched out indefinitely; nothing is 
established save a blank affirmation of the sovereignty of life.  Two distinct identities engage with each other, 
the result of which leads to nothing other than coming face to face with their own isolated insufficiency; the 
limits of Identity are revealed and the I is found wanting, caught short and sent back into its prison with a taste 
of its own limitation.  Eroticism, like the sacrificial act, proves a challenge to the established order.  Just as 
ritualistic sacrifice upsets the order of economic utility that a society is founded upon, so the erotic moment 
violates the order of individual Identity, challenges it, affirms nothing except itself; a scream of insubordination 
that wreaks havoc on the I by revealing that within himself, man is more than himself.   
One must, in fact, understand literature itself, the practice of writing and reading initiated by Bataille, 
as an erotic practice: henceforth there could no longer be an erotic literature, literature and eroticism 
being now inseparable and utterly coextensive. Everything Bataille develops surrounding this theme of 
communication is intended to establish precisely this “communication” between eroticism and literature. 
(Hollier, 1992, p. 67) 
 
Hollier equates Bataille’s literary practice to that of Eroticism, and we can recognise also how the interruption 
of the restricted economy of identities heralded by the descent into Erotic diffusion is paralleled by Bataille’s 
contention that literature as practical heterology seeks to introduce “the demand for the violent gratifications 
implied by social life” (Bataille, 1985d, p. 97). The communion felt between those who ‘communicate with 
each other through their hidden rents’ in the erotic moment is reflective of the “mode of communication” that 
occurs in literature which sees “a dépense of the self in union with the other” (Richman, 1982, p. 68).  This 
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‘communion’ which is a result of desire is distinct from the relational interdependence of the Hegelian subject, 
although as Guerlac rightly acknowledges: “from what has been said so far it should be clear that there is a 
version (or fiction) of Hegelian recognition in eroticism” (1990, p. 93).  The movement of desire which draws 
together those engaging in erotic acts is not, as in Hegel, the delineation of distinct spheres between individuals 
whose relationship to each other is defined negatively.  The erotic communion is an expenditure of energy and 
“not an appeal, an exchange, or a negotiation, but an uninhibited wastage that returns energy to its solar 
trajectory” (Land, 1992, p. 33) and as such is the movement of individuals subject to the “mega-motor” (1992, 
p. 37) of energy flow that characterises the general economy.  For Bataille, the relational subject of Hegel is a 
temporary stabilisation, a dam in the general flow of energy where, in Land’s words, “the burning passage of 
energetic dissipation is restrained in the interest of something that is taken to transcend it; a future time, a 
depredatory class, a moral goal” (p. 33)  What Eroticism, and by extension Literature, serves to do is to 
interrupt the illusion that the Hegelian subject creates for itself (where its discontinuous integrity is taken as 
Truth) by consuming the resources appropriated by the subject in its creation.  Hollier summarizes it as follows: 
Communication does not use, but consumes (spends, dépense) the elements whose composition forms 
the structure of any exchange. It makes the separate poles (sender, receiver) lose any distinct identity at 
the same time that it disturbs the code they obey. (1992, p. 142) 
The violation of the restricted subject involved with literary and erotic communication introduces a traumatic 
moment where the illusion of the integrity of the subject is interrupted by unveiling the elements which, 
through the process of negation, it has excluded or suppressed (as excremental or external) from consciousness.  
Desire here is the unrestricted flow of energy which is held back by the subject utilising its energy to cement 
its own self-consciousness.  What it fails to recognise is that through the process of creation it has necessarily 
repressed aspects of itself which the practice of literature seeks to awaken through the breaking down of the 
barriers created to stem the tide. This unbridled energy as such has a threatening character, containing the 
potential to undermine the sense of security that the restricted subject has erected and which it struggles to 
maintain.  Benjamin tells us: 
The threat from these energies is one of shocks. The more readily consciousness registers these shocks, 
the less likely they are to have a traumatic effect. Psychoanalytic theory strives to understand the nature 
of these traumatic shocks ‘on the basis of their breaking through the protective shield against stimuli.’ 
(1999, p. 157) 
It is now that we turn towards the thought of Freud to examine in more detail the nature of trauma, its relation 
to the creation of the subject, and the relationship between desire, taboo and transgression which will allow us 
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to better understand “the price paid to maintain the illusion of homogeneity through the repression of its 
heterogeneous foundation” (Richman, 1982, p. 42) 
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Part Two 
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2.1: The Erotic Neurotic 
 
 
For those familiar with the biographical history of Bataille, it will come as no surprise that his work was formed 
under the heavy influence of Freudian analysis.  Indeed for those who are less familiar, his subject matter of 
choice and its execution seems to scream 'neurotic'.  What reveals the importance that analysis had in his 
writing is best indicated by the fact that he produced his first 'mature' work – his Story of the Eye – whilst 
undergoing a course of treatment with the heterodox Freudian Adrien Borel.1   
 
Given this, it is not unsurprising that between the thought of Freud and Bataille there exist a great number of 
similarities and yet, Bataille's relative silence in regard to this is indicative of the important points of divergence 
we find between them.  What will become clear is that within the Freudian edifice, between the Ego and the 
Unconscious, we find parallels with Bataille's notion of sexuality and its relation to consciousness and death.  
Interestingly, we also find that at the points where the Freudian theory starts to strain to maintain the distinction 
between Eros and Thanatos, Bataille attempts to resolve this problematic.  It is by maintaining the Freudian 
notion of a “vacillating rhythm” (Freud, 2001b, pp. 40-1) to man’s existence that he seeks to resolve the 
potential conflict between the two. By displacing their functionary role in relation to self-consciousness, 
Bataille looks to bring the two competing concepts into a greater collusion by stressing what Land sees as the 
“primary process” (1992, p. 31) or “mega-motor” (p. 37) of energy flow that underpins Freud’s thought of 
both Eros and Thanatos. To begin with however, a sketch of the Freudian structure of the psyche is necessary. 
 
As should be recognizable to those even unfamiliar with the work of Freud, sexuality plays a constitutionally 
foundational role in the construction of the psyche.  Indeed, throughout his early works with their focus on the 
analysis of ‘neurotic tendencies’, he establishes (or seeks to establish) the link between neurotic manifestations 
                                                 
1 The freedom that he gained through this course to be able to write perhaps cannot be overstated.  Whilst he is notably 
rather silent on the subject, the fact that following this initial analysis, each book that he subsequently wrote and published 
- including his Story - he would send the first printed copy to Borel, does allow us to make the conjecture that he 
understood well, and indeed felt a certain indebtedness to Borel and Freudian psychoanalysis. Dean highlights the 
importance that Borel had for Bataille: 
  
He had also psychoanalyzed many members of the dissident surrealist group that met at Raymond Queneau’s 
apartment in the Desnouettes Square, including Bataille, Leris, Robert Desnos, Roger Vitrac, and others, and he 
was closest to Bataille, to whom Borel remained attached his entire life. (1992, p. 217) 
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and libidinal desires.  Commonly, even today we suppose that the development of sexuality in a person begins 
during puberty.  However, for Freud, in tracing back the sexual development of a person further into the 
formative moments of childhood, he links the development of an awareness of a 'separated' consciousness with 
the sexual desires of the child: 
Infantile sexual activity may assume a variety of different forms which can only be determined by a 
precise analysis of individual cases.  But all its details leave behind the deepest (unconscious) 
impressions in the subject’s memory, determine the development of his character, if he is to remain 
healthy, and the symptomatology of his neurosis, if he is to fall ill after puberty. (Freud, 2001d, p. 189) 
 
Between the ages of three and five, they also begin to show signs of activity which may be ascribed to 
the instinct for knowledge or research… we have learnt from psycho-analysis that the instinct for 
knowledge in children is attracted unexpectedly early and intensively to sexual problems and is in fact 
possibly first aroused by them. (Freud, 2001d, p. 194) 
 
The sexual researches of these early years of childhood are always carried out in solitude. They 
constitute a first step towards taking an independent attitude in the world, and imply a high degree of 
alienation of the child from the people in his environment. (Freud, 2001d, p. 197) 
 
At its very foundation, the Ego for Freud develops directly out of a sexual 'arousal' or 'excitation' in relation to 
an object of desire. Bataille himself does not directly share this story of 'origin' with Freud however, instead 
drawing upon Hegel to make the claim that it is the positing of objects as distinct from the subject (as tools 
separate and subordinate to self-consciousness) that is the formative movement for subjectivity.  What is 
different however when we talk of the subject/object relation is that when the object is of a sexual nature it 
becomes of a different order than that of the mere 'object of perception' as in Hegel.  The sexual object in 
Freud, and also for Bataille, plays a role more akin to that of the Hegelian 'Other', where it is involved in the 
construction of the self-certain identity of the 'I', specifically at the moment of confrontation between the two 
which serves to bring into conflict (and distinctly separate) the two concepts, prior to the overcoming relation 
that was ultimately Hegel's conclusion.  However, the development of the Freudian Ego does not always  
follow this dialectical path, and the mature self-consciousness of adulthood, whilst a result of its formation 
through and in reaction to this sexual awakening, does not always result in a harmonious balance between 
subject and object.   
 
It was through recourse to the neurotic fantasy that Freud sought to illustrate that these manifestations reveal 
an undercurrent of discord between a person’s express conscious desires and their hidden, unconscious desires. 
In contrast to the Hegelian conception of self-consciousness, in Freud we find that, whilst taking into account 
this subjectivity in relation but born through opposition, by recognizing the importance of the unconscious 
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apparatus of the psyche, subjectivity is founded upon a continuously churning conflict. Let us now examine 
his most illustrious patient 'Dora' in more detail to allow us to flesh out this notion: 
A house was on fire.  My father was standing beside my bed and woke me up.  I dressed quickly.  My 
mother wanted to stop and save her jewel-case; but Father said: “I refuse to let myself and my two 
children be burnt for the sake of your jewel-case” We hurried downstairs, and as soon as I was outside 
I woke up.  (Freud, 2001a, p. 64) 
 
This is the account of Dora's first dream as recounted in Freud's case history.  It is a seemingly innocuous 
account to one not aware in advance of the conclusions that Freud is likely to draw, but, just from its explicit 
content, we can infer an undercurrent of anxiety in the tale.  A house on fire, quickly dressing, a confrontation 
between mother and father, and a hurried flight from the burning building all lend themselves to the impression 
of a great disturbance at the root of the dream.  However, whilst Freud would agree that at origin there is indeed 
a deep anxiety at play here, it is not initially clear how this arises from Dora's unconscious sexual desires.  In 
regard to dreams Freud tells us: 
A regularly formed dream stands as it were, upon two legs, one of which is in contact with the main and 
current exciting cause, and the other with some momentous event in the years of childhood. The dream 
sets up a connection between these two factors – the event during childhood and the event of the present 
day – and it endeavors to re-shape the present on the model of the remote past.  (Freud, 2001a, p. 71) 
 
We see here that the 'manifest' content of the dream (the fire, the fight, the flight) has an indirect link between 
the initial cause of the dream (an event or situation encountered during the immediate or recent past) and some 
traumatic event that occurred deeper in the history of the person.  In the case of the recurrent dream, a current 
excitation or event is being linked repeatedly to the same event which up to the point of the dream has not been 
adequately 'dealt' with; a conscious repression of some traumatic event of the past is the cause of the repetition 
of the dream.  In the case of Dora, with this in mind, Freud links the manifest content of her dream with the 
repressed sexual desires of Dora herself.  Whilst he draws many correlations between content and unconscious 
desire in detail from the patient, he gives us a brief summary which serves us well: 
Perhaps you do not know that 'jewel-case' is a favorite expression for the same thing that you alluded to 
not long ago by means of the reticule you were wearing – for the female genitals, I mean...  the meaning 
of your dream is now becoming clearer.  You said to yourself: “This man is persecuting me; he wants to 
force his way into my room.  My 'jewel-case' is in danger, and if anything happens it will be father’s 
fault.”  For that reason, in the dream you chose a situation which expresses the opposite. (Freud, 2001a, 
p. 69) 
 
Two things jump out here that require qualification.  Firstly, who is 'he' that wants to get his grubby hands on 
Dora's jewels, and secondly, why should the dream in fact seemingly express the opposite of what she 
subconsciously (rather than unconsciously) wishes to see fulfilled?  Establishing the first will lead to the 
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second, and will also enable us to see the particular relationship that the Ego has at times to the sexual instincts. 
 
'He' in this passage refers to one of the central 'characters' in Dora's neurotic drama, one 'Herr K', who we are 
told pursued the young Dora (whose father was incidentally having an affair with 'Frau K'). This pursuit 
ultimately culminated in his making sexual advances towards her in a scene by a lake. This is presented to us 
as supporting the claim made previously as to the interpretation of the dream, and yet, a spanner is thrown into 
the works of this straightforward analysis when, through further questioning, Freud uncovers that Dora, far 
from being disgusted and fearing Herr K's amorous intentions, is in fact subconsciously in love with him.  
However, this aspect of her desires having been repressed, we are led to believe that without the intervention 
of analysis she would have remained unaware of this as the primary cause of her neuroses, neuroses which 
seem in part to be 'self-caused' by the Ego rejecting aspects of unconscious desire which run counter to and 
threaten to undermine its structure: 
There was a conflict within her between a temptation to yield to the man's proposal and a composite 
force rebelling against that feeling.  This latter force was made up of motives of respectability and good 
sense, of hostile feelings... and of a neurotic element, namely the tendency to a repudiation of sexuality 
that was already present in her and was based on her childhood history.  (Freud, 2001a, p. 88) 
 
This allows us to glimpse the three layers that underlie Freud's theory of the psyche, namely that of conscious, 
pre-conscious and unconscious mental activity.  His thoughts on this are crystallized in his later work and most 
clearly outlined in his Ego and the Id where he sets out in detail the dynamic relationship that exists between 
the three.  In relation to Dora's dream we can illustrate this in the following way:  
 
1) The manifest content of the dream and the initial interpretation gives us a glimpse into the conscious 
and pre-conscious activities of the patient, that is, that her father is 'protecting' her from the advances 
of Herr K.  
2) It is only by delving into the analysis of the dream that Herr K’s relevance to its content is revealed as 
at work on a pre-conscious level.  
3) Through further investigation into the unconscious desires and personal history of the patient herself 
her neuroses are shown to be based not upon hatred or fear of Herr K, but in fact from a sincere love 
and desire for him.   
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Both pre-conscious and unconscious mental activities here seem to be equally out of reach of the patient. 
However, through the course of analysis those pre-conscious thoughts (hatred/fear of Herr K) are more easily 
brought to the surface when they are attended to in comparison with those deeper buried desires which reveal 
for us both her feelings of love towards the object of her conscious hatred and her libidinal desires more 
generally.  It should also be noted that the pre-conscious hatred for Herr K is more easily brought into conscious 
reflective focus because of the common vein that runs between this pre-conscious desire and her conscious 
ego.  What is meant by this is that as her conscious Ego has as one of its founding principles notions of 
'respectability' and a rejection of sexuality in general, the feelings of hatred for Herr K are more easily aligned 
to this conscious Ego, involving as they do a rejection of Herr K in the particular and a rejection of sexuality 
more generally.  The unconscious desire for Herr K and the attached feelings of sexuality are buried more 
deeply (repressed) due to them running counter to the established Ego, and are uncovered eventually as the 
root cause of her neuroses in general. Freud tells us in regard to this distinction in non-conscious activity: 
We see, however, that we have two kinds of unconscious – the one which is latent but capable of 
becoming conscious, and the one which is repressed and which is not, in itself and without more ado, 
capable of becoming conscious. (2001c, p. 15) 
 
Putting aside for the moment considerations of the dynamic of interaction between the conscious, pre-
conscious and unconscious, what becomes apparent from this is that the conscious structure – the Ego –seems 
to be acting in such a way as to censor those aspects of its own psyche that run counter to its conscious 
conception of itself.  In Dora's case we see this manifested through her conscious awareness of her actions 
which serve to reinforce her anti-sexual Identity (such as her hatred towards Herr K).  However, her neurotic 
tendencies, in which Freud finds the genesis of her unconscious libidinal desires, reveals that the conscious 
Ego has been set up in opposition and reaction to her libidinal urges.  This means that her conscious awareness 
of what she thinks and feels (and also to what she thinks she thought she felt previously) is ordered and filtered 
through the lens of her Ego, where her love for Herr K is changed into an conscious hatred by dint of the fact 
that tied up with her feelings of love towards Herr K is a recognition of the nature of her sexual desires which 
she seeks directly to repress.   
 
This is not to say that all constructed self-conscious decisions are created in opposition to all desires, as this 
sort of ruthless censorship which turns back upon the psyche is the realm of the super-ego properly speaking.  
In this case it is the particular unconscious desire to acquiesce to Kerr K's advances that become tied to her 
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libidinal desires in general, but, this is not to establish or imply a general rule from the particular instance.  
What Freud does do however, through recourse to his other case histories, is to infer that the general structure 
of the Ego, formed through a particular ordering of desire and its cementing in the development of the child, 
can be at odds (and often will find itself confronted) with a conflicting desire which threatens  it.  Simplified, 
in whatever structure the Ego takes, for Freud, the guiding desire or 'principle' that frames the particular assent 
or refusal to adopt a certain course of action is regulated by the pleasure principle which entails that “unpleasure 
corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution” (Freud, 2001b, p. 8), and 
it is in this way that we can see that the pleasure regulates the activity in the Ego.  In this sense we can 
understand that the pleasure principle dictates how the Ego 'regulates' which psychic phenomenon are allowed 
to be made conscious by seeking to reduce those 'excitations' (read disturbances) which through their activity 
or existence threaten the harmony and stability of the Ego. 
 
This idea seems to allow us to make the claim, and indeed people do, that if only we could reconcile those 
unconscious aspects of our selves with the conscious ones – indeed, even if to do so involves jettisoning the 
latter through a recognition of their being held in 'Bad Faith' – we would be able to re-establish a harmony and 
unity to our mental activity.  This is not an uncommon idea, and is in fact implied as the end result of psycho-
analytic discourse, and yet, in Freud’s later works this becomes problematic, as he recognizes that this drive 
towards a potential harmony is contested by a contradictory impulse to increase our 'excitations': 
It must be pointed out, however, that strictly speaking it is incorrect to talk of the dominance of the 
pleasure principle over the course of mental processes.  If such a dominance existed, the immense 
majority of our mental processes would have to be accompanied by pleasure or lead to pleasure, whereas 
the universal experience completely contradicts any such conclusion. (Freud, 2001b, p. 9)2 
                                                 
2 Martin Hägglund has recently called this problematic into question, making the claim that the apparent contradiction 
between the Pleasure Principle and the Death Drive arises from a misunderstanding of the process of how ‘excitations’ 
are bound to experience.  He argues that the process of binding “is undecidable: it is the source of pleasure and pain, 
chance and threat, love and hate” (Hagglund, 2013, p. 191) and that the subject “comes into being through the bond” (p. 
191) Binding for Hägglund provides a necessary condition through which excitations are aligned to a given drive, and it 
is in this way that he feels able to overcome this apparent disjunction: 
 
The structural necessity of binding entails that the experience of pleasure is bound internally to pain. Without the 
binding of excitation, there could be no pleasure in the first place. But the binding that makes pleasure possible at 
the same time limits it and charges it with tension. Accordingly, there is an interrelation between the pain of 
limitation and the intensity of pleasure. (p. 191) 
 
For Hägglund, this process of binding underpins his conception of ‘care’ which itself is reflective of the structure of the 
subject as a temporal being “who can suffer, can lose things, and can die, but who for that very reason has a sense of what 
it means for something to be precious, to be valuable, to be worth caring for.” (p. 195) 
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Wishing for Death 
 
In the case of Dora, we saw how in her dream Freud claimed to have uncovered a hidden wish tied to her 
unconscious libidinal impulses.  Indeed, early in his work, Freud goes so far as to tie all dream material to the 
notion of 'wish-fulfillment' which was subject to the 'pleasure principle'. In regard to Dora, the pleasure 
principle was at work in her dream in that it sought by roundabout ways to fulfill her repressed love for Herr 
K in particular, and her repressed sexuality in general, with her neuroses being a manifestation of her conscious 
activity running counter to, and attempting to keep repressed, her libidinal impulses.  Here we seem to have a 
case, founded in a rejection of sexuality, of Sartrean 'Bad Faith', where the mental illness arises from a 
disjunction between the conscious activity of the subject and their unconscious desires.  We seem in this way 
to have a rather 'simple' prescription for a cure, in that, much in the same way as Roquentin resolves to leave 
town and write a novel, if the patient were here to recognize those hidden, and dare I say, 'authentic' desires, 
then we would not be far off the mark in being able to point the way to resolving the unconscious/conscious 
conflict which is at root of the neuroses.  Such an interpretation here would maintain the early Freudian claim 
to the primacy of the pleasure principle and also explain away 'unpleasure' as those actions which inhibit the 
development and free flow of the unconscious.  In this sense, the neurotic’s conscious Identity would be a 'sick' 
identity, perverted or corrupted by some past traumatic event such that, if only the originating cause were 
revealed and explained – through a 'talking cure' – then we would be able to resolve the apparent conflict at 
heart of the subject and restore a sense of unity and harmony to Identity.   
 
We can forgive the medical practitioner in Freud for seeking such a conclusion3 for, in comparison to 'normal' 
people, the neurotic displays through the manifestations of illness actions which seem to highlight their internal 
disharmony when compared to the apparent harmony of the ‘normal’ healthy subject.  However, as we are well 
aware by this stage, Bataille would reject such a conception, explicitly disavowing the potential harmony 
                                                 
3 Hollier extends this and identifies this desire as fundamental to psychoanalysis as a discipline:  
 
“Freud seems committed to the right of the reality principle, and its representative the ego, and thus to accept a 
survival (or adaptation) imperative as the principle of therapeutic practice. It is because of this basic prejudice 
against the claims of desire that psychoanalysis has always had a tendency to degenerate into a technology of 
repression that subtilizes, and therefore reinforces, the authority of the ego” (1992, p. 46) 
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between the conscious and unconscious levels of psychic activity for any extended period. Freud himself in 
his later works begins to acknowledge such an impossibility, where he begins to recognize in human behavior 
tendencies and actions which do not fall under the sway of the pleasure principle (which Freud claims has the 
goal of seeking to reduce mental 'excitations' that cause disharmony) and which ultimately lead him to posit a 
second, contradictory instinct, that of his 'Death Drive': 
Enough is left unexplained to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat – something that seems 
more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle which it overrides. (Freud, 
2001b, p. 23) 
 
Freud outlines the shortcomings of a reliance upon the pleasure principle in the field of analysis in his Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (though he notably stops short in this work of proposing a strict definition of this 'death 
drive' which he sees as running counter to the activity of the previously established pleasure principle), also 
admitting that he had up to this point been unable to “solve the problem of the relation of the instinctual 
processes of repetition to the dominance of the pleasure principle.” (2001b, p. 62)  He does however, in the 
course of his investigation, allow us to glimpse the nature of the phenomena which run in opposition to those 
of pleasure. 
 
He examines two distinct manifestations of the notion of 'repetition', that of recurrent dreams originating in 
'war-trauma' and a child's game repeated ad nauseum. In both cases he identifies the existence of a 
predisposition towards repetition and seeks to explore the causal link between the origin and manifestation of 
the repeated activity.  In the first case, the 'traumatic' nature of this phenomenon is particularly evident, it being 
the result of the horrific experience of the subject in warfare; however, on initial inspection, similarities 
between this and the child’s game are not immediately apparent: 
The only use he made of any of his toys was to play 'gone' with them... the child had a wooden reel with 
a piece of string tied around it... What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skillfully throw 
it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive 
'o-o-o-o'.  He then pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a 
joyful 'da' ('there')” (2001b, p. 15) 
 
In the first case, what is problematic is that the recurrent dream revisits the scene of the trauma and this would 
seem to run counter to the function that Freud ascribes to dreams in his earlier work as seeking to fulfill some 
repressed wish (why would the soldier wish to revisit the scene of the traumatic event that is the source of his 
distress?)  The interpretation that we saw in the Dora casebook, where her repressed libidinal desires (what 
she actually wanted) found expression in the dream content, is seemingly incompatible (if the driving force of 
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the dream is wish-fulfillment), with the claim that the soldier revisits the scene of trauma to realize some 
repressed wish that finds its expression in the content of the event.  If we maintain that the manifest content of 
the dream does indeed veil some unconsciously held desire, it leads us to question what this wish could indeed 
be, for the content at first glance seems to be irreconcilable with any notion oriented towards pleasure.  This 
however, given the reversal that we found in the analysis of Dora's dream, may not be an impossible task.   
 
Moving away from the case of 'war-trauma' and toward the child's game, we will begin to see how this apparent 
contradiction can be reconciled.  In the case of the repeated game of 'gone!’ Freud finds that the repeated 'o-o-
o-o' ('gone!') and 'da!' ('there!') displays a repetitious 'working over' of an initial event of loss. Freud ultimately 
ties this game to the child's traumatic experience of the mother's leaving (and subsequent return to) him, and 
this allows him to tie the strange game to a 'traumatic' event in the child's world.  This tendency to 'make a 
game' of the traumatic event (that of the child's separation from its mother) and its continual repetition, Freud 
believes is incompatible with the notion of the pleasure principle for, in the act of repetition, the 'excitation' 
(trauma) caused by the loss of the mother is re-enacted by the child in their game. If the Pleasure Principle 
held sway over the workings of the psyche, then, if Freud is to be believed, we would not expect to see such a 
'dredging up' of a traumatic event.  This repetition reproduces the initial feelings of loss experienced within 
the child at the loss of the mother, transferring those feelings onto the loss of the toy.  This brings with it the 
reintroduction of the traumatic experience of loss and the corresponding increase in feelings of un-pleasure 
that accompanied the mother’s absence, a manifestation recognizable with each utterance of the 'o-o-o-o'. 
 
However, as can be seen from the culmination of the game and its accompanying 'da!', even in this instance it 
is difficult to divorce the pleasure principle completely from the situation. The symbolic return of the mother 
(‘da!’) implies that, whilst the initial unpleasure is brought to bear, the resolution of the game nullifies and 
brings to a close the disharmony by reintroducing the pleasure felt at the return of the mother/object.   Could 
we thus posit that the game and the traumatic recollection of the war-trauma in the dream are repeated in order 
to result in a feeling of pleasure at its close?  Or perhaps, is the repetition itself caused by a contradictory 
impulse, the conclusion of which is only the conscious subject’s intervention which seeks to resolve the tension 
that is reintroduced independently of it?  This requires further examination as Freud recognized: 
Even under the dominance of the pleasure principle, there are ways and means enough of making what 
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is in itself unpleasurable into a subject to be recollected and worked over in the mind...  they give no 
evidence of the operation of tendencies beyond the pleasure principle, that is of tendencies more 
primitive than it and independent of it.  (2001b, p. 17) 
 
What strikes us here as potentially misleading Freud is that whilst he seems to highlight some need to repeat 
or 'work through' unpleasurable experiences, the oppositional forces at work that generate this need (as seen 
in the repetitious dream of the soldier and the child's game) only seem to arise as a result of the influence of 
an external source.  This external influence, once experienced, then seems to be worked through by the 
individual in such a way as to seek to master (and thus nullify) this intrusion under the sway of the dominant 
pleasure principle.  In order to maintain his hypothesis of the existence of an instinct that runs counter to the 
pleasure principle, Freud must then shift the source of unpleasure from the external source – the mother and 
war – towards one which arises from the internal mechanism of the psychical processes.  He will ultimately 
seek to resolve this problematic by identifying an 'instinctual' drive within nature (and by extension in man) 
towards a state of inertia which leads him to posit that the true aim of life is paradoxically geared to the attempt 
to “bring about death” (2001b, p. 39)4.   
A particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which produce too great an increase 
of unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from 
the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation against them.  
(2001b, p. 29) 
 
Whilst the traumatic experience of the soldier is generated by an external cause – war – it seems to be the case 
that the cause of unpleasure in the child's game is likewise external, being generated by the child's upset at the 
departure of its mother.  In this type of interpretation, we can clearly see how the child's game and the soldier’s 
dream are an attempt to seek to “master the stimulus retrospectively” (2001b, p. 32), by seeking to recreate the 
feeling of anxiety and trauma through repeated simulation of the event, the reason being that when the event 
of trauma occurred, the subject in both cases was not ready for it, and was unable to prepare itself in defense 
against it.  When viewed in such a manner, these stimuli take on a violent character (in the sense of a violation) 
which proves threatening to the assured integrity and harmony of the subject that experiences them5. As 
                                                 
 
5 Walter Benjamin makes some interesting remarks on this topic in his essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’. He notes 
that the role of consciousness in the psychical dynamic is not to be receptive to external stimuli, but chiefly to provide 
this “protection against stimuli” (Benjamin, 1999, p. 157). In his reading of Freud, Benjamin, quoting Freud, draws our 
attention to the special conserving function the Ego plays in protecting itself “against the effects of the excessive energies 
at work in the external world” (p. 157) In seeking to master retroactively the traumatic stimuli, the Ego works to ensure 
that the “acceptance of shocks” (p. 157) through repeated “training in coping with stimuli” (p. 157) takes the form of 
“dreams as well as recollection” (p. 157) and leads to the ‘sterilization’ of the external threat and its reduction to ‘lived 
experience’: 
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previously noted, if we are able to bring the origin of these stimuli from the strictly external source into the 
psyche itself as involving its own internal processes, then we will be able to more fully recognize the contrary 
instinct that Freud is seeking to establish.  This is something that will come into focus by establishing the link 
between the departure of the mother and the cementing of the child's identity, that through investigation 
becomes apparent in the game of 'gone' and 'there!'. 
Don’t leave me Mother! 
 
Why is the departure of the mother such a traumatic event for the child, and why does it cause such an 
unpleasant experience that it has to be simulated by the child in play?  The answer here seems that the child 
either suffers at the unexpected loss of the object of its affections, or it feels threatened by the loss of the 
presence of the mother that provided a reassuring frame of reference.  Whilst both these elements play a part, 
we must look beneath the surface explanations to reveal that it is both the traumatic threat to its burgeoning 
identity that is bound up with the parent, and the trauma of the transformation to a new form of identity, one 
which the working through aims to resolve.  At base, we will see that the traumatic event reveals a violent 
moment of transition, one which arises from an internal desire to maintain its current identity against the loss 
of itself, and concurrently a desire to cement and master this new identity that it was not ready for.   
 
Within the context of Freud’s tale, it is implied that prior to the event of separation it is not right to talk of a 
properly self-reflexive and independent Identity of the child for, owing to the total reliance upon the parent, 
we cannot truly claim that there exists between the mother and child a distinct I/Other separation when viewed 
from the vantage point of the child.  In its reliance on the mother, and prior to the moment of her departure, 
we can tentatively posit that for the child, with its rapidly increasing awareness of the world, the lines between 
itself and its surroundings (including it's mother) are blurred, lacking a proper representation of itself, which 
as we saw in Hegel, arises from the reciprocal recognition of a distinction between itself and another.  This 
apparent blurred identity – where the line between mother and child, for the child, is not clear – leads Freud 
quite justifiably to state that the departure of the mother provokes a reaction in which “the child cannot possibly 
                                                 
 
That the shock is thus cushioned, parried by consciousness, would lend the incident that occasions it the character 
of having been lived in the strict sense. (p. 158)  
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have felt his mother's departure as something agreeable or even indifferent” (2001b, p. 15)  In the departure of 
the mother, the child is losing a part of itself, its own identity being so closely linked to her own, and in the 
sudden disappearance of part of itself, this violent absence shows itself as particularly traumatic.  The departure 
that generates its simulation in the game serves to illuminate the nature of the 'threat' to the embryonic identity 
of the child.  The separation that causes anxiety in the child is revealed as an experience which threatens the 
child's Identity, with the working through in the game being evidence of an attempt to master this loss and an 
operation to reinforce and solidify the remaining Identity.  The game in this sense both protects and creates the 
Identity of the child by protecting itself from the loss of part of itself, and serves to create and reinforce a new 
sense of self that excludes the part that was lost through the traumatic event.  We are beginning to see that in 
the process of repetition we have two conflicting impulses at work; one which is threatened by the loss of itself 
and seeks to re-establish itself, and the secondary impulse which seeks to master it by externalizing the source 
of the trauma and leads to the creation of a sense of Identity which excludes this traumatically lost portion of 
itself.  This leads Freud to see the instinct contrary to the pleasure principle as: 
An instinct…inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been 
obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces. (2001b, p. 36) 
 
Taking this into account, we can begin to see that the Ego is constructed and acts in such a manner as to protect 
itself against these 'disturbing forces', where the violent experience disturbs the instinctual drive to maintain 
the “status quo” or “old state of things” (p. 38), and consequently, the protective forces (under the auspices of 
the pleasure principle) are set in motion to damp down and nullify the event of Trauma.  This creates an 
'externalization' of the event and effects a 'split' between the conscious mental activity which forms and 
constitutes the new subject, relegates the previous state of affairs through repression and denies the contrary 
drive to maintain or return to the previous state by transforming it into a threat.  This externalization in effect 
reinforces the separation that it is working to protect against by distancing itself from the source of its own 
trauma.  In separating out the internal Trauma from the sphere of mental activity (where conscious mental 
activity is construed as identity) the Ego serves to repress it by transferring the internal disturbance outside of 
itself and onto an external cause.   In this case, we see the child transferring the cause of the trauma, that of its 
insufficient self-hood, externally (for whilst the mother is indeed external to the child, in relation to the identity 
of the child that is not strictly true6) and attributing it to the mother's departure, thereby ensuring its own 
                                                 
6 Despite the fact that the child is, from an external viewpoint, not part of the mother, it is important to recognize that 
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perpetuation by excluding an aspect of itself as foreign that previously was an intimate part of it.   
 
The Ego here forms itself in the first instance in the recognition of the distinction between Subject and Object 
and their non-Identity (as we saw in Hegel), and we find that in the very initial movements of the creation of 
Identity a fabricated externalization of Object from Subject takes place.  For Freud, life itself exists in a state 
of inertia, in which the distinction between Subject and Object is not truly 'there'. Nature, excluding 
consciousness (to borrow a phrase from Bataille), exists in a state akin to “water in water” (1989, p. 24).  Here 
we find two conflicting notions of desire; one which seeks to maintain and preserve the distinction between 
Subject and Object (self-consciousness) through “self-preservation, self-assertion and mastery” (Freud, 2001b, 
p. 39) and the other which endeavors to return to a state of existence prior to this distinction.  The distinction 
that he finds at the formation of the Ego leads Freud to claim that instincts that run counter to the pleasure 
principle (and thus at times to the Ego itself) desire to “bring about death” (2001b, p. 39), even going so far as 
to claim that the “aim of all life is death” (2001b, p. 38).  This death we must therefore see as two-fold.  Firstly 
it involves the implication of a ‘real’ physical destruction or death where life seeks to return to the ‘inertia’ of 
the point before the existence of the distinct mode of existence. Secondly, it implies a state of affairs prior to 
the establishment of the Ego, where a retrograde movement to return to the point prior to the traumatic origins 
of self exerts itself.  Ultimately, Freud comes to recognize that man lives caught between two opposing poles: 
It is as though the life of an organism moved with a vacillating rhythm. One group of instincts rushes 
forwards so as to reach the final aim of life as swiftly as possible; but when a particular stage is reached, 
the other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and continue the journey.  (Freud, 
2001b, pp. 40-1) 
 
We are beginning to see where an apparent convergence between the thought of Bataille and Freud takes place 
for both share a similar conception of a 'vacillation' between two poles of activity.  Freud places these opposing 
poles under the terms of Eros and Thanatos, and the movements that he sees between these poles (and their 
oppositional character) seems to echo the structure that Bataille characterizes in his General and Restricted 
economies. 
 
                                                 
misapprehensions of reality can still be of import for psychical development.  In his response to Hägglund’s ‘On 
Chronolibido’, Johnston notes: “how subjects self-consciously experience and spontaneously self-interpret their emotions 
and motivations cannot be dismissively written off as inconsequential qua purely epiphenomenal, false, fictional, illusory, 
reducible, and the like.” (Johnston, 2013, p. 153) This idea, that what may be a psychological ‘fiction’ may, for the subject, 
be felt as no less real is how we should view Bataille’s ‘restricted’ subject who is the target of his literary practice. 
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However, it is at this apparent point of convergence that we will ultimately see the two diverge – it being in 
actuality only a similarity of structure – where although the two recognize the vacillation between the opposing 
poles, we will find that it is Freud’s tethering of the notion of Eros (sexuality, growth, preservation) to the 
conscious ego with which Bataille will take issue.  In much the same way as we have seen Bataille examine in 
his Eroticism, Freud turns to simple-celled organisms - “protozoa” (2001b, p. 47) – to initially seek to establish 
in more detail the relationship and tension that exists between sexuality and death.  As he is seeking to establish 
the reality of the existence of instincts that run counter to the pleasure principle as part of the psychical make 
up of man, he, not unlike Bataille, seeks to establish this relationship in an empirically verifiable way.  Again 
like Bataille (though preceding his analysis), he identifies that in the scissiparity of unicellular reproduction, 
the distinction between sexuality and death proves 'indistinct'; reproduction occurs at the point of destruction 
of the parent animal which, involving as it does the creation of the new, means that the death of the original 
organism is “obscured by it” (2001b, p. 47).  This observation could easily be drawn from the same well of 
knowledge as is tapped by Bataille, and it is unsurprising to see the correlation between these two analyses.  
However, what is of note (and what is lacking in Bataille's analysis) is that Freud recognizes that  unless 
“stimulating agents” external to the dividing cells are introduced and maintained throughout the act of division, 
the resultant cells are eventually “injured by the products of metabolism which they ultimately extruded” 
(2001b, p. 48). Freud makes this observation when he is seeking to counter the proposed 'immortality' of 
protozoa, in that, as the chemical identity of the parent cell continues intergenerationally (in that the 'parent' 
and 'child' cell are identical) that he observes that it is only so under scientific experiments where resultant 
offspring are maintained with the introduction of fresh material that proves a catalyst for their reproduction.  
He observes in cases where the resultant offspring are not 'nurtured' in this sense that they are ultimately 
destroyed by attempting to metabolize the by-products that they excrete during this process of division – in 
other words, the waste product ultimately is ingested and destroys the organism. Again, there are parallels here 
with Bataille who recognized that, in order to create and sustain itself the rational subject by way of “the 
intellectual process automatically limits itself by producing of its own accord its own waste products” (Bataille, 
1985d, p. 97). 
 
As we saw in Bataille's Eroticism it is when we begin to proceed from this immediately apparent relationship 
between sexuality and death in 'protozoa' to seek to establish the same relationship in more complex organisms 
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that we encounter problems.  Freud at this juncture also acknowledges that he gets into difficulty, and we can 
see that this problematic arises once we attempt to move from the observation of a biological relationship 
between sexuality and death (through empirical scientific observation) to seek to understand why a recognition 
of the link between the two was understood by man long before such a biological observation could be made.  
Freud notes: 
Science has little to tell us about the origin of sexuality that we can liken the problem to a darkness into 
which not so much as a ray of a hypothesis has penetrated. (2001b, p. 57) 
 
Freud turns to 'mythical' interpretations of the nature of the origin of sexuality, most notably Plato's account of 
it as contained in the Symposium, to gain insight into the operation of sexuality and death in more complex 
organisms. As we would expect for a man of 'science', Freud finds such an explanation ultimately lacking, 
requiring as he does a scientifically verifiable basis for his notion of the death instinct.  Importantly though, he 
does not jettison his notion for lack of certainty, and whilst in regard to the details of his own argument he 
claims “I am not convinced of them myself” (2001b, p. 59), he does not reject his inference of the existence 
of such an instinctual process that runs counter to pleasure, acknowledging that he still has to resolve “the 
problem of the relation of the instinctual processes of repetition to the dominance of the pleasure principle” 
(2001b, p. 62).   
 
The relationship of the desire for inertia (death) to that of the process of repetition can be seen in the trauma 
in evidence in the play of the child.  The desire to try and maintain or return to the prior state of affairs before 
the departure of the mother (which proves the catalyst of the repetitious game) and the relationship to the 
notion of the pleasure principle is, though we have hinted at it, not completely clear for Freud.  If the two 
notions (pleasure and death), are both biologically instinctual processes, then there must for Freud be a 
scientifically verifiable phenomenon that proves the relationship between the two; both in the case of the 
protozoa and also the human being.  Being both parts of existence and 'life', the two, whilst allowing for 
differences in degree regarding how the instincts manifest themselves, we find that being instinctual, there 
must be some common bond or similarity in the relational structure of the opposing instincts that is common 
to both.  Freud does not manage to complete this explanation to his satisfaction in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, though he does believe that his argument serves as a preliminary foray that allows us to glimpse that 
there is indeed something fundamental to such a relationship. 
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There does however exist within Beyond the Pleasure Principle something of a thread which, with a bit of 
rearrangement, will allow us to overcome this apparently obscure relation between instinct and Ego which, at 
times, seems to intimate a desire which works contrary to that of the pleasure principle, whilst at others in 
harmony with it.  The problem that we are essentially grappling with here is that as the nature of 'Eros' is tied 
to the desire for growth and self-preservation (that being the founding movement of the pleasure principle) 
then why do phenomena that seemingly arise from acts generated in Eros often run counter to the apparently 
desired outcome – the maintenance and growth of the Ego?  We are primarily thinking here of those erotically 
charged moments in contrast with 'normal' manifestations of sexuality.  Both events seem to have their roots 
in the libidinal desires of man, and yet, the erotic phenomenon, as illustrated through the actions of Marcelle, 
seems to run in opposition to the surety of the Ego itself.  The answer that we seek here arises when we 
recognize that the relationship between Eros (libidinal desire for growth) and the Ego is not as straight forward 
as has been intimated.  The problem of a disjunction between (and apparent opposition of) Eros and Thanatos 
can be resolved if we remove the link that ties Eros and the Ego under the auspices of the pleasure principle 
and instead posit that both Eros and Thanatos can work in collusion with and in opposition to the Ego 
dependent upon the particularities of its manifestation and how the Ego was structured at the time of its 
insurgence.  We have already seen in the case of Dora and the child’s game that oftentimes the Ego will, in its 
drive to protect itself and maintain it’s perceived 'harmony', exclude as alien instinctual desires as foreign and 
harmful to itself.  There is here illuminated a selective process in the Ego which allows access to and 
assimilation of certain phenomena along with the exclusion of others.  The pleasure principle guides this 
process in that it seeks to reduce the impact of these phenomena that cause an increase of 'excitation' in the 
Ego.  In the case of Dora particularly, we can see that in the repression of her sexual desire for Herr K the Ego 
functions in such a manner as to exclude from its constitution those aspects which are potentially harmful to it 
and that upset its apparent harmony.  In the child’s game we have seen that the desire to repeat the game itself 
stems from a foundational trauma in the establishment of the child's own self-consciousness – indeed, the 
trauma is in Freud’s analysis the cause of self-consciousness.  In both cases what strikes one is that both the 
desire that arises from the libido (Dora's desire) and those that Freud ascribes within the compulsion to repeat 
(which he aligns with the death drive) share the same characteristics of being potentially threatening to the 
self-conscious Ego.   
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In both cases, though the desire which precedes the repression/repetition came from the individuals themselves, 
it is right to say that they were not conscious of it. Through the process of its breaking (or threatening to) into 
the conscious sphere of the psyche it is immediately pushed outwards and made external to conscious activity.  
What we can recognize is that the two perhaps need to be re-evaluated in such a way as to recognize the 
common factor of excess that runs within each.  These two phenomena, Eros and Thanatos, become excessive 
in that they are at times 'too much to handle' for the Ego, where their very manifestation threatens to overcome 
the stability and harmony of the Ego as it is conscious of itself.  What we are led to acknowledge is whilst the 
two categories of instinctual processes which Freud identifies do indeed seem to have contradictory 
characteristics (Growth vs. Death), that instead, by recognizing the common bond of excess that ties them (that 
of Land’s ‘primary process’), we can posit that the distinction Freud makes potentially arises only from a 
confusion of categorization that fails to acknowledge what they share. 
 
This ‘common bond’ differs from that proposed by Hägglund (2013) in that, through recognizing the 
fluctuations in the movement of energy (excess and exhaustion), the subject is able to retain its dynamic 
character.  The establishment of a unifying absolute (time in Hägglund’s case) underpinning the psychical 
structure, effectively “paralyses” the Ego and prevents it “defending in any effective fashion” (Johnston, 2013, 
p. 150) against this absolute.  Instead, if we recognize that the apparently contradictory Eros and Thanatos are 
only shades of excessive desire interpreted differently, then we can see how at times desire runs in support of 
the Ego’s “various investments” (Land, 1992, p. 48), whilst at others it runs in opposition and threatens to 
submerge it. The Ego in this fashion floats atop a sea of desire, at times sailing with the prevailing wind and 
happy to be carried with it, whereas at others, it struggles to stay on course whilst fighting against the threat of 
capsizing7.   
 
The establishment of a notion of a 'death drive', whilst alluring to the reader, serves to confuse and deflect us 
from the reality of the relationship between desire and the Ego.  We can see here how if we remove the 
distinction between life and death drives and instead insist upon the common bond of excess that underpins 
                                                 
7 This notion is reminiscent of the passage from Schopenhauer quoted by Nietzsche in his Birth of Tragedy which depicts 
man as a ‘flimsy barque’ atop a raging sea. 
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both phenomena, we are able to resolve the apparently contradictory ‘impulse to repeat’ that finds itself 
manifest in human activity.  By viewing both Eros and Thanatos as shades of desire we are able to understand 
the relationship between actions which can be both in harmony and in opposition to the Ego whilst drawing 
their water from the same well. We will now turn to the notion of 'Taboo' and 'Transgression' to see how Bataille 
takes this insight and extends it to the structure of human society as a whole.  It will clarify my contention that 
the conflicting aspects of Desire Freud struggled with are only manifestations “deployed by the psyche” as it 
wrestles with an impersonal energy flow “that floods the nervous-system with potentially catastrophic 
quantities of alien excitation” (Land, 1992, p. 41). Similarly, it will also allow us to highlight the co-
dependence Bataille’s notions of restricted and general economies, played out at a societal or individual level, 
have: 
The experience of transgression is indissociable from the consciousness of the constraint or prohibition 
it violates; indeed, it is precisely by and through its transgression that the force of a prohibition becomes 
fully realized.  (Suleiman, 1995, p. 317) 
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2.2: Don’t you dare touch that! 
 
Man belongs in any case to both of these worlds and between them willy-nilly his life is torn.  The world 
of work and reason is the basis of human life but work does not absorb us completely and if reason gives 
the orders our obedience is never unlimited.  Man built up the rational world by his own efforts, but 
there remains within him an undercurrent of violence. (Bataille, 2006, p. 49) 
 
'An undercurrent of violence': with these words we find an echo of the unconscious strata of the psyche that 
we saw in the previous chapter.  Violence here does not coincide with the phenomena we most commonly 
associate with the term despite these events being included under its influence.  We are not only dealing with 
acts of rape, pillage and murder – explicitly violent acts – but instead, to understand violence in the Bataillean 
sense, we have to recognize that he uses the term to define violent acts as acts of violation.  Indeed, horrific 
acts normally described as violent share this characteristic (it actually being the defining one) but, as the notion 
of violation is key here for Bataille we can foresee how actions not overtly violent in character can be included 
within such a framework.  Violation is the disregard for the integrity of an object or Other, the overstepping of 
a boundary of respect that normally exists between people and involves the recognized relation (as we saw in 
Hegel) being disregarded.  An act that takes on this violent flavour need not be physically or mentally damaging 
and, in order to understand Bataille's use of the term (for violence is central to his literature) we must allow 
ourselves to jettison morally inherited notions that equate violence with evil.   
 
We have already examined in much detail a violent act which falls outside this normal conception, which upon 
reflection reveals itself as a particularly traumatic and violent experience; that of the child's game. Initially, the 
game seems an innocuous expression of childhood curiosity; however, in the course of Freud’s deconstruction 
of the act, the motive force that drives its repetition, along with the generative separation, is revealed as 
distinctly violent  in regard to the burgeoning self-hood of the child.  The separation from the mother violates 
the pre-existing proto-identity of the child whilst reflexively, the Ego, in its attempt to exorcise and dominate 
this disturbance, perpetrates its own acts of violence against itself.  Violence – understood as a violation – is 
shown to be present at the founding movement of the Freudian subject, where desire has split itself apart, 
establishing a duality that oscillates between self-preservation and self-loss.  Bataille, though not explicitly 
drawing reference to Freud, reaches a similar conclusion and finds this structural relationship evidenced in the 
construction of the Ego in operation at a societal level: 
Work demands the sort of conduct where effort is in a constant ratio with productive efficiency.  It 
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demands rational behaviour where the wild impulses worked out on feast days and usually in games are 
frowned upon.  If we were unable to repress these impulses we should not be able to work, but work 
introduces the very reason for repressing them. (Bataille, 2006, p. 41) 
 
Much like the Ego, the desire for self-preservation generates, in the face of heterogeneous elements, a counter 
movement which seeks to sublimate and direct desire away from destructive outlets and towards useful (read 
productive) ends.  And yet, whilst on a mechanical level we understand that this action is necessary (as man 
cannot forever 'spend without reserve' – Chapter 1.4), what we find is that in the sublimation to 'work' (or Ego) 
there is a break with the dynamic general economy of energy towards one which excludes wasteful, violent 
expenditure.  Protection against dissolution and the guarantee of self-preservation in the first instance 
establishes work/Ego, which then as established becomes the reason itself for future repression.  In other 
words, though initially the repression and exclusion of violence occurs in a reactive, protective manner 
following the act of trauma, it then metamorphises into a pro-active self-perpetuating mechanism which 
functions to the exclusion of those things which, although part of its constitution, threaten the integrity of what 
it worked so hard to maintain.  In a remark that is again distinctly reminiscent of this psychic development, 
Bataille identifies 'taboos' functioning in a similar way: “Hence the human collective, partly dedicated to work, 
is defined by taboos without which it would not have become the world of work that it essentially is.” (2006, 
p. 41) 
 
In his Eroticism Bataille outlines his conception of the nature of Taboo in such a way that it echoes directly the 
Freudian conception of the Ego as it functions as a “protective shield against stimuli” (Freud, 2001b, p. 31).  
It is in the nature of how Taboos function in relation to their transgression that we can infer similarities of 
intuition between Freud and Bataille.  However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Freud struggles with the 
relation between the instincts and the subject, and I ascribed this to a confusion of categorization.  I posited 
that by removing the distinction made between the instincts of life and death they could be unified under the 
auspices of the violation that is in common with both of them.  In focusing on this aspect we are able to see 
the commonality that exists between taboos and the Ego where, when faced with phenomena that it is unable 
to contain, the Ego suffers a traumatic experience (whether the origins are those that Freud would deem as 
arising from Eros or Thanatos).  We can be confident here that Bataille would agree with such a conclusion 
(one itself evocative of the Nietzschean critique of Hegelian consciousness), for we see him emphasizing a 
similar relationship between Taboo and its Transgression when he tells us: “Violence is what the world of work 
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excludes with its taboos; in my field of enquiry this implies at the same time reproduction and death.” and 
“this link ought not to sound paradoxical.  The excess from which reproduction proceeds and the excess we 
call death can only be understood with the help of the other.” (2006, p. 42) 
 
Violent excess characterizes both sexual phenomena and death, and it is in the dynamic structure of Taboo and 
Transgression that we can see the link most clearly.  In the second and third chapters of his Eroticism, Bataille 
works to examine the natures of taboo in general alongside a focus upon those regarding sexuality and death 
in particular.  In doing so, he is able to do away with the apparent incongruity between sexuality and death that 
we saw in Freud by bringing them together under the common bond of violence.  By reviewing his comments 
on Taboo in general and in particular we are able to see this common aspect most clearly. On Taboo's relating 
to death he tells us: 
For each man who regards it with awe, the corpse is the image of his own destiny.  It bears witness to a 
violence which destroys not one man alone but all men in the end.  The taboo which lays hold on the 
others at the sight of a corpse is the distance they put between themselves and violence, by which they 
cut themselves off from violence. (2006, p. 44) 
 
Whilst in regard to sexuality: 
All we can say is that as opposed to work, sexual activity is a form of violence, that as a spontaneous 
impulse it can interfere with work.  A community committed to work cannot afford to be at its mercy 
during working hours, so to speak.  We would then be justified in thinking that, from the first, sexual 
liberty must have received some check which we are bound to call a taboo. (2006, p. 50) 
 
And finally on taboo in general: 
Its shape and its objects do change, but whether it is a question of sexuality or death, violence, terrifying 
yet fascinating, is what it is leveled at. (2006, p. 51) 
 
Violence, both against the individual and against the organization and motivation of society at large, is the 
threat against which taboos are erected.  Whether in the case of menstruation, whose “discharges are thought 
of as manifestations of internal violence” (2006, p. 54) or the “nauseous, rank and heaving matter” (p. 56) of 
death and decay, it is the threat of violation of the perceived integrity of the individual or society against which 
the taboo seeks to protect.  In both cases, menstruation and death, we can perceive the dissociation that is 
carried out by the individual/group in its ostracizing movement that occurs with the erection of the taboo.  
Functioning as it does in an analogous way to the 'protective shield' of the Ego, society erects barriers against 
those aspects of its own constitution which threaten its continued stability and growth.  Like the Ego, it serves 
to eliminate certain vital elements which potentially – certainly in the case of death – by their very nature, if 
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left unchecked cast a threatening shadow over the productive, accumulative march of progress. 
 
Whilst we can perceive the common facet of violence that draws sexuality and death together, it is still not 
apparent whether this violent character is the result of a unity between these phenomena, or whether this is 
only an apparent unity.  To pursue this conjecture, it is not clear whether sexuality and death are deemed 
threatening as a result of just their capacity to interrupt the smooth functioning of society, or whether they 
share some deeper connection beyond this.  This is particularly pertinent in the light of our previous insight 
into the notions of Eros and Thanatos, and it will be necessary to show such a structural similarity if we are to 
prevent sexual desire from being completely nullified by a revised introspection of desire.  If however we are 
able to establish the common bond and unity between sexuality and death, we will be able to discover over 
and above – or perhaps below – this politicized, sublimated sexuality, a sexuality that glows in its violent, 
traumatic and sensuous glory. 
 
Excrement reeks.  It reeks of death and decay, threatening to infect us by its presence.  For this reason we expel 
it behind closed doors, flush it away, and at least in polite company, pretend we do not do it.  Farmers however 
use excrement and waste matter as fertilizer for crops.  The very object that is abject (Kristeva) is recycled and 
reintroduced into a cycle whereby death guarantees and nourishes life.  Destruction leads to creation and 
creation leads to destruction.  Recognizing this repetitious circularity, Bataille tells us: 
The death of one being is correlated with the birth of the other, heralding it and making it possible.  Life 
is always a product of the decomposition of life.  Life first pays its tribute to death which disappears, 
then to corruption following on death and bringing back into the cycle of change the matter necessary 
for the ceaseless arrival of new beings into the world.  (2006, p. 55) 
 
This echoes the revelations uncovered in both Bataille and Freud's discussions of 'protozoa', and is evocative 
of Bataille's general economic theory being applied to biological concerns.  Taking a step back from the 
microscope, if we extend our range of perception, we can see how this interrelation of sexuality and death 
functions on a more general level.  Bataille draws our attention to the cyclical process of growth and death that 
we find in the movement of energy in the food chain (through the cyclical process of Plants->Herbivore-
>Carnivore->Decomposer's->Plants (p. 60)).  At each stage the proliferation and growth of the successive stage 
is made possible and guaranteed by the consumption or destruction of the former.  However, as is implied in 
this cycle, and perhaps what is most unpalatable for man, there is no ultimate protection possible against life 
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where, at the apparent 'top of the food chain', “nothing is left but this fierce beast of prey” who, despite their 
position of power, will become “in their turn the prey of hyenas and worms.” (p. 60)  The cycle of life here is 
guaranteed only by the perish-ability of the previous link in the chain.  From this vantage point, death and 
decay allows for the possibility of growth and reproduction and vice-versa. In the end, our death and our waste 
are intimately bound up with our growth, and what gives us our sexual power can be traced back to the 
engagement with the festering matter of decay: 
It takes an iron nerve to perceive the connection between the promise of life implicit in eroticism and 
the sensuous aspect of death.  Mankind conspires to ignore the fact that death is also the youth of things.  
Blindfolded, we refuse to see that only death guarantees the fresh upsurging without which life would 
be blind.  We refuse to see that life is the trap set for the balanced order, that life is nothing but instability 
and disequilibrium.  Life is a swelling tumult continuously on the verge of explosion.  (p. 59) 
 
Nature itself, vast and impersonal, is the 'balanced order', and life, here human conscious life, is a trap which 
interrupts the flow of energy.  Human conscious life becomes threatened by instability, a notion that we saw 
evoked in the functioning of the Ego.  The barriers against excess – taboos – are erected in order to protect the 
stabilized human life against the current of existence, (to ensure the ability to “produce at cut prices” (Bataille, 
2006, p. 60)) which works in opposition to the threat of destruction in consumption.  Human existence for 
Bataille, as we have repeatedly seen, functions, as in Hegel and Freud, through the restriction of its own desire.  
Indeed, restriction is constitutive of the subject and precipitates the split between the sacred and profane.  
However, like Nietzsche and the child, we see how this fracturing of existence splits off a part of itself, so 
much so that “a febrile unrest within us asks death to wreak its havoc at our expense.” (Bataille, 2006, p. 60)  
In such a bind we find Bataille's man, unable to engage fully with his own desire (threatening to unravel him 
as they do), hostile as they are to his productive social existence, and yet subject nonetheless to the natural 
cycle of energy which compels one to spend without reserve: 
Nature demands their surrender, or rather; she asks them to go crashing headlong into their own ruin.  
Humanity became possible at the instant when, seized by an insurmountable dizziness, man tried to 
answer “No”.  Man tried?  In fact men have never definitively said no to violence (to the “excessive” 
urges in question).  In their weaker moments they have resisted nature’s current but this is a momentary 
suspension and not a final stand still.  (2006, p. 62) 
 
There is a charge which can be brought to bear against Bataille, and is one that can be similarly leveled against 
Freud; are we are able to make the transition from the observations of extremes of human behaviour (such as 
the 'sick' in Freud or the 'libertine' in Bataille) and apply the observations to those of 'normal' people?  This 
albeit relatively weak challenge, would follow as such; granted that we can observe the functioning of the 
psyche or subject in the manner we have seen when we observe these 'depraved' characters, are we then able 
109 
 
to extend these findings to humanity in general?  In other words, by the very fact that either the neurotic or the 
erotic exist upon the limits of human behaviour, can the lessons we learn from these 'abnormal' cases be 
extended to apply in the case of the 'normal' or healthy individual?  To test this argument we will focus upon 
a taboo which Bataille deals with in detail, and against which one would be hard pressed to align its functioning 
to something found only in ‘degenerate’ peoples or societies.  We will now turn to the taboo against Incest – 
the transgression of which was the subject of Bataille's novel Ma Mere – and find at its foundation an excessive 
sexual desire that is kept in check and which seeks to mitigate the potential violence that acquiescence to this 
desire can have. 
 
The Enigma of Incest 
 
 
We are struck straight away with the universality of prohibitions where incest is concerned.  In one form 
or another all mankind is aware of it though the modalities will vary. (Bataille, 2006, p. 197) 
 
Incestuous relationships are a universal obsession as dreams and myths show.  If this were not so, why 
should the taboo be so solemnly proclaimed?  Explanations of this order have a fundamental weakness.  
The disapproval which does not exist with animals is a historical occurrence, a result of the changes that 
made human life what it is, it is not simply part of the order of things. (2006, p. 199) 
 
Two things initially jump out at us from the above passages.  The first is that Bataille states that the 
phenomenon of Incest in its general appearance is a universal experience, and whilst the particularities of the 
prohibitions may vary, the general rule of prohibition holds.  Secondly, we see him drawing attention to the 
exclusively human aspect of the taboo, the appearance of which he claims is unique to man and not found in 
animals.  We can see in light of this that we can say that the taboo against incest is a particularly human 
phenomenon arising from the nature of the historical development of man as man.  Bataille sees the taboo 
arising as a result of the generative forces in the consciousness of man and societies which, given the myriad 
times and places in which man has formed social groups, in turn explains the variations that can be found in 
the manifestation of the taboo.  To draw attention to the multiple permutations that this taboo can take, a few 
examples highlighted by Westermarck will suffice to draw attention to the fact without belaboring the point: 
The Malays of the uplands of Padang are forbidden to marry within the mother's tribe; the Bataks of 
Sumatra, Alfura of Ceram and Buru, Niasans, and Timorese, within the father's.  Among the Italones of 
the Philippines, marriage between blood-relations is not allowed.  The Bugis and Watubela Islanders 
prohibit the intermarriage of cousins, paternal and maternal; whilst among the Orang-Banûwa of 
Malacca, the Macassars, and the natives of Aru, near New Guinea, children of brothers cannot 
intermarry, though children of sisters, or of brothers and sisters, can.  Again, among the Lettis of the 
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Serwatty Islands, marriage may take place between brothers' children and between brothers' and sisters' 
children, but not between children of two sisters; and, among the Bataks, Rejangs, and natives of 
Amboina, a sister's son is allowed to marry a brother's daughter, whereas a brother's son must not marry 
a sister's daughter. (1891, p. 302) 
 
The particular variations and nuances found in differing societies allow us here to glimpse the “multiple 
permutations” (Bataille, 2006, p. 201) that the taboo can take.  It will not benefit us here to go further into an 
exploration of the many varied manifestations of the taboo as it is found. Instead, we will follow Bataille's 
lead, and recognize that to examine these variations in depth will not only become desperately tedious, but 
also that the conclusions we could draw from such an exercise would really only serve to lead us deeper into 
the quagmire: 
The fog has only become thicker of course, while we have been probing into these details.  Not only are 
the distinctions between these separate kinds of blood relationships purely theoretical ones, quite 
meaningless, not only are we miles from the clear and specific difference between our parents and sisters 
and the rest of mankind, but the relationships often mean different things in different places! (2006, pp. 
202-3) 
 
In seeking to find the answer to the problem of incest, it seems natural to focus upon the many manifestations 
that are found in the world, laying out the varying structures and hoping to identify some common bond that 
exists between the proscribed characters which lends them this prohibited value.  Whilst there is merit in such 
an approach, in that is allows us to glimpse the structure that defines the prohibition, such an endeavor allows 
us to see nothing more in common between them than that the taboo prevents certain groups from having 
sexual relationships.  It does not however tell us why certain people are forbidden, and it does not allow us to 
view the universal aspect of the taboo.   
 
One theory that seeks to explain the variations of the taboo is a modified version of the Westermarckian notion 
of ‘negative imprinting’.  This theory attests that the reason for the incest taboo is as a result of (depending 
upon the starting point of those who hold to it) either a process of socialization or, perhaps more radically, of 
our genetic make-up inherited from our forebears. This idea contends that for reasons of natural selection and 
the minimization of the possibility of infant mortality, during our upbringing we go through a process of 
'negative imprinting' which serves to establish a pattern of behavior and results in us being at least less inclined 
towards and at most horrified by, the idea of sexual liaison with those with whom we share a close (most often 
blood) kinship. 
Here, I think, we may find a quite sufficient explanation of the horror of incest; not because man at an 
early stage recognized the injurious influence of close intermarriage, but because the law of natural 
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selection must inevitably have operated.  Among the ancestors of man, as among other animals, there 
was no bar to sexual intercourse.  But variations, here as elsewhere would naturally present themselves; 
and those of our ancestors who avoided in-and-in breeding would survive, while the others would 
gradually decay and ultimately perish.  Thus an instinct would be developed which would be powerful 
enough, as a rule, to prevent injurious unions.  Of course it would display itself simply as an aversion 
on the part of individuals to union with others with whom they lived; but these, as a matter of fact, would 
be blood relations, so that the result would be survival of the fittest. (Westermarck, 1891, p. 352) 
 
The formulation I am advancing argues that the biological consequence of inbreeding is a decrease in 
fitness... Given this lowered fitness a human group practicing incest operates at a selective disadvantage 
in competition with outbreeding human groups and ultimately would be unlikely to survive... one might 
expect over time that natural selection would lead to preservation of societies that practiced outbreeding 
(incest taboo) and elimination of those societies that favored, or were neutral to, the practice of incest.  
Consequently, what eventually remains is a substantial amount of variability in marriage rules and 
kinship structure across cultures, but with all varieties providing the basic minimum of outbreeding 
imposed by natural selection.  (Lindzey, 1967, pp. 1051-2) 
 
Linking the notion of the taboo against incest to the potentially damaging effects on the offspring of such a 
union seems to be rather convincing.  Indeed, identifying the ill-effects that can be passed onto subsequent 
generations8 as the generative cause for the erection of the taboo seems a well founded argument. However, it 
is unsettling that such an idea which ostracizes this particular behaviour and expels it from the normal 
functioning of human beings under the banner of 'unnaturalness' can be seen to share similar undertones as 
those once leveled against homosexual or interracial relationships.  Whilst such a notion as that of negative 
imprinting appeals as it removes the threat of incestuous desires from the realm of activity of the healthy 
individual, recent research9 suggests that the notion of a biological or genetic force that underwrites the taboo 
is mistaken, whereas in fact, far from being repelled by those who are close kin, we are in fact more attracted 
                                                 
8 Such as those proposed by Lindzey in the paper previous cited: “The findings most directly relevant to our present 
interest resulted from a very recent study by Adams and Neel (1967) in which they compared the children of 18 nuclear 
incest matings… with 18 control matings, rather closely matched with the incest group for age, weight, stature, 
intelligence, and socioeconomic status. At the end of 6 months they found that of the 18 children of an incestuous union, 
five had died; two were severely mentally retarded, were subject to seizures, and had been institutionalized; one had a 
bilateral cleft palate; and three showed evidence of borderline intelligence (estimated IQ 70)… On the other hand, none 
of the 18 control children had died or were institutionalized, none were severely retarded, only one had a major physical 
defect, and 15 were considered ready for adoption.” (1967, p. 1054) 
9 Fraley and Marks have carried out a series of experiments to question the validity of the Westermarckian hypothesis 
when used in conjunction with notions of evolutionary psychology – the results of which can be found in their paper 
Westermarck, Freud, and the Incest Taboo: Does Familial resemblance activate Sexual Attraction?.  In brief, their 
investigations contested what Westermarck proposed, that; 'an instinct would have developed', in this case an aversion to 
close family members, and this arises from evolutionary concerns.  Fraley and Marks challenged this by carrying out a 
series of experiments in which pairs of participants were shown a succession of images of strangers which were mixed 
using image morphing software at increasing gradations with pictures of themselves and their  opposite sex parent.  If we 
were to accept Westermarck's hypothesis then we would expect to see that the greater the mix of the parent image with 
the stranger, we would find that the attractiveness of the image would decrease to the participants.  The converse was 
actually discovered with participants rating those images which were more like their kin as more attractive than those 
which contained less.  The upshot of such research is two-fold, in that it suggests that the Taboo against incest is firmly 
rooted in either the psychic or social development of the individual, and secondly, perhaps more unpalatably, that we may 
in fact find our close kin to be more sexually appealing than we normally consider. 
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to them.  
 
Research such as that carried out by Fraley and Marks (2010) is compelling evidence that suggests two things.  
Firstly it suggests that rather than having a 'natural' disinclination toward those with whom we share kinship 
bonds, we may actually prefer them to non-kin as sexual partners. Secondly, as a result, the question of the 
origin of the taboo is shifted away from biology and towards the social structure of society or the psychic 
development of the individual. This is where Bataille saw the taboo originating also, sharing the notion that 
the attraction felt towards those close to us was far greater than that of those who were distant.  It is for such a 
reason that he saw the taboo arising from an economic structure which guarantees social cohesion through the 
prevention of the hoarding of potential sexual partners: 
The father marrying his daughter, the brother marrying his sister would be like the man with a cellar full 
of champagne who drank it all up by himself and never asked a friend in to have it. The father must 
bring the wealth his daughter represents into a cycle of ceremonial exchanges.  He must bestow her as 
a gift, but this cycle entails a number of rules valid within a social group.  (2006, p. 205) 
 
The brother giving away his sister is less concerned to deny the value of sexual union with somebody 
closely related to him than to assert the greater value of marriages that would unite his sister with another. 
(2006, p. 207) 
 
Guerlac, in her ‘’Recognition’ by a Woman!’ elucidates the particular position of women within this structure. 
For Bataille, she argues, women are “at the centre of eroticism” (1990, p. 100) owing to their position as the 
“paradoxical object which marks the limit between law and transgression” (p. 103). Women10 entering (or more 
rightly being 'given') into this economic exchange gain the “same sort of significance as champagne” (Bataille, 
2006, p. 206), whose value is in the social communication that is ensured through the prevention of the 
monopolization of sexual relationships within the family. The taboo on incest, like festivities and the 
phenomenon of potlatch – and indeed sexuality in general – reveals a general economic structure in contrast 
to one which denies the value of loss within human relationships.  The incest taboo thus: “Entail(s) and 
outward-goingness, a refusal to turn in upon oneself, and so the calculations of the miser, logical though they 
may be, are denied the highest value.  The sexual relationship is itself a communication and a movement, it is 
like a celebration by nature, and because it is essentially a communication it provokes an outward movement.” 
                                                 
10 It scarcely needs highlighting that though the literature deals with the 'distribution' of women within a cycle of 
exchange, the taboo against incest holds just as much for the male as it does the female.  A charge of sexism that could be 
brought to bear here would be attributable to the social structures from which we are deriving this theory, and one could 
easily imagine that rather than a woman being 'given' in marriage, a man could be equally 'given' to the wife’s family. 
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(Bataille, 2006, p. 207) 
 
By focusing on the economic structure of exchange in the taboo on incest (which guarantees a form of social 
cohesiveness insured against violent envy and desire), we are straying into territory which reflexively adds 
substance to this argument.  When considering the taboo on incest in this way,  we are reminded of the notion 
of the 'Originary Crisis'11 which cites a similar threat of violence as the genesis of societal structure, out of 
which grows the many forms of social organization (and particularly defines the Taboo and the Sacred).  Such 
a theory contends that to avert the potential disaster that could arise from jealous violence, social conventions 
and rituals are established which serve to avert or defer the desire which threatens to undermine the stability 
of the group.  The taboo against incest thus ensures that the reciprocal gift giving (“who gives this 
man/woman...”) continues and defers the potential for violence that would threaten should this desire remain 
unchecked. 
 
Here we are able to discern yet another similarity that exists between the Ego and the nature of Taboo.  Both 
exhibit a function which ensures the continuation of the existent structure (either Ego or social grouping) 
through the averting or deferral of potentially threatening situations.  However, to view the two structures 
working in such a manner runs the risk of overstating their utilitarian aspects and thereby reducing the function 
that they play to a classically economic principle; namely, that you have to 'speculate to accumulate' or, that 
the 'giving away' of those closest to you reveals a faith in a future gain or profit12.  To focus too narrowly on 
                                                 
11 Eric Gans, in his Originary Thinking, tells us in regard to the 'Originary Crisis': “we may conceive the originary 
event as follows: a circle of proto-humans, possibly after a successful hunt, surround an appetitively attractive object, for 
example, the body of a large animal.  Such an object is potentially a focus of conflict, since the appetites of all are directed 
to something that cannot belong to all.” (1993, p. 8)  If we transpose the conflict of interest from surrounding a carcass, 
and instead, place within the center a potential sexual partner, we can see that the potential for conflict exists between 
jealous rivalries for the ownership of the available person.  Thinking in such a manner, we can see the erection of the 
incest taboo under such conditions as being a mechanism in which the potential for disaster is averted by instantiating 
prohibitions which dictate who may, and who may not, be a potential sexual partner, thus reducing the potential for conflict 
by defining specific 'spheres of influence' in which a person may sexually operate.  This is further reinforced when Gans 
continues: “But it also follows from the parsimony of the hypothesis that the peace brought about by the deferral... must 
ultimately lead to increased appetitive satisfaction for the participants; in order for a new conflict-deferring mechanism 
to survive, it must provide a more successful outcome than the old... the object must be equally divided among the 
participants. This is the foundation of the communal system of exchange” (1993, p. 9). 
12 In his The Post Card, Derrida makes the interesting claim that the method of Freud’s ‘speculation’ extends beyond 
‘mere’ scientific speculation and towards a model which foreshadows the return on this speculative investment: “You 
must already find that I myself am corrupting the ‘properly Freudian’ usage of ‘speculation,’ of the notion or the 
concept, and of the word. Where Freud seems to make of it a mode of research, a theoretical attitude, I am also 
considering it as the object of his discourse… it is the bias of this procedure which interests me. I am acting as if the 
very thing he appears to analyze, for example the relation between the two principles, were already an element of 
speculative structure in general: simultaneously in the senses of specular reflection (the pleasure principle can recognize 
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these aspects is to turn away from the truth that the horror incest provokes in us, a reaction that seems out of 
all proportion to its cause if we wish to stress its purely utilitarian aspects: 
Everything suggests that these regulations deal with the play of deep seated impulses among individuals.  
How otherwise can the unnatural renunciation of near relations be explained?  We have here a truly 
extraordinary process to make imagination boggle: a sort of inner revolution of violent intensity. 
(Bataille, 2006, p. 211) 
 
The revulsion that one feels in the pit of the stomach at the thought of inter-familial relationships – however 
‘familial’ is defined – indicates that there is more at play in the functioning of the taboo than this 'miserly' 
calculation.  If the incest taboo was merely erected after the fashion of utilitarian considerations alone - that it 
is better to share the available 'resources' of sexual partners rather than suffer the jealous attention of others - 
we would expect to see the giving away of and prohibition against sexual congress with those close to us in 
existence much as it is now.  However, such a calculation (that it is better to give than to hoard), whilst maybe 
explaining the economic structure of the taboo and its positive manifestations, is still unable to explain the 
disgust that accompanies such a desire if consciously recognized. It is the very real possibility of actually 
possessing sexually those closest to us that is at the root of the taboo itself, and the fact that it reveals a desire 
in the first place to do it that is perhaps the cause of horror. Bataille continues: “this movement is no doubt at 
the bottom of the potlatch of women, exogamy, that is, the paradox of giving away the coveted object.” (2006, 
p. 211) 
 
We are dealing here with a question of sexual desire.  Recalling the early stages of this argument, we can see 
that the choice of persons that the taboo guards against, when compared to our common understanding, appears 
arbitrary.  There is nothing within the object itself that makes it liable to be placed under restriction save the 
relation of proximity between those subject to the taboo itself.  When we understand that the persons with 
whom relationships are forbidden need not necessarily share any blood relationship (for instance in those 
'totemic' societies in which relationship taboos exist outside of biological relations), we can infer that there is 
nothing in the participants themselves that prevents them from being the focus of sexual desire.  The sexual 
object choice in children posited by Freud (which gives further credence to the findings of Fraley and Marks) 
states that the development of the child's self-consciousness occurs chiefly through its interaction with the 
                                                 
itself, or no longer at all recognize itself, in the reality principle); of the production of surplus value, of calculations and 
bets on the Exchange, that is, the emission of more or less fictive shares; and finally in the sense of that which 
overflows the (given) presence of the present, the given of the gift.” (Derrida, 1987, pp. 283-4) 
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parents and other persons of close proximity which become the sexual object choice of the burgeoning identity. 
When we examined the child's game, we saw how the 'gone' and 'there' of the performance betrayed a desire 
to externalize the traumatic experience of the emergence of self-consciousness of the child, and which 
reflexively results in the erection of the Ego and its drive to perpetuate itself.  The anxiety that the new person 
exhibits and sublimates in his playtime allows us to perhaps unlock a facet of the feeling of horror associated 
with incestuous desire for, as we have seen, the child’s relationship with the parent (or others of close 
proximity) reveals a blended identity without the strict definitions of I and Other which develops later through 
the establishment of the Ego. In such a way, the mother, father, or sibling (whoever was the particular other 
that was at one stage integrated into this 'proto-identity'), when externalized retains part of the threat of trauma 
which was worked through in the game.  We can see here the double aspect of the other person; subject to a 
desire to be reintegrated into the whole (formerly being part of it), and yet at the same time (because the existent 
identity only came about as a result of the expulsion and rejection of such an identity), a cause of horror as it 
reawakens the originary traumatic experience:  
 
In other words, then, there is no pure origin of transgression, or of the economy of expenditure. It seems 
that the dance of interdiction/transgression goes all the way back – or circles round. There is no 
transgression which is not mediated by interdiction, no rebondissement – without a moment of recul. 
But neither is interdiction primary, for the historical narrative refers us back to a (violent) animal 
sexuality from which we step back in horror. (Guerlac, 1990, p. 102)  
 
The key here to understanding the taboo on incest is that the taboo and its associated horror indicates a two-
fold structure:  
 
1) That in its manifestation and associated rules and regulations it guarantees the 'distribution' of potential 
sexual partners and averts the possibility of conflict arising – the utilitarian aspect.  
2) That its structure exists owing to the very real desire for union that is apparent between family 
members which at the same time, is both desirable and in equal measures horrifying.   
 
In summation, Bataille evokes this double aspect to the incestuous sexual object which, in its operation on an 
individual and societal level, is truly indicative of the human situation:  
 
For a close relative to remove his right to forgo the enjoyment of his own property: this is what defines 
human beings... As I have said, such renunciation enhances the value of the thing removed.  But this is 
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also a contribution to the creation of the human world in which respect, difficulty and reservations are 
victorious over violence... there would be no complete respect if the lapse into eroticism were not both 
possible and full of delightful promise. (2006, p. 218) 
 
This brief review of the phenomenon of the Taboo in general and against incest in particular allows us to focus 
our attention on what is relevant to our investigation.  We are able to see that the taboo against incest is not 
derived from some inherent opposition to familial relationships, instead deriving from the proximity between 
persons, and that in fact the prohibition itself is established to insure society against the threat of violence that 
comes with the greedy monopolization of relationships. Much like the Ego, and also the renunciation of Hegel's 
master, we can see Taboo functioning in such a way as to protect society and its members against the desire 
which threatens to damage its continued existence.  The issue is that whilst the restriction of desire creates the 
Ego/self-consciousness, in its creation externalizes aspects of itself.  This does not mean that the desire 
dissipates and is overcome in the movement to self-consciousness, but instead is repressed and disowned as a 
part of the resultant structure itself.  This is what separates the thought of Hegel with that of Bataille; in the 
renunciation of desire in the name of 'respect', whilst essential for the creation and maintenance of self-
consciousness, in the moment of overcoming does not truly remove desire from the playing field.   
 
The object subject to taboo is shown to be dependent upon the interdiction which defines it as such and, owing 
to its double aspects of threat and lure, remains shadowed by the structure which determined it as taboo in the 
first instance. Because of this shadowing, the taboo object resists attempts to define it objectively. Bataille 
balks at such attempts, claiming that to do so results in a state of affairs where “the element envisaged remains 
in practice unreal; and can only be abstractly made objective”, so that to continue upon such a path only 
represents “the persistence of a dominant need for appropriation, the sickly obstinacy of a will seeking to 
represent, in spite of everything, and through simple cowardice, a homogeneous and servile world” (1985d, p. 
98).  Subjective heterogeneity by contrast, the experience of the object in its relation to the structure in which 
it is proscribed (either psychological or social), is for Bataille “alone concrete” (p. 98)  
 
Transgression then is not the movement from one economy to another outside of restricted economies which 
create the taboo.  Instead, as ffrench tells us: “Bataille’s strategy... resists this tendency to formalize the space 
‘on the other side’ of transgression. Transgression is rather an operation or a strategy of the cut, the interruption, 
117 
 
which destabilizes the fixity and structural coherence of form” (1999, p. 129). By not just reversing “the 
priorities of the existing order”, Bataille emphasises the tension at the heart of transgression by illuminating 
the “joy of consuming without return... fused with the anguish of loss” which creates a “profound ambivalence” 
(Richman, 1982, p. 103) in those participating in the act.  Because the object deemed taboo is a product – and 
indeed part – of the structure which it is excluded from the taboo object is not an isolated, independent object. 
Bataille’s anthropological presentation stresses that the taboo does not designate the content of an 
absolute law, but is tantamount to a limit whose inscription within a culture is historically displaced by 
transgressive acts. The limits that tempt most exist primarily in the consciousness of those who defy 
them. (Richman, 1982, p. 71) 
 
In the consummation of the taboo object, the subject uncovers “its inability to generate an internal unifying 
force as the basis for its own identity” and finds that it “must derive its definition from an expelled object” 
(Richman, 1982, p. 40) This consummation however is not an appropriation for, despite it being designated as 
taboo by the process of negative desire which characterises consciousness, by being driven by the general 
economic movement towards dépense, it exceeds the limits of consciousness.  The moment of transgression 
thus induces an ambivalent experience, the object challenging the mastery of the subject whose self is 
implicated in the erection of the taboo which whilst prohibited, is nonetheless fundamentally desirable. Just as 
the fledgling Ego through the process of repetition betrayed its concurrent desires to reinforce itself (through 
the repression of its traumatic origins) along with the desire to return to this lost state, so too the object subject 
to taboo pulls in two directions.  These two directions are also at the heart of Bataille’s practice of literature, 
seeking as it does to subvert the restricted economy of language by utilising the very tools it seeks to subvert.  
As such, the following question is raised: 
Bataille asked whether the self could be preserved from annihilation without betraying its desire for self-
loss, its pleasure, whether literature could be the site both of repression (sublimation, projection, 
displacement, and so on) and of subversion (self-loss or transcendence, the explosion of limits), or 
prohibition and transgression. (Richman, 1982, p. 243)  
I will now turn to Bataille’s novella L’Abbe C to examine this tension as it plays out between the character of 
Eponine, Robert and Charles and show how it produces an ambiguous moment where prohibition and 
transgression, pulling simultaneously leads the subject to a laying bare, and an anguished laughter. 
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2.3: Playing with the Priest 
 
 
Eponine for her part, wasn't satisfied with the apparent unhappiness of my brother. What did she care if 
he suffered, when, in his suffering he continued to deny her existence?  Furious and tired of laughing 
about it, she wanted Robert to recognize her, to let her be a part of his life; and since she knew that her 
immorality was the only thing about her that was authentic, she would never be content until she seduced 
him. (Bataille, 1988a, p. 56) 
 
In L'Abbé C the intertwined relationship of the central characters (Charles, his twin brother Robert and the 
prostitute Eponine) unfolds in a way that provokes a distinct uneasiness in the reader.  It is arguably Bataille's 
finest novel, dark, cruel and with moments of the blackest comedy, and yet, perhaps strangely for a novel by 
Bataille, it does not contain much of the 'obscenity' prevalent in (and which one comes to expect from) his 
other works.  Further to this, the novel seems to contravene the “basic Bataillian pattern” of “an anguished 
young male narrator surrounded by (usually two) disturbingly aggressive females” (Richman, 1982, p. 82).13 
It is a novel which, like his others, has the subject of eroticism at its heart, and yet, unlike the others, seeks to 
illustrate this notion through the psychological relationships between the characters rather than through their 
excessive, obscene actions.  The novel is no less powerful or shocking for this; indeed, in focusing instead on 
the interrelation between the characters, he manages to provoke a heightened tension in his readers and allows 
the tenuous erotic structure to be portrayed in a much more subtle form. By shifting the focus of the narrative 
away from the extremes that we find in Blue of Noon or Story of the Eye, we find in this work a much more 
subdued and yet powerful portrayal of his conception of Eroticism, one which unfortunately can be 
overshadowed by the excessive events that often attract our attention in his more ‘pornographic’ writings.  The 
three characters interact in such a way as to illuminate for us what we have examined previously; that sexuality, 
when devoid of 'potential', causes a great anguish, an anguish produced by the challenge that erotic desire 
makes to the integrity of the individual that seeks to sublimate it.  What we will see, through recourse to Freud, 
is that the interaction of the central characters and the nature of their intermingling identity, brings into stark 
relief Bataille's notion of Eroticism and how he perceived it functioning on the part of human beings. 
 
Eponine, a prostitute, is licentiousness personified. She feels her excesses are directly aligned to the core of 
her being and is in a 'relationship' with Charles, a 'trick' (Charles regularly pays Eponine's mother following 
                                                 
13 However, we will see in the coming pages that though this work diverges from the normal ‘pattern’ of Bataille’s work 
that there are similarities which tie it to others within his oeuvre. 
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their rendezvous) who, despite this, is much more than that.  Charles himself is equally debauched, indulging 
dutifully and with ardent fervor in her desires.  Bataille tells us that he is her “most diligent lover” (1988a, p. 
50), and together they engage in what we are impelled to consider as a very excessive affair: “before anything 
else, I had to satisfy the wishes of Eponine... all afternoon we had made love and I had laughed” (p. 37).  Little 
however is explained in regard to the personal relationship between Charles and Eponine, for this relationship 
serves as the backdrop for what becomes the nexus of the story; Charles and Eponine's relationship in the 
shadow of Charles's twin brother Robert. 
During the summer of 1942, Robert, Eponine and I found ourselves, for various reasons, together in a 
small town where we were born. (p. 34) 
 
Robert, identical twin of our narrator Charles, shows a similarity with him that extends beyond the visible, 
reinforced by the claims that Charles felt that Robert was his “alter-ego” (p. 34).  However, Robert is not a 
perfect mirror image of our libertine narrator, for in most things he represents the polar opposite of him.  Whilst 
Charles revels in his base desires, Robert, a priest, lives a life so devout that we are told that he is given by his 
brother the title “the abbé” (p. 13), a title to which he is referred to more often than his own name.  The physical 
mirror but moral opposite of Charles, Robert provokes a constant challenge to both Eponine and his own 
brother.  Prior to her descent into licentiousness, Eponine and Robert enjoyed some kind of relationship, 
seemingly monogamous, which preceded his conversion to Christianity. However, once she had begun to 
indulge in her excesses, he openly shunned her and, for Eponine, this becomes tantamount to denying her very 
existence: 
Only a few years earlier, my twin brother was, like me, just one of the young men of the village:  as a 
boy he had been the object of Eponine's affections and she went around with him for a long time; later 
on, she openly went astray; and he pretended, out on the streets, that he didn't know her. (p. 37) 
 
'Diligently' loved by one, yet rejected by the other whom she loved originally, the physical identity of the two 
brothers serves as a challenge to Eponine's 'authenticity'. Robert’s rejection of (or perhaps more rightly, refusal 
to acknowledge the existence of) Eponine, coupled with his physical identity with Charles, gives us a strange 
'love-triangle' in which the physical identity, and yet moral opposition antagonizes the relationship and 
identities of those bound up in it.   
 
The three characters first come into contact on the roof of the village Church tower, a meeting arranged by 
Eponine with the express aim of luring Robert from his piety and drawing out his animal desires.  Charles, 
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primed by Eponine, tricks his brother into following him up the tower in order to force a meeting between the 
three.  During the ascent to the roof, Robert realizes that he has become the victim of a ruse and recognizes the 
“trap into which friendship had made him fall” (p. 38). 
Raging, breathless and, on a narrow platform, isolated from the rest of the world, shut up, in a sense, in 
the limitless void of the skies, we stood confronting each other like dogs frozen by a sudden spell.  The 
hostility that united us was static, confused, like the laugh of someone who has missed a good thing.  
(pp. 41-2) 
 
With wind raging about them atop the tower, the three stand transfixed.  The lovers have cornered their prey; 
brother betrayed by brother is led to confront that which he refuses to acknowledge.  Eponine, drunk, was all 
“docility, and yet menace itself”, clasping her arms tightly around her coat, naked underneath, and seized by a 
“state of indecisive immobility”.  Her nakedness under her overcoat provides here the potential provocation; 
with one movement of her hands she would bare all to Robert, and this suspension makes her hidden obscenity 
the “object of anxiety”.  At this point, forced into a corner and unable to escape from a threat so at odds with 
his moral compass, Robert falls to his knees and begins to chant; “slowly and lugubriously, as if he were calling 
to the dead.” (p. 43) 
It was a ravishingly melodious lament, but so ambiguous!  Such a bizarre profession of horror before 
the delights of nudity!  Robert was going to conquer us by self-denial and his very effort to escape made 
this more obvious; the beauty of his chant in the silence of the heavens enveloped him in the solitude of 
a pious ecstasy. (p. 43) 
 
Robert falling to his knees in prayer here shows his fleeing in the face of obscenity.  His shared past – now 
rejected – with Eponine and the presence of his brother brings to the fore the complicity that he shares with 
his interlocutors.  Yet, mirroring Marcelle's incarceration in Story, Robert flees back into the surety that is given 
him by what he is self-certain of (his faith), and his lamentation serves here to protect him against the obscene 
assault to which he is being subjected.  However (again like Marcelle), Robert cannot escape as easily as all 
that and, inevitably, through a chance occurrence, is confronted by that which he attempted to flee.  Eponine, 
seized as she was by the tension of the moment, initially fails to notice that Robert has fallen to his knees, and 
on coming around from her “dreamy stupor” (p. 44) convulses with laughter at the sight, so much so that she 
loses her footing and ends up leaning over the side of the tower, consumed by the sight of the praying priest: 
She was laughing with her face in her hands and Robert, interrupted by a cackle she couldn't suppress, 
looked up, with his arms outstretched, only to behold her naked bottom: the wind had lifted up her coat 
which, when she was seized by laughter, she had been unable to keep closed. (p. 45) 
 
Following the episode in the tower, the narrator Charles tells us that his brother was “suddenly changed”, with 
people thinking he was “losing his mind.” (p. 46)  This change begins to unravel the apparent sanity of the 
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pious 'abbé', and we are given the impression that his profound notion of religious morality was shaken. His 
inability to look away when faced with Eponine's nakedness undermines his attempts at self-denial and we are 
told that Robert “admitted that he had had a...” (p. 45). The following day, in his weakened state, his brother 
pays him a visit, and is asked to go to Eponine and sleep with her, being challenged that whilst he may object 
and see in her summons a provocation (Charles suggests that in fact he may be indeed be subject to 
provocation), that in truth he has received this request “to fulfill an obligation that you've never wanted to 
recognize.” (p. 49) 
 
Robert’s previous involvement with Eponine, and his involuntary erection atop the tower all suggest that his 
rejection of Eponine and subsequent turn to piety involves a rejection not of Eponine herself (as his erection 
would imply the contrary), but what she stands for, who she is, and a recognition that what she is – her 
sensuality being her most 'authentic' aspect – is the very thing that he himself struggles to control.  We see that 
within him there exists an unbridled sexuality that runs counter to his outward display of piety; an outward 
display which itself is undermined by his unconscious bodily reaction.  Despite this momentously traumatic 
event, Robert continues to refuse to visit Eponine, further exacerbating her desire to debase him.  However, 
the novel is not a simplistic tale of the systematic wearing down of the resolve of this pious priest and his being 
lured into debauchery by a duo of libertines.  It is a rather different story that unfolds in the pages of the book, 
and rather than Charles and Eponine bringing Robert to the brink of collapse – for up to this point with great 
effort he had maintained his purity – instead it is the priest that brings all to collapse around him. 
 
In the first chapters of L'Abbé C Bataille seems to be setting up a similar scenario as we saw him develop in 
his Story and the character of Marcelle.  The parallels between the characters at this stage of analysis being 
quite plain to recognize; Marcelle, 'the purest and most affecting' of characters, playing the same role as that 
of Robert, a man so pious that his own brother refers to him as the 'abbé'.  Both share a similar quality of 
religious purity, and both are seemingly drawn into a confrontation with their own sexuality in which the 
realization of the inescapability from, and nevertheless the attempt to flee in the face of this sexuality results 
in the destruction of their ordered, self-conscious identity. Now, whilst this is undoubtedly true in the case of 
Marcelle, with Robert we are faced with a character that as the story develops draws further away from such a 
comparison.  Instead, he is transformed into the object which challenged Marcelle, becoming for Charles and 
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Eponine that which threatens the stability of their identities.  He becomes much more than the object of erotic 
desire which Marcelle fulfills for Simone and the narrator in Story, becoming rather, through a reversal of 
'common' logic, the agitating center which, when his mask of purity begins to slip, becomes an erotically 
charged challenge to the apparent self-assured identity of his twin and his lover.14   
Traumatic Ambiguity 
 
That was the language of a prostitute, but it was infused with such fanatical determination, with such 
intense emotion, that it was impossible for anyone to be misled by its undeniable crudity: it was, at the 
same time, the language of passion, which put on a vulgar face... (Bataille, 1988a, p. 57) 
 
Eponine, as she is presented to us, cuts a figure that exudes sexuality.  She wields her sex like a weapon, 
flaunting it in the face of Robert, using its potential for ruin to lure him in.  We are given the impression of a 
strong, independent woman in possession of a powerful will.  At first glance, her character seems to be in 
complete contrast to those of Dora and Marcelle that we met earlier in our investigation.  Both Dora and 
Marcelle display a pervasive indeterminacy, a decided weakness of will in front of their own sexual desires 
and in this respect Eponine could not be more different.  However, the relationship here is not as simple as all 
that.  If we recall our interaction with both Marcelle and Dora, we will remember that their state of 
disintegration and confusion could be attributed to their failure to engage with their own sexuality following 
on from their respective traumatic episodes.  We do not have to look far however to see a similar ‘weakness’ 
of character within Eponine, arising similarly from a comparable traumatic experience. It is an experience from 
which we are able to trace the origins of her licentious behaviour, along with her fervent desire to destroy 
Robert: 
Only a few years earlier, my twin brother was, like me, just one of the young men of the village: as a 
boy he had been the object of Eponine's affections. (p. 37) 
 
When Eponine had started making love with the local boys, he hadn't just kept away: she began, at the 
age of thirteen, to sleep around as much as she could.  Robert, who had up to that time shared all her 
secrets, pretended that he no longer knew her. (p. 50) 
                                                 
14 It may seem strange, given Bataille's obsession with Eroticism that we seem to be seeking to establish how the pious 
Robert creates the erotically charged challenge to the other more 'erotic' characters, as it seemingly runs counter to our 
intuition here.  However, it will become clear in due course why Robert is the illustration of the Erotic in this relation. 
Here it would be important to remind ourselves of what we have seen previously.  It will be recalled how Bataille's notion 
of the erotic and of other sovereign acts have been conceived of being devoid of utility, that is, without 'purpose', and 
whilst Charles and Eponine are indeed excessively licentious, they do not 'inhabit' the erotic as they, by sublimating their 
actions to their identity (in much the way as Sade's heroes and heroines), their actions cannot truly be said to be erotic.  
The upshot here is that one cannot claim to, or indeed be erotic, this phenomenon only ever coming about through a 
'chance' moment that whilst being the result of conscious action, cannot truly be said to have been the object of this or 
that desire.  
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Recalling the case history of Dora, we can plainly see a parallel between her case and the above description 
and which provides us with a potential explanation as to the origin of Eponine’s desire to debase Robert.  
Having been very close to him (a position in which we are told he knew her intimately), his rejection of her, 
justified as it was by her actions, serves to create and confirm her hatred of him.  It is implied that his continual 
refusal to accept her forms the provocation towards which her desire is directed.  Robert, having been in a 
position of confidence, in rejecting her stands as a challenge to her 'authentic' self.  As a result of this challenge, 
Eponine needs to bring Robert to his knees in an attempt to master his oppositional attitude and the threat that 
this poses to her.  His 'intimate' knowledge of her and her subsequent 'vendetta' reminds us of the process of 
externalization that Freud's Ego passes through in the stages of development of the psyche, as well as that of 
the master/slave struggle that we saw in Hegel.  When Robert rejects Eponine in both a physical and moral 
way, in order to protect her from the traumatic loss of this relationship she seeks to externalize and shut out 
the threat that he poses in a two-fold manner.  Firstly, the continued erotic challenge to him can be viewed as 
an attempt to undermine his apparent position of moral authority and asexuality (after all he was a priest) by 
seeking to seduce him into a liaison with her. This pattern of behaviour would suggest that she believes that 
Robert has not really converted to a life of piety nor rejected his sexuality, and, could she just tempt him to 
bed, she would have vanquished her opponent, thereby vindicating her own 'authentic' outlook.  Secondly, her 
zealous desire to debase him (so much so that it consumes her) reveals – much in the way that Dora's conscious 
hatred of Herr K was an external manifestation of her real repressed love – that the loss of Robert as a lover 
was in fact more upsetting for her than she is admitting both to herself and to others.   
 
Her desire to ruin Robert, at first glance, can seem greatly out of proportion for one who was 'merely' rejected 
by a man we are told she was already moving away from.  The thread that will lead us towards a potential 
resolution to this question can be found when the narrator tells us: “Robert's attitude was, it seemed to me, not 
only cowardly but a self-abnegation... Ultimately, his refusal to recognize Eponine exacerbated her desire for 
me.” (p. 55) We will do well to remember that Robert and the narrator Charles are identical twin brothers.  
Eponine's turn to Charles can be viewed as the finding of a substitute after being spurned by his brother; indeed, 
it is possible to examine her passion and find at its root only a displaced attachment to Robert that proves the 
origin of her taking up with his brother.  The hint that we are given as to the extent of Robert and Eponine’s 
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relationship, allows us to read into this movement the transference of emotions from the original brother to his 
double. Again, much like the case of Dora (for significant parallels exist) we can identify a further aspect of 
this situation, where Eponine directs her aggression towards Robert, consciously seeking his desecration, 
directly in opposition to her feelings of affection towards him (which have importantly been transferred to his 
brother). Owing to the process by which she is able to maintain her emotional connection by proxy, she is then 
able to circumvent any feelings that she may hold which would prove a stumbling block to achieving the first 
aim of subjugating Robert to her will.   
 
The secondary aspect of this situation, when taken in conjunction with the first - being intimately related in 
truth - allows us to provide one reading of her character which explicitly aligns her behaviour, albeit with 
contrasting manifestations, with that of Dora and Marcelle.  Such a reading would go as follows: Eponine, in 
her younger days, 'went around' with Robert and (we are told) they enjoyed each other’s company and 
confidence.  At this stage of the relationship we are given no hint of discord between the pair, and no apparent 
inconsistency of outlook on life between them is implied.  However, she then begins to 'wander' sexually with 
other young men of the village.  In reaction to (and what is possibly indicative of a betrayal of trust), Robert 
then rejects her (and his own) sexual behaviour, swinging so wildly to the other end of the spectrum that he 
joins the priesthood and becomes the 'Abbé' of the title.  He represses his own sexual desires15 which, as we 
know following the episode atop the church tower, he struggles to keep in check.  This complete rejection, not 
only of her, but of her whole way of life aligned to sexual expression, is the catalyst for her desire to re-awaken 
Robert to his previous self by forcing him to acquiesce to her advances and his own sexual urges.   
 
Eponine, who once held tender affection for – one might venture so far as to say loved – Robert, following his 
rejection of her, has her certainty of self brought into question.  In his continued public display of contempt, 
he at each juncture serves to challenge all that she is, having previously been so close to him.  She must 
                                                 
15 It seems fair to make the conjecture that rather than rejecting Eponine for her sexual licentiousness whilst not 
rejecting his own, in order to externalize any source of trauma that this event caused he was forced to consciously renounce 
his sexuality in full.  The reason behind this one can suppose would be that Eponine would not exclusively be the only 
one to have urges which would have caused the eye to wander.  Understanding this, that Robert as a young man possessed 
sexual urges, and in order to justify his renunciation of Eponine based upon her behaviour, he would have had to reject 
his sexuality as a whole. For, should he admit that he himself wanted to do as she did, the conscious justification he 
created for his behaviour would be undermined, and thus any process of distancing would be more difficult to achieve.  
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accordingly 'despoil' him to prove as legitimate her own perception of her 'authentic' self, in contrast to his 
'inauthentic' posing as a priest.  One can imagine her train of thought running like this: 'Why has Robert rejected 
me? Does he not love me? Does this mean that I am not worthy of love, that who I am is not valuable, that I 
am not really a human being? This must be false! I am true to myself, I have always been! It is not I who have 
changed, but him; it is Robert who is lying to himself!'  If we ascribe to her such a thought process, we can see 
that by causing Robert to reengage with his former sexual self, she would vindicate her reasoning as to why 
he rejects her, and thus validate her own Identity.  In order to protect her own sense of self, she must externalize 
the threat that the separation poses and transfer any feeling of unease in the affair onto Robert.  It is he who is 
betraying himself (and her) in this whole charade, and this transference of blame wholly onto him absolves her 
of any guilt in the affair so as to sidestep the event's traumatic legacy.  This claim is further established when 
we consider her relationship with Charles for, owing to his physical identity with his brother, plays the role of 
substitute lover for Eponine.  By indulging in carnal activity with Charles, she is able to surreptitiously 
maintain her 'relationship' with Robert through his mirror image, reinforced as this notion is by the lack of any 
real passion between Eponine and Charles.   
 
This reading of the 'history' of Eponine allows us to glimpse more clearly the parallels that exist between her 
and the others that we have examined previously.  In the case of Marcelle and Eponine, we can then make the 
claim that the former’s piety and the latter’s excess are constructed and function in an analogous manner.  The 
psychological structures around which they orientate their conception of self and through which they attempt 
to protect themselves against the re-occurrence of trauma mirror each other.  Marcelle (much like Dora) 
consciously rejects her sexuality and represses her sexual urges, potentially damaging as they are to her 
conceived notion of Identity.  In much the same way, Eponine buries her feelings for Robert in a substitute 
lover, whilst consciously turning him into an object of hatred.  In this manner, she externalizes and protects 
herself from engaging with the distress she feels at the loss of her confidante, whilst concurrently she is able 
to satisfy her emotional attachment to Robert by transferring it onto his substitute Charles. 
 
In such a reading, Robert shows himself to fulfill the role of erotic object for Eponine.  Functioning in much 
the same way as phenomena subject to taboo's – they also being erotic objects – he presents a dual aspect, 
being both the most attractive object for her whilst simultaneously being the object whose proximity causes 
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the most anguish.  His character, who rejects Eponine, serves as the foundation upon and against which she 
constructs and maintains her Identity.  Conversely, he also has an horrific quality to him for, by recognizing 
the unconscious current of warm feeling that she extends towards him, the more she tries to destroy him, the 
more she brings herself into question, being as he is the object of her sublimated desire. Such an interpretation 
here would seem to align her behaviour quite neatly to that of the Freudian interpretation of Identity, and yet 
it is not the only possible reading of their relationship. 
 
We could also apply a secondary interpretation to this dynamic, one which mirrors the dialectic of Hegel's 
master and slave.  The pair can be seen to be enacting the life and death struggle between self-certain 
individuals seeking to establish their own autonomy, where their conflicting desires pit them in a struggle 
against each other.  Each seeks to validate their own self-certainty through the sublimation of the other. Eponine 
must enslave Robert to her will to validate her own conception of self, whilst Robert must resist at all costs 
Eponine's advances to maintain his own perception of autonomy.  In this reading, Eponine's more 'troublesome' 
behaviour – that of her relationship with Charles and her potential love for Robert - would be justified by 
appealing to the final movement of the Hegelian dialectic.  This would explain these apparently paradoxical 
desires by revealing them as indicative of a move to restrict her wish to defy Robert's challenge, pre-empting 
the moment of reserve required to overcome this opposition and establish a relational self-consciousness16 
between them.  
 
Admittedly however, both readings, whilst having many examples of behaviour with which to support them, 
do fall short of encapsulating the full range of behaviour that we see the pair exhibit.  Both readings here will 
find it difficult to address a further, heretofore unconsidered occurrence in the novella, where Eponine's dogged 
pursuit of Robert reaches its climax with his collapse at the altar whilst giving Mass: 
He smiled almost imperceptibly and seemed to be waking up but simultaneously lapsing into a coma, 
as he uttered something totally unintelligible... he fell, his body suddenly went limp, slid to the floor, 
and tumbled down the steps of the altar. (1988a, p. 76) 
 
However, this is the point at which we find the most interesting and unsuspected twist in the tale for, despite 
                                                 
16 Whilst acknowledging the shortcomings that Bataille saw in the Hegelian system, it is not surprising here to be able 
to see this dynamic at work. Further to this, recognizing the power that Bataille felt this aspect of Hegelian thought to 
carry, the fact that we can read such a relationship existing between them, alongside a recognition that it is insufficient to 
explain all that we perceive, aligns itself well with the complex relationship that Bataille has with Hegel's thought itself. 
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his collapse, all is not quite as it seems: 
I gulped and kept perfectly still, my brother lay there totally lifeless with his mouth wide open and his 
head hanging down, but he was pinching my wrist: he did it so discreetly that no-one noticed.  Could I 
have imagined it? I was reluctant to believe I was being taken in like that... (p. 79) 
 
With the revelation of Robert's masquerade the sense of the novel collapses.  For, instead of being the sexually 
repressed priest, he is actually revealed as more debauched and depraved than either his brother or Eponine.  
Rather than being the pious 'Abbé' of the title, Robert unmasked is shown to embody unbridled madness; he 
fornicates wildly with prostitutes17, composes the notes that we are presented with as the fourth part of the 
book, and disappears on nocturnal excursions which we are told ultimately lead to his arrest by the Gestapo.  
Alongside these escapades, and in what is perhaps the most shocking manifestation of his irrational behaviour, 
he is also found to be the one who has been leaving Eponine 'gifts' of excrement beneath her window: 
Eponine had once heard him making a small noise, she approached the window and saw him completely 
naked. He saw her and didn't make a move, but she turned away.  She came back to sit on the edge of 
the bed and, keeping her head down, stayed there without saying a word.  We didn't hear anything the 
other times but, in the morning, we would find traces of his visitation. (p. 124) 
 
Robert's behaviour following his collapse is far removed from the picture we have previously been given.  
Once led to breaking point by the confrontation at the altar, he does not just acquiesce to his desires and engage 
with his repressed urges, instead seemingly acting with such abandon that he goes beyond the expectations 
that we have been given as to what he seemed to be fighting against. More troubling, this revelation comes to 
be implied as his own more 'authentic' self, one which we come to view as preceding both that of his religious 
period, whilst also being prior to his period with Eponine (which itself seems restrained in comparison).  We 
find that his actions exceed the perception that Charles and Eponine have in terms of what they have felt the 
'true' nature of his character to be, the impact of which proves drastic: “It was so obvious, so overwhelming, 
night was suddenly made day. Darkness was light and tears could laugh.” (p. 114)  For Eponine, the shock of 
this revelation (that the Robert she thought she knew and thought was repressing his true self was not Robert 
at all), is monumental, and this revelation throws her into turmoil: 
Eponine was laughing, hiding her face in her hands; but she was naked and it was her nudity that 
laughed.  It was a soft, intimate laugh, excessively ashamed... it was the same as excessive anguish, a 
gentle laugh like that is artfully stifled. Such a laugh is at the heart of excessive sensual pleasure and 
makes it a source of pain. (p. 114) 
                                                 
17 Here we see an example of the more usual ‘pattern’ identified by Richman. Robert, in his agitated state spends his 
time with two prostitutes.  This however is not the focus of the novellas narrative and it is important to note that this 
occurs after the “relinquishment of all social and historical “points de repère” that help to solidify the sense of identity 
of a social being” (Richman, 1982, p. 82) 
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Interpreting Ambiguity 
 
We have noted how Robert plays the role of the erotic object for Eponine, him being the center towards which 
her desire draws her and concurrently repels her.  However, her laughter, her anguished and 'stifled' sobs which 
reveal her nudity challenges the position of Robert as a threat to her Identity with which we previously 
attributed to him.  If we recall Hegel's master, and to a certain extent Freud's Ego, then we would expect to see 
(if she followed their respective notions of the movement of identity) an outcome potentially different from 
the dissolution we see above.  In the former, with the removal of the 'challenge' to the master, whilst the 
possibility of transforming self-certainty into Absolute Relation is removed, it does not preclude the collapse 
of the sense of self-certainty itself.  The master, when victorious over objects of its perception, then moves 
further to seek that elusive object which would provide the recognition he desires, and as we have seen (Chapter 
1.2) this can only be achieved through the restriction of desire and the maintenance of the Other as Other.  In 
this case, with the removal of the object of her perception (Robert), Eponine as master would perhaps mourn 
the loss of recognition but, as the source of her desire arises from within (the master's self-certainty does not 
rely on the other as a condition of possibility), we would be surprised to see the master's self-certainty dissolve 
into nudity.  For this reason, Eponine's laugh, resounding as it does both with pleasure and pain, does not sit 
comfortably with the dynamic that we would expect to see Hegel's master follow.  If we consider her position 
in the same way as the master seeking to establish her self-certainty (which her desire to debase Robert seems 
to attest to), then the nudity that she feels and that is perceived by Charles seems out of place.   
 
Through Freud, we are able to obtain a much more nuanced account of this situation, and yet it is still 
insufficient to account for the full force of the behaviour that she displays.  We have seen that if we take Robert 
to be the originating point of trauma for Eponine around which her Ego is built, it takes the form of a trauma 
which both repels her (causing her to seek his debasement) and attracts her (her transference of affection onto 
Charles betraying her feelings for Robert) simultaneously.  This would allow us to sufficiently explain the co-
existence of pleasurable and painful feelings, where the complete overturning of the grounding of the traumatic 
event (Robert was not even who she thought he was not being) causes her to feel joy at the removal of the 
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painful rejection he meted out to her, and pain at the realization that the Robert she loved was not Robert at 
all.  Pleasure in this would come from the fact that as he was never really the pious priest he claimed to be, 
and as this false Identity was intimately bound up with his rejection of her, when revealed as a charade allows 
for the removal of the traumatic object (in effect it is annulled) as he never really rejected her.  Similarly, pain 
would arise from the acknowledgment of the fact that he was never really the man that rejected her at all. The 
excessive behaviour he presents – which suggests that he may not have been the man he was prior to this 
rejection - would bring into question her unconscious affection for him, and as a result, would undermine this 
other aspect of her desire (to be with Robert).  
 
Robert's lack of 'reality' and Eponine's nudity are problematic for us owing to their ambiguity.  This ambiguity 
arises directly from the nature of Robert's indeterminate character, where the collapse of the relational structure 
between the three central characters occurs as a direct result of Robert's revelation.  Both the Hegelian and 
Freudian model, when applied to this situation, seek to account for the existence of this ambiguity.  The 
Freudian would align this ambiguity to feelings of ambivalence drawn from the wellspring of Eponine’s 
conflicting desires, whilst the Hegelian would root this similarly in feelings arising from ‘victory’ over Robert 
mixed with the acknowledgement of the closure of the possibility of recognition.  Both interpretations here 
seek to isolate the causal factors that contribute to this ambiguity, effectively reducing the impact of the 
revelation to known categories.  Interpretations such as these establish Eponine’s behaviour as either that of a 
‘confused’ woman struggling with her own self-deception, or as a wounded ‘master’ interrupted on the path to 
absolute knowledge.  In both cases we see a violence enacted towards this ambiguity, to pin it down and employ 
it in the service of either Freud or Hegel.  However, we must be mindful of approaching this nudity in order to 
preserve its power – derived as it is from this ambiguity – and prevent it from being categorized, and as a 
result, neutered.   
 
Shoshana Felman, when grappling with the problem of interpretation in the debate surrounding Henry James' 
'Turn of the Screw', highlights the issue that faces us here:  “Is a reading of ambiguity as such really possible?  
Is it at all possible to read and to interpret ambiguity without reducing it in the very process of interpretation?” 
(2003, pp. 163-4)  The contention of this thesis, that central to Bataille's heterological practice of literature is 
the affecting of a moment of trauma, requires that the intentional evocation of this 'impossible' moment (the 
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ambiguity of Eponine’s 'nudity' and of Robert's behavior) remain intact. It is an ambiguity that Bataille's work 
seeks to affect in us, and as such must remain resistant to interpretation.  This issue of interpretation, 
particularly that of the 'baggage' that the reader will bring with them to the task, is acknowledged by Felman, 
and proves useful for us here. In drawing to our attention the contrasting justifications of the Governess's 
behaviour, she identifies two distinct trends: 
The 'psychoanalytical' camp, which sees the governess as a clinical neurotic deceived by her own 
fantasies and destructive of her charges; and the 'metaphysical', religious, or moral camp, which sees the 
governess as a sane, noble savior engaged in a heroic struggle for the salvation of a world threatened by 
supernatural evil.  (2003, p. 145) 
 
Her argument develops in such a way as to demonstrate that interpreters of this text – a text with layers of 
indeterminacy, re-reading and re-interpretation at its heart – repeat the process of interpretation, of reading, 
being carried out within the novella.  She claims that the interpreter’s differing ways of viewing the Governess's 
behaviour and the attempt to undermine the opposing camps argument in a “fight against division” (p. 160) 
leads to an attempt to seek to answer “for the text.” (p. 152) And yet, in attempting to find the 'answer' or 'truth' 
of the text, they remain unaware that through the very process of conflict and re-interpretation that develops 
between them (a conflict that seeks to demystify the ambiguous center of the text) they can by “no means 
master or exhaust the very meaning of that division”, and are destined to repeat that division; “perform it, be 
part of it.” (p. 160).  The indeterminacy of Robert's character and the resulting ambiguity of Eponine's nudity 
beg the reader for interpretation.  The issue that Felman draws attention to is that the process of interpretation, 
in seeking to find the answer for the text, constitutes a violence enacted towards the text, and yet when 
considered within the framework of Bataille's writings as seeking to affect the reader - to draw them into a 
traumatic moment of communication – we can acknowledge that such a violent reading is exactly what Bataille 
is counting upon. 
 
Eponine seeks to answer 'for' Robert, to justify his behaviour, and thus justify herself, and the more that she 
strives to achieve this, the further into the trap she is drawn.  In seeking to answer for him, she leaves herself 
open to the eventual revelation of the lack of substance to his character.  In other words, by bringing with her 
her own 'reading' of Robert's character, she leaves herself open to the eventual irruption of his unmasking, 
where this irruption forces her to answer to Robert.  Her own sense of self, which she brought to bear against 
him (and which, as we have seen, was an identity formed in relation to the Robert that she thought he was), 
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when he is revealed to be a sham, is forced to confront the fact that not only was Robert not who he said he 
was, but that she, as a result, was not really who she thought she was either.  The tendency to try to answer 'for' 
the text, to seek its truth or justify its existence through a particular reading (either as an artifact, or to justify 
the actions of its characters or narrative structure), brings us into a game that the text is playing, and by being 
drawn into the text to seek to answer for it - in the case of Bataille's work, just as much as in James' short 
novella - the reader, much like Eponine, is made to answer 'to' it.   
Writing on is the epitome of a discourse in control, calmly assured of its position. It is deployed with 
complete assurance in a realm over which it has taken possession, one it has inventoried after first 
closing it off, to make sure it is absolutely safe. This discourse runs no risk at all: it is not uneasy about 
the future, it steadily expands. One chooses an object and relies on it. (Hollier, 1992, p. 23) 
Hollier here echoes the concerns raised by Felman surrounding the process of interpretation but extends this 
to the act of writing itself. Writing as a ‘discourse in control’ is reflective of that desire to master the subject 
under consideration through the carving out of a space for the object to reside safe from contamination.  He 
expands on this point: 
Science and philosophy (models of discourse on) would like to fix and accumulate meaning in a closed 
language where clearly defined terms are enumerated hierarchically according to finite, calculable 
connections with no lateral linkage. They invest meaning in the lexicon, which as a result is allotted to 
control by the concept. (p. 26) 
This process of writing however is fraught with difficulty: “Meaning exists only as risk. It is never fixed, never 
arrested. There are no guarantees. Meaning is uninsured. Not covered.” (Hollier, 1992, p. 26)  Recalling the 
discussion of Taboo in the previous chapter, it will be noted that transgression of a taboo generates ambivalence 
and we have seen a similar pattern with the character of Eponine and her interaction with Robert.  A problem 
here becomes apparent for the reader and writer of literature that arises from the very ambivalence generated 
by the proscribed object involved in transgression.  The cold, calculating reader or writer seeks to subjugate 
the object of study and establish their mastery over it after the fashion of Hegel’s master who subjugates the 
slave to guarantee his own sense of self.  The rational edifice that is constructed through the process of writing 
or reading sublimates the text and establishes it in a relationship of subservience to the identity that produces 
it, reinforcing it in much the way the slave regretfully acknowledges the master’s superiority.  However, much 
like the development of Freud’s Ego, the process of reading or writing involves the excretion or exclusion of 
certain aspects (be they themes, narrative structures or content). Reading and writing in this way negatively 
define what is included, is reliant upon the suppression or repression of aspects which would contradict its key 
propositions, and retains only those which support it to provide a reassuring mirror for the reader or writer.  
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Bataille’s practice of writing expressly seeks to subvert appropriation by introducing ambiguous elements 
(such as that of Eponine’s naked laughter) which resist this movement towards restriction of the text.  These 
elements are typified by failure and incompletion which, in Hollier’s view, “enter into the tactical arsenal of a 
writing that tries to escape the rules of mastery: they delineate the critical figures of a rhetoric of non-power” 
(1992, p. 118) which ultimately “undermines and destroys everything whose existence depends on edifying 
pretentions” (p. 23)  The ambiguity which typifies the heterogeneous elements of Bataille’s work is ultimately 
seductive. Existing at the limits of understanding they draw the attention of the reader by being that object 
which, like that of the erotic or taboo object, is the result of the process of excretion that creates the subject, 
and thus becomes a pole of affectivity which concurrently attracts and repels those who enter its orbit. It is 
with this in mind that I now turn to questions surrounding the interpretation of ambiguity as contained within 
Edgar Allan Poe’s work ‘The Purloined Letter’ to seek to illustrate more plainly how ambiguity exacerbates 
the perceived problems of textual interpretation and reveals the implicit drive to mastery within approaches to 
Poe’s work that struggle to contain ambiguity within their ‘edifying pretensions’.  
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2.4: The Poetic Affect 
 
 
Given that literary works are made of language, it is natural to imagine them as full of differential 
meaning and nothing else.  This is true to the letter, but the letter here is not everything, or perhaps it is 
too much. In fact, it could be the vocation of great works to constrain language to say things that 
contradict its own laws, the sound and the fury of the relationship of the doubles, signifying nothing. 
(Girard, 1988, p. 42) 
 
 
In seeking to explicate the importance of ambiguity within Bataille’s work, it will serve us well to segue into 
another critical debate that surrounds a work with ambiguity at its heart.  Poe’s ‘Purloined Letter’, much like 
Henry James’ Turn of the Screw, spawned a slew of critical debate (following Lacan’s Seminar) and also shares 
with James’s work a particularly ambiguous center, namely the letter of the title.  What will become apparent 
is that the Lacanian analysis with its focus on the signifier underplays the role of rivalry within the text – a key 
notion in Girard’s conception of Mediated Desire – and its relation to ambiguity.  This focus on the signifier 
maintains the “straight line which joins subject and object” (Girard, 1980, p. 2) and results in a blindness to 
the role that mediation plays in generating what Felman calls its ‘poetic affect’ (Felman, 1988) 
 
In his seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter’, Jacques Lacan identifies a triadic structure generated by the movement 
of the letter that he feels defines the trajectory and character-roles within Poe's tale.  Within this structure he 
follows the path of the letter as it moves through successive stages of the work, establishing that, through its 
movement, the characters within the novella orbit around it and come to occupy successive places within a 
triangular structure.  Lacan uses this orbiting as evidence of the structural underpinning of the Freudian 
'repetition automatism' (which we examined earlier in Chapter 2.1) where the letter takes on and causes the 
repetition of the moment of 'originary trauma’. The letter, with its successive thefts, concealment and return 
are indicative for him of the dynamic that forms the subject, where repression, sublimation, transference and 
return endlessly revolve around the locus of the signifier.  Lacan begins his seminar by telling us that “repetition 
automatism finds its basis in what we have called the insistence of the signifying chain” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 6) 
and that in Poe's work this signifying chain is uncovered through analysis of the successive structures which 
repeat themselves throughout the work.  The letter takes upon itself the mantle of the ‘pure signifier’ whose 
place determines the ‘displacement’ of the characters due to their respective positions within the structure 
relative to it.   By examining the successive triangles that are in evidence within the work we are able, for 
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Lacan, to track the movement of the letter as signifier within this chain and identify how, in each case, three 
characters successively occupy established places within the triadic structure.  For Lacan, the three positions 
relative to the letter, defined by the place of the holder of the letter, are structured as a series of 'glances': 
The first is a glance that sees nothing... the second, a glance which sees that the first sees nothing and 
deludes itself as to the secrecy of what it hides... the third sees that the first two glances leave what 
should be hidden exposed to whoever would seize it. (2006a, p. 10) 
These glances repeat themselves through the text, defined by the position of the letter, it being that which the 
second seeks to hide, and which reverberates throughout the novella.  Lacan identifies two primary scenes as 
follows: 
 
1) The 'Queen' receives the letter and hides it – in plain sight – from the King, who does not notice the 
letter at all.  The Queen believes that the letter is safely hidden from discovery and yet the Minister 
has seen all, and knowing that it is ripe for the plucking, duly does so through a sleight of hand. 
2) The Minister now hides the letter and foils the police charged with recovering it because of the 
simplicity of his method of concealment.  The Minister feels confident that he has fooled his pursuers 
but is unaware that another, Dupin, has discovered his ruse.  Once discovered, and with as much 
audacity as the Minister employed to acquire the letter, Dupin steals it away, again through a sleight 
of hand. 
 
The contents of the letter, who it is from and why it has the potential to cause the Queen such jeopardy is never 
revealed to the reader. For Lacan, the unknown contents of the letter1 are of less importance than the letter’s 
place amongst the participants where the “fable is so constructed as to show that it is the letter and its diversion 
which governs their entries and roles”, or alluding to the etymology of the title: “if it be in sufferance, they 
shall endure the pain.” (p. 44)  In his seminar, Lacan focuses chiefly upon the two scenes mapped out above.  
However, these are not the only scenes identifiable within the text, and indeed, one is able to locate this 
structure at several points within and across the text.  One of the additional scenes (unnoticed by Lacan) is 
identified by Derrida in his critique of the Seminar.  Derrida adds a further scene (and alludes to the potential 
                                                 
1 The contents of the letter are not unknown to the characters within the novel, and Barbara Johnson is right to 
draw attention to this fact in her essay “The Frame of Reference”, though, as I will argue in due course, the letter’s 
contents, though known by the actors within this tale, are of little importance when we discover the motivation that 
generates the desire to obtain the letter. 
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existence of many others) to the two given by Lacan and, charging him with being too narrow in his view of 
Poe's text, claims that Lacan's analysis has an “effect of neutralizing exclusion (the 'narration' as commentary) 
that transforms the entire Seminar into an analysis fascinated by a content”, which ultimately leads him to 
“miss a scene.  When it sees two... there are three. At least.” (1988b, p. 179).  This is a just criticism, for Lacan 
does not acknowledge that in the course of his reading the letter has taken a further detour and escaped the 
confines of Poe's text.   
 
Once Dupin has successfully 'purloined' the letter, he holds it and uses it to extract a large sum of money from 
the Prefect for its safe return (or perhaps delivery is a better term to use here).  In this regard, he moves from 
the position of 'seeing' (hereafter referred to as (C)), where he initially perceived and obtained the letter, to 
occupy that of 'seeing that the other does not see' (B) that was previously held by the Minister.  At this juncture, 
the prefect remains in the position of 'not seeing' (A), and Lacan enters the structure as the one who 'sees what 
is hidden' (C)2.  Dupin, in ensuring that the Prefect is at the end of his tether, and willing to forgo a portion of 
the large reward promised him for the letter’s return, only reveals that he has obtained the letter when, 
aggrieved, the Prefect recounts:  “I would really give fifty thousand francs to anyone who would aid me in the 
matter” (Poe, 2008c, p. 256).  At this juncture, Dupin replaces the Minister in position (B) as seeing that the 
Prefect (A) does not see.  However, it is here that Lacan enters the fray, is caught in the continuing 'sufferance' 
of the letter coming to occupy the third position (C) as seeing what Dupin sought to keep hidden. 
 
Derrida quite rightly perceives Lacan's lack of recognition of his involvement in the game, but he can equally 
be charged with being drawn into the same process.  In his eagerness to align psychoanalysis with the process 
of deduction employed by Dupin (a process encapsulated by Lacan in the game of even and odd utilized by 
Dupin as an illustration of his deductive method) Lacan takes ‘possession’ of the signifier from Dupin, 
effectively purloining the letter to be held against Dupin for his own purposes.  Derrida here enters the fray at 
(C), for he perceives Lacan's blindness to other aspects of the tale, obsessed as he is with the power of the letter 
                                                 
2 This is not the only structure reducible to Lacan’s triangular model. Another that he does not explicitly deal with 
involves the Minister moving to the first position (A) after the letter has initially been stolen, for, until he deigns to try to 
utilize the letter, the Minister it is implied is unaware that he no longer possesses the letter.  However, I have not used this 
example here, for the relationship between the Prefect and Dupin, as it extends across the body of Poe's three stories 
involving him, is of capital importance. 
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and his desire to appropriate it for his own ends.  It is in this manner, where the letter's power lures the spectator 
into its orbit, that the pattern of the triadic structure is able to repeat itself and extend its reach out of the text.  
The desire to possess the letter, to appropriate its power, generates a desire which, as we shall see in due course, 
leads us to acknowledge that, blind to the violence of their actions3, when “desire takes charge, readings will 
grow erratic.” (Larkin, 2003, p. 67) 
 
Derrida charges Lacan with a certain blindness, a blindness to the limitations of his own method that excludes 
portions of the text, along with a complicity with the structure which he himself draws attention to. This, as 
we have said, is a 'fair cop', and yet, Derrida's perpetration of the same crime4 allows us to recognize something 
of note which is passed over in this intellectual conflict.  Let us recall, a fact often overlooked within the 
secondary literature, that the stated aim of Lacan's seminar is to establish that Poe's work is an illustration of 
the truth of Freud's intuition of the nature of 'repetition automatism', as it reveals that “the symbolic takes hold 
in even the deepest recesses of the human organism” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 6).  It is with this in mind that we return 
to the child's game of 'fort' and 'da'.   
 
The Reassuring Image 
 
Recalling our treatment of the child’s game (Chapter 2.1), we will acknowledge that the departure of the mother 
is given as the traumatic event against which and around which the Ego constructs itself.  One part of the tale 
however was not considered, and only appears as a footnote to the main narrative of Freud’s tale, that being 
the interaction of the child and the mirror: “He had discovered his reflection in a full length mirror which did 
not quite reach the ground, so that by crouching down he could make his mirror image ‘gone’” (Freud, 2001b, 
p. 15n).  This occurrence is given to us in a footnote to the main body of the text, and is not developed further 
by Freud in the main body of his argument.  Yet, it is particularly relevant when we consider what this 
interaction with the mirror entails (Freud’s recounting of the incident suggests that it occurred after the first 
                                                 
3 It is the violence of reading identified by Felman and touched upon at the close of the previous chapter.  Such a violent 
reading is carried out by Dupin, Lacan and Derrida successively when they each seek to further demystify that which they 
perceived as insufficiently divined by their precursor. 
4 Barbara Johnson identifies this when she states; “Derrida, by filling in what Lacan left blank is repeating the same 
gesture of blank-filling  for which he criticizes Lacan” and “Therefore it is all the more noticeable that Derrida’s own 
reading of Lacan’s text repeats the crimes of which he accuses it.” (1988, p. 218) 
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appearance of the game) with its echoes of the ‘fort’ and da’ of the game this child was so fond of.  Lacan 
directs our gaze accordingly: 
The important point is that this form situates the agency known as the Ego, prior to its social 
determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual or, 
rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subject’s becoming, no matter how successful the 
dialectical synthesis by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with his own reality. (Lacan, 2006b, 
p. 76) 
We will recall that the originary trauma against which the Ego constructs itself in Freud’s schema is repressed 
by the Ego in an attempt to master and thus nullify its traumatic impact.  In the process by which Freud’s Ego 
constructs itself, the traumatic event is repressed through the successive establishment and solidification of the 
Ego whereby it enforces its own forgetfulness as to the origins from which it arises.  This repression however 
is precarious, and one can conjecture with Lacan that the repetition of the ‘fort’ and ‘da’ – uttered by the 
fledgling Ego – at the ‘mirror’ stage aptly illustrates what Freud proposes as the origin of the compulsion to 
repeat.  As we saw in Chapter 2.1, the Ego that forgets (represses) its traumatic origins establishes within this 
dynamic a fictive image of its own self, fictive in that the illusory mastery that it has promised itself over its 
own trauma is never complete, and the play of the child in front of the mirror serves to further reinforce the 
imaginary wholeness of the self by aligning this mastery with the unified image of the body.  By identifying 
the Ego with its own image, the Ego’s manipulation of its body reinforces the ever increasing sense of security 
and control that the fledgling ‘I’ has over its own destiny, arising as it has from “a fragmented image of the 
body to what I will call an ‘orthopedic’ form of its totality”, and ultimately culminating in “the finally donned 
armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, 
2006b, p. 78). 
 
Through the identification with its own image, the Ego is firmly married to itself, elevated to the level of the 
imaginary where this image-inary unity of self invokes an illusory sense of self-mastery that the Ego carries 
with it; indeed, it is this imaginary unity of self which is constitutive of the Ego itself.  Now, recognizing that 
this imaginary unity is built upon the suppression/repression of the traumatic splitting of itself from itself, and 
how the process of externalization results in an ‘objectification’ of the repressed trauma, we are at this stage 
better placed to see the way in which Lacan’s ‘signifier’ maintains a dynamic of desire which isolates desire 
and its genesis within the imaginary subject.   
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Hiding in plain sight, and stealing by sleight of hand: these are the two maneuvers which accompany the second 
(B) and third (C) positions within Lacan’s triadic structure.  The first (A) position has blindness as its 
distinctive feature, and the work of stealing and hiding (B) seeks respectively to take advantage of this inability 
to see and avoid the repercussions should the first position discover the hidden letter.  In the first or ‘primal’ 
scene, the Queen conceals the letter by turning it face up so as to conceal it from the King.  This simple ruse 
succeeds in its aim, hiding it from him who, should he discover it, will cause the full force of law to descend 
upon the Queen. However, in her concealment, with her attention fixed upon the King, she leaves herself open 
to a secondary, unprepared for threat; that of the sly Minister.  In the ‘second’ scene, we see the Minister 
perform the same movements that we witnessed the Queen carry out when she held the letter.  He, in order to 
maintain his position of power as the controller of the letter’s destiny (for it is the letter’s potential to be used 
that provides it with such momentous import), hides the letter simply by turning it inside out and replacing the 
original address and seal with his own.  Again, despite successfully fooling the Prefect and his officers, he does 
not fool Dupin who, promptly, and with as much gall as the Minister before him, extracts the letter right from 
under his nose.  The analogies between these scenes and the ‘mirror’ stage are here plain to see, for the letter 
is ultimately seductive owing to the potential for power (or the threat of destruction) that it holds, a promise 
that entails that should one control the letter, the holder would be in a position of heightened mastery of his 
environment.  The letter is coveted for this potential power that it holds, which, when faced with another who 
holds it, ensures that they have more self-mastery (more resources at their disposal) than the one who lacks 
and therefore covets it.  The desire to possess the letter is thus seen as the desire to increase the mastery of the 
one who wishes to possess it, recognizing the lack of control that they have over their situation when it is in 
the clutches of another.  Interestingly, and in a direct parallel to both the child’s game and the subsequent play 
with the mirror, once the letter is in one’s control (thus nullifying its potential to cause the possessor further 
trauma) it is swiftly hidden from view (repressed) and that person then, like the Minister, carries on outwardly 
as if there were no letter at all.  This is the key to understanding Lacan’s interpretation of the tale, and Felman 
succinctly summarizes it for us as follows: 
In much the same way as the repressed returns in symptom, which is its repetitive symbolic substitute, 
the purloined letter ceaselessly returns in the tale – as a signifier of the repressed – through its repetitive 
displacements and replacements. (1988, p. 146) 
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We can utilize this insight and apply the structure identified in the first and second scene to others seen both 
throughout the novel and within the critical literature which grows from it.  We can identify the scene involving 
the Prefect, Dupin and Lacan, along with that of Dupin, Lacan and Derrida; the ‘scene’ as perceived by Lacan 
is repeating itself successively through the text and eventually outside the text with each successive re-reading 
of the reading of the text.  The position of analysis, that is, the position (C) is the place in which the reader (be 
they Dupin, the Minister, Lacan or Derrida) occupies and obtains insight into and over the preceding position 
(B).  When this position is occupied by Lacan, it is a position of insight where he, much like Dupin and the 
Minister before him, is able to make his claims for the truth of the triadic structure by dint of his ability to 
perceive clearly “what must be hidden.” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 10), and from which he claims he was able to have 
“deciphered Dupin’s true strategy.” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 30)  However, it is at this stage that Derrida levels another 
of his criticisms of Lacan’s method, claiming that his focus upon what is “recounted in the account”, that is, 
the content of the novella, is to the detriment of “the scene of writing.” (1988b, p. 179)  He tells us: 
The seminar’s interest in the agency of the signifier in its letter seizes upon this agency to the extent that 
it constitutes precisely, on the first approach, the exemplary content, the meaning, the written of Poe’s 
fiction, as opposed to its writing, its signifier and its narrating form. (p. 179) 
Lacan is charged with blindness (one might say critical obtuseness or poor scholarship), being seemingly 
ignorant of the other factors at play within and across the text.  A kinship exists between Lacan under Derrida’s 
gaze and the Minister under Dupin’s.  Dupin is able to take advantage of the position that the Minister finds 
himself in due to the fact that he is not looking, or perhaps, focusing too narrowly on those aspects he perceives 
to be a threat to his continued holding of the letter, and as such, leaves himself open to attack from an obtuse 
angle.  Similarly, in being charged with being overly concerned with content – a concern that Derrida links to 
the limitations of Lacan’s method – we can tease out the similarities between the two situations.  In Derrida’s 
critique we see a Lacan who sees that the other does not see, whilst remaining ignorant of the gaze that sees 
what it hides.  What Lacan hides, indeed perhaps represses, are the aspects of Poe’s text (the position of the 
narrator and Poe’s work as a ‘scene of writing’) that threatens to destabilize the theoretical structure he has 
mapped out in his Seminar. Lacan has in this manner been drawn into the orbit of the signifier to take the 
position (C), where he previously situated the analyst-Dupin, seemingly able to observe the shortcomings of 
the one who preceded him. Interestingly, this potential pull of the signifier, which draws along the actors within 
the novella, in turn affects Lacan (not without a tinge of irony), and also seems to be infecting Derrida.  
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Henry James, in the New York preface to his Turn of the Screw, made the following comment; “I need scarcely 
add after this that it is a piece of ingenuity pure and simple, of cold artistic calculation, an amusette to catch 
those not easily caught” (James, 2000, pp. XXXII-III) and it would be fair to say that this is a comment that 
could equally be applied to Poe’s work, given the extensive debate that was instigated by Lacan’s seminar.  
What is most striking about Poe’s work and its ensuing critical re/interpretation is that it evinces an undeniable 
affect on those it touches, an affect that itself structurally mirrors that of the movement of the letter within the 
text itself. Felman, in her On Reading Poetry, alludes to this when she contends that: “it is overwhelmingly 
obvious in a case like Poe’s, that the discourse of literary history itself points to some unconscious 
determinations that structure it but of which it is not aware” (1988, p. 154).   The critical conflict that surrounds 
this text is for Felman symptomatic of the poetic effect, where the drive to dominate the truth of the text through 
its repeated interpretations becomes a “deadly struggle” with the conscious need to master the text continually 
undermined by the unconscious undertow of the poetic object. “Poetry”, she tells us, “has to do with what can 
be neither resisted nor escaped” (p. 154), and acknowledging this, we should perhaps adopt a more cautious 
approach, one sensitive to the dislocating power of poetry, an approach which seeks “not necessarily to 
recognize a known, to find an answer, but also, and perhaps more challenging, to locate an unknown, to find a 
question.” (p. 153)5   
 
Jealousy and Envy 
 
Critical interpretations such as those of Lacan, Derrida or indeed Dupin are undertaken with a focus upon the 
need to clarify the text, to identify its truth or the process by which it displaces truth.  They focus upon trying 
                                                 
5 This line of argument leads to the same concerns as raised by Meno: “How will you look for it Socrates, when you do 
not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet it, how 
will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?” (Plato, 2002, p. 70) Following this, Socrates, insisting that he 
is “not teaching the boy anything” (p. 73), proceeds to illustrate how the slave arrives at understanding through a process 
of recollection.  What such a critique fails to understand is that the cautious approach Felman wishes us to take with 
poetry is an approach that seeks not to answer that which the slave already knows, but to approach the work with a mind 
aware of the potential critical pitfall of doing so.  Such an approach would approach a text to let the potential ambiguity 
affect the reader and allow for a critical evaluation of this ambiguous point without insisting upon its reconciliation with 
some ultimate truth.  
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to identify the known within or about the text, to dominate the letter and dominate the other which epitomizes 
what Hollier terms a “discourse  in control” (1992, p. 23).  Such a focus leaves those concerned blind to one 
important factor of this work which defines the trajectory of the signifying chain (Lacan) and is the 
undercurrent which pulls along the critical interpretations.  Rivalry here will be our guide, and it will be by 
tracing the disquieting, unsettling effect of the poetically ambiguous letter - a letter whose possession promises 
great power and tempts those who see it as ripe for the picking – that we will be able to see the unveiling of a 
double mediation (Girard) that defines not only the content of Poe’s work, but also that of the ensuing critical 
debate.   
Why – it did seem not altogether right to leave the interior blank – that would have been insulting. D-, 
at Vienna once, did me an evil turn. (Poe, 2008c, p. 265) 
To begin, let us re-examine Poe’s work to root out rivalry as it functions as part of the content of the text. In 
addition to his extraction of the monies from the Prefect, Dupin’s actions are motivated further by his acting 
“as a partisan” (p. 265) on behalf of the ‘Queen’. Further to this, we can glean an eagerness in his actions to 
revenge himself upon the Minister for some wrong carried out in a previous encounter. He places the oft 
discussed quote (a quote that itself hints at their similarity, or perhaps, identity and which was unnecessary in 
that it did not further the aim of returning the letter to its rightful owner through its inscription) upon the fake 
letter substituted for the original.  By placing his signature, we see that for Dupin it is not enough to have 
outwitted his adversary, but in fact he must go further and rub his foe’s nose in his defeat, leaving him in no 
doubt as to who was responsible for his downfall. 
 
Jealousy, envy and retribution pervade the ‘Purloined Letter’, and it is this which will allow us to flesh out this 
tale and explain how the movement of the signifier, the letter, comes to interact with the characters, defining 
their actions and their preoccupations.  The key here will be the notion of Mediated Desire6, and particularly 
those insights of Girard into the relationship between the model and the subject, defined as it is for him through 
the double movement of rivalry and admiration.  This will be in stark contrast to Lacan who places the stress 
in his observation of the inter-subjective movement on the signifier. For Girard, the letter as signifier would 
fade from its central position, it instead being the mediator that becomes the focus of this structure.  Lacan tells 
                                                 
6 Girard uses several different words to denote his conception of desire including, among others; metaphysical, mediated, 
triangular and mimetic. 
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us: 
Such is the signifier’s answer, beyond all significations: “You believe you are taking action when I am 
the one making you stir at the bidding of the bonds with which I weave your desires.  Thus do the latter 
grow in strength and multiply in objects, bringing you back to the fragmentation of your rent childhood. 
That will be your feast until the return of the stone guest who I shall be for you since you call me forth.” 
(Lacan, 2006a, p. 29) 
Lacan establishes and places the desiring locus of the subject relative to the position of the letter as signifier.  
It is a position which itself betrays a repetition of the originary formative movement of the ‘mirror stage’ that 
for him generates the image-inary subject.  However, despite side-stepping the scientifically dubious grounding 
that Freud gives repetition (where he seeks to place this originating stage within some biological imperative - 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle), Lacan is able to recognize the importance within the Freudian structure of the 
imaginary, illusory nature of the unified subject.  For those familiar with Girard’s work, the signifier’s 
challenge to the subject echoes the description that he gives to the work of the mediator upon the subject, 
where this model rouses desire within the subject, and as a result defines the identity of the subject for which 
it is a model.  However, despite these similarities, Girard takes issue with the rooting of this dynamic within 
the obscure realm of the unconscious. He tells us that psychoanalytic readings “succumb to familial fetishism” 
which search “exclusively in a distant past or in the depths of some unconscious for the cause of neurosis” 
(1988, p. 55)   Instead, he feels that this same dynamic is able to be explained sufficiently by the identification 
of the mediator as the generator of desire, rather than the resulting action being caused by the irritation of a 
signifier reverberating since childhood.  What is key to his analysis of mediated desire, and what as we will 
see in due course is applicable to Poe’s case, is the desire for (and promise of) power resulting from possession 
of the letter. 
 
Within, preceding and following the text of the ‘Purloined Letter’, jealousy or admiration of the Other defines 
the trajectory that the letter takes. At a given point, whether it be in Lacan’s first or second scene, or indeed in 
any of the following ‘scenes’ that constitute the critical discourse, we can identify the rivalry at play that defines 
the inter-subjective structure, a rivalry which defines the participant’s entry into the scene prior to their 
engagement with the letter.  I do not wish to take issue with Lacan’s insistence upon a structure which defines 
the content of the work, and yet, I do wish to contend that it is not the signifier itself which defines the 
participant’s position within these structures, for as it will become clear, the participants are defined prior to 
143 
 
the intrusion of the signifier and, more importantly, the signifier as desired object is no more than an excuse 
for the actions that are carried out in its name.   
 
The importance Lacan gives the signifier results in him mistaking the letter for the cause that generates this 
structure, giving as he does the letter the primary position in generating desire.  However, through a re-
evaluation of the dynamic we can see that the letter’s entry into it is defined in advance.  Rather than the letter 
as signifier being of prime importance, it is instead the Other as model in whom we will find the source of the 
desire to possess this letter. This Other who is in possession of the letter, who generates desire, is hidden within 
Lacan’s analysis by dint of its focus upon the letter for, mistakenly, the person who seeks to purloin the letter, 
sees only this object and not the model that designates it as such.  Girard notes here: “In the ‘normal’ stages of 
mimetic desire, the object is already designated by the model, but this model stays in the shadows, the object 
remains the principal pole of affectivity and desiring activity.” (1988, p. 53) Lacan here could with good reason 
concede much ground to the Girardian notion that it is the Other that defines the letter’s entry and movement 
within the tale, and yet, a fundamental difference exists between the two, one which potentially undermines 
Lacan’s insistence upon the letters course being a repetition of the foundational mirror stage which defines the 
signifier and its repetitive movements. Lacan reminds us that the signifier serves to bring back ‘the 
fragmentation of your rent childhood’ and that its source can be located squarely within the subject which 
grapples with it.  The signifier and its movements are grounded (indeed caused by) the subject themselves for, 
as Lacan reminds us: ‘I shall be for you since you call me forth.’  A direct genealogical line is thus posited by 
Lacan which traces the signifier back from the current dynamic which determines its trajectory to its genesis 
within the traumatic childhood formed in the mirror stage.  In such a manner the subject is at the mercy of 
themselves as signifier for, whether conscious of the ‘true’ nature of the object-signifier or not it nevertheless 
retains that thread which ties it to the burgeoning subject in the mirror stage. The mechanisms which bring the 
letter into the grasp of a particular person allow for the transference of spontaneous desires and traumas onto 
the letter and its subsequent transformation from a piece of paper covered with words into the ambiguous 
signifier of Lacan’s analysis.   
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Within such an analysis the other actors within Poe’s tale fade into the background through the stress that is 
placed upon the letter as signifier. This blindness to the Other can be viewed as an inherited prejudice that 
gives primacy to an interpretation which favors the autonomy of individual desire; the signifier and the 
movement it dictates rely upon the subject’s relation to itself, it being the signifier of their subjectivity, and it 
is this which lends the letter the ambiguity it holds. This contrasts sharply with the Girardian model which 
would seek to explain the ambiguous nature of the letter by dint of the fact that what is seemingly the locus of 
the tale (the letter) is in fact not that at all.  In such a conception, the illusion of autonomy that grounds the 
narrative of subjectivity (as we saw in Hegel and Nietzsche) is not questioned by the subject, who believes in 
the autonomy of their own desires and choices. What we will find by re-examining both the content of the text 
and the dynamic that determines the critical literature is that the letter, be it the letter within the text, or the text 
itself when we move outside of it, becomes secondary to the subject who is in ‘possession’ of it.  Firstly, let us 
examine two scenes within the text, beginning with Lacan’s ‘primal’ scene. 
 
The Queen has received a letter, one which, should it become known, threatens her position of confidence with 
the King.  Concealing the letter from him by turning it face up, she does not fool the canny Minister who spies 
the letter and steals it away.  The Queen seeks to conceal it from the King (or whoever he is; all we are told is 
that both of these are Royal personages) for it threatens her position with him.  The Queen’s relationship to the 
King ensures, we can presume, a certain level of prestige and power afforded to her by his faith in her.  It is 
through the King that the Queen gains her power, and by his leave that she maintains it.  The Minister steals 
the letter primarily with the aim of establishing a hold over the Queen thus ensuring that he would by proxy 
be able to exert an influence upon the King through forcing her hand7.  Without this threat to the established 
power the letter would not be enticing in the slightest, and the Minister would not have sought to obtain it.   
 
The motive that we can read into the Minister’s actions is that he is envious of the Queen’s position of authority, 
                                                 
7 Whilst we are not told explicitly that this woman of Royal lineage is indeed the Queen, we can infer that by the fact that 
vast sums are spent in ensuring its safe return, that she holds some great power or influence with the court that is threatened 
by the letter’s content. 
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and that his behavior betrays his wish to elevate his own amount of power to the level of the Queen, that is, to 
effectively become the Queen.  The Queen is his model here, and through her the King, and it is envy that 
drives the Minister to seek out some means of redressing the balance of power by reversing the hierarchy that 
they currently inhabit. By taking the letter he is effectively able to take her place as regards her influence over 
the King, with the desire to supplant her in this way revealing the ambivalent attitude he shows towards her.  
Girard notes on this ambivalence: “The person who hates first, hates himself for the secret admiration 
concealed by his hatred” (1980, p. 11).  When we view the relationship between the participants in such a way 
– for it is difficult to agree with Lacan that the signifier defines the inter-subjective relationships fully – the 
importance that it placed upon the signifier fades, where instead of the object-signifier generating the desire 
for its possession, it is the model who reveals their desire for the object that generates the desire in the Other.   
The Queen’s attempts to conceal the letter invest it with the promise that it holds some key to her power and, 
spying this, the Minister covets this object which the Queen desires to keep to herself so badly.  One feels that 
within this situation, had there not been this letter, there would have arisen some other opportunity - or excuse 
- whereby the Minister could have, or would have, attempted to take the place of the Queen (either by having 
her deposed of her position, or as in the text, by controlling her actions).  Girard reminds us of the arbitrary 
nature of the designated object when he tells us “This power (of the object) he confers elsewhere, on a second 
object, on a new desire.  The Hero goes through his existence, from desire to desire, as one crosses a stream, 
jumping from one slippery stone to another.” (1980, p. 89)8   
 
The nature of the glances that the characters successively exchange through the course of the story serve to 
reinforce the implication of a mediated rivalry at play within its structure, where (in contrast to Lacan’s 
conclusion) the possessors of the letter take upon themselves characteristics of the former possessor, namely a 
                                                 
8 This is echoed by Lacan but, despite this similarity which recognizes that the actors within the tale will make arbitrary 
decisions as to what generates the desire, it is important again to stress that this type of object choice (effectively that any 
object will do) differs between Lacan and Girard.  For Lacan as the individual is struggling with their own traumatic 
origins the arbitrary choice betrays a belief that the imaginary self clings to (that they are dictating the choices they make, 
not the signifier).  For Girard it is the Other which, as model, defines the choices for the subject, but which the subject 
‘ignores’ wishing instead to believe in their own spontaneity of desire. The contrast, as said previously, is that the Lacanian 
analysis roots this ‘false’ object choice within the subject’s relation to itself (the signifier) which maintains the closed 
genealogy (even if the subject is unaware of the signifiers influence it nevertheless influences the subjects own desire) 
which Girard is working to contest. 
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directed gaze that leaves them blind to the gaze of the unseen, unexpected observer.  The very desire to take 
hold of the letter is evocative of what Girard notes when he states “every hero expects his being to be radically 
changed by the act of possession” (1980, p. 53), it being of course a letter which promises to give “its holder 
a certain power in a certain quarter where such power is immensely valuable.” (Poe, 2008c, p. 250)   The letter 
is immensely seductive, drawing people to it, not by dint of what the letter contains – and on this point Lacan 
is correct – but instead by what possession of the letter promises the bearer.  What this letter promises is an 
increased level of power, of mastery, in relation to the model of that desire, a notion reinforced when we recall 
that whosoever is in possession of the letter has something that the person in the first position previously had 
and lost, at which point the person in the third position, once perceiving that the model has something that they 
do not, succumbs to the desire to possess it.   
 
Each of the letter’s bearers has their rival (in some cases more than one), and the interplay of these rivalries 
influences the course that the letter shall take.  We can trace many rivalries at play within and across the text. 
We can acknowledge the Minister’s desire to depose the Queen, Dupin’s need to revenge himself upon the 
Minister for that slight in Vienna, and the long standing rivalry between the Prefect and Dupin.  This rivalry 
itself stretches from the ‘Rue Morgue’ where Dupin, in solving that case, defeated the Prefect “in his own 
castle” (Poe, 2008a, p. 122), and again, in solving the ‘Mystery of Marie Rogêt’, he received the reward 
“punctually, although with reluctance” (Poe, 2008b, p. 191) through to their final encounter, where 
“thunderstruck”, the Prefect, after “several pauses and vacant stares” is given the letter - less 50,000 Francs of 
course - “in a perfect agony of joy” (Poe, 2008c, p. 256)  Each of the characters in this way has a pre-existing 
orientation to the other, and the letter itself becomes in this light little more than a pretext which is attached to 
the already existent rivalries being played out. When we recognize that the letter forms the pretext for a 
character’s introduction into the dynamic, once the subject and mediator are close to conflict, we see how the 
letter slides out of view: “When the mimetic mechanism of the subject tends to turn from the designated object 
towards the rival designating the object, the object fades away.” (Girard, 1988, p. 53)  
147 
 
 
Mediated Rivalry 
 
The revered object has come close; it seems within reach of the hand; only one obstacle remains between 
subject and object – the mediator himself. The closer the mediator comes, the more feverish the action 
becomes. (Girard, 1980, p. 85) 
The work of René Girard is focused upon the dynamic of ‘mediated desire’, formulated most eloquently in his 
seminal Deceit, Desire and the Novel, and is a notion that underpins the entirety of his work.  Girard 
systematically explores the works of Stendhal, Proust, Dostoyevsky and Flaubert, tracing the workings of 
desire and the role of the mediator within their novels. The mediator, or mediation in general, is the “generator” 
of desire which (in contrast to psychoanalytic conceptions which root desire within the unconscious), Girard 
believes to be “the simplest possible.” (1980, pp. 172-3)  Rather than proximity to the object defining the 
subject and their relationship to desire, instead Girard seeks to undermine the primacy of the object in the 
subject/object relationship by introducing the third term – the mediator.  By an extensive analysis of the role 
of the mediator within ‘novelistic literature’, he claims that consideration of this third term reveals that “the 
impulse towards the object is ultimately an impulse towards the mediator” (p. 10).  Without considering the 
role of the mediator, we are unable to overcome the “myth of personal mastery” (p. 44) which is our legacy 
from the enlightenment, and which we can see traces of in the thought of Hegel and Nietzsche, as well as in 
the stated aim of psychoanalysis (through the drive to eradicate or master neurosis).  Should we choose 
however to acknowledge the defining role that the mediator plays within the genesis of desire, and thus of 
subjectivity, Girard would have us recognize that “in reality no one is spontaneous.” (p. 206)   
 
Girard is proposing here a socialized Identity akin to that which we saw in the analysis of Hegel (Chapter 1.2) 
and indeed, similarities do exist between the two.  Chiefly, this involves a shared recognition of the primacy 
of desire as the foundation of Identity, and initially, without further explication, it could be difficult to tease 
the two apart.  We will recall that for Hegel, man’s subjectivity is formed through the restriction of desire in 
the face of the other, and as this restriction already had taken place at the point of recognition, Identity is 
revealed as a relation between subjects reliant upon each other for the formation of each other’s Identity.  In 
the reading of Hegel proposed in this work, one could argue that the myth of the self-sufficiency of a person’s 
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Identity is undermined by the very recognition of the absolute relation to the Other that is the cornerstone of 
Hegel’s conception of subjectivity. Such an absolute relation, one in which it would not be right to consider a 
subject in isolation, would allow us to draw the same conclusion as that made by Girard, namely, that the ‘myth 
of self-sufficiency’, of the autonomous man, is proven false by the very relational nature of this self-same 
identity.  Reliant upon the Other for its very constitution and maintenance, the Hegelian subject as master of 
his own destiny is undermined (indeed, the very dialectic which Hegel proposes involves the removal of this 
notion of Mastery as a pre-requisite to the establishment of subjectivity) and within this model, the 
‘spontaneity’ of the subject is challenged by a recognition of the intertwined destiny of the I and Other.  
However, within the mythology of the subject that Hegel creates, prior to the establishment of the subject 
proper the proto-subject is one that is defined by its desire to establish without question its own certainty of 
self.  Prior to the acquiescence of the I to the Other (and vice-versa) the ‘subject’ is defined by its own desire, 
a desire that originates from the negative relation of the I to the world9.   
 
Girard avoids discussing the origin of the desiring self in Deceit, Desire and the Novel. The tendency to trace 
the origins of desire, through either its reduction to a murky, traumatized unconscious, or as the first grasping 
of a self-certain Identity would be considered by Girard as only so many ruses by which we reinforce the 
romantic ‘myth’ of personal autonomy.   By identifying the strange workings of desire with the mysterious 
pre-history of the self or the machinations of a relatively dim unconscious, we inevitably avoid confronting 
the mediator’s presence by locating the unknown of desire within another unknown, albeit one that is ultimately 
mine.  Now, we will see presently how uprooting desire from its foundations in a mythologized self has 
parallels in the work of Bataille, but it is important to recognize that Girard, again like Bataille (and Hegel and 
Nietzsche before him), did not seek to sever the tie that binds desire and Identity.  Indeed, Girard too sees 
desire as constitutive of the subject, since it is through it that the subject’s identity is formed.  Girard’s subject, 
like Hegel’s, is one that is formed negatively in relation to what it is not; however, the distinction here rests 
not on the primacy of the subject faced with the not that is the object of its perception as found in the 
                                                 
9 It is this issue that we drew attention to in the previous chapter.  We saw how in the character of Eponine the Hegelian 
conception, reliant as it is on the basis of the self-certain individual, was insufficient to explain her actions following 
Robert’s ‘collapse’. 
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Phenomenology, but instead rests the subject encountering another subject.  This distinction is further teased 
out when we recognize that the Hegelian subject is engaged in the life/death struggle which characterizes his 
dialectic, and whilst this aspect of conflict carries over into Girard’s work, he stresses the dual aspect of the 
Other, not solely as competitor, but also as one to be admired and copied. If we are ignorant of the role that the 
mediator plays in the generation of desire, then Girard points us towards the tendency, when an object is 
seemingly not enough to engender the actions around it, to seek to find the motivation located within the 
desiring subject (thus ignoring the role of the mediator).  He tells us; “when the ‘nature’ of the object inspiring 
passion is not sufficient to account for the desire, one must turn to the impassioned subject.  Either his 
‘psychology’ is examined or his ‘liberty’ invoked.” (1980, p. 2)   
 
Returning to Poe’s work, we can see evidence of this tendency within the Seminar where Lacan, by aligning 
the letter with the signifier (arising from the traumatic ‘birth’ of the subject), is able to overcome its ambiguity 
by reducing the generation of desire caused by the letter to the particular moment of Trauma.   In order to 
account for the excessive labors that are undertaken to obtain, conceal and return the letter, Lacan, by equating 
the particular letter with the general signifier, reinforces the subject/object model of desire by tracing back 
what Girard calls the “simple straight line which joins subject and object” (1980, p. 2).  This effectively reduces 
the presence and influence of the mediator within the text by sidestepping any influence that they might have 
had in instilling the desire for the letter in the mediated subject, a sidestepping which reinforces Derrida’s 
claim with regard to the partially blind approach which Lacan takes to the text.  If we accept the role that the 
mediator plays within the text - and we have seen how key the role of rivalry is in this respect - then we are in 
a position to extend this acknowledgment to the critical literature.  In her analysis of Henry James’ Turn of the 
Screw, Felman establishes that the central ambiguity of the text is in direct contrast with the uncritical approach 
to the hinterland of theory which frames the debate, namely Freud, and particularly his conception of 
repression: “James’s critics curiously enough, all held Freud responsible for their disagreement: ‘Freud’ is 
indeed believed to be the cause and is referred to as the demarcation line of their polemical divergence” (2003, 
p. 161)  
In this debate, we find Freud functioning as mediator, setting the terms by which the object is approached.  
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Freud and his thought function as either the mediator-model or mediator-rival for the opposing camps, whereby 
he becomes the third presence in respect to whom the text is read either ‘for’ or ‘against’.  What is at stake is 
not so much the truth of James’ work (despite the lengths to which the critics go to make such a claim), but the 
validity of the Freudian claim to be able to approach and interpret literature.  The central ambiguity of James’ 
work, indeed, its intentional ambiguity serves only to heighten the tension between the parties, and the actual 
object (the work itself), as an ambiguous trap, fades from view in the shadow of the mediator.  We find parallels 
between the ambiguity central to James’ work and Poe’s ‘Purloined Letter’, where the letter, which for the 
reader is ambiguous (as we are the only ones not to know its content), is put to use by those who seek to 
venerate or violate their mediator.  When Felman talks of those ‘unconscious determinations’ which define the 
debate, we should cast our nets wider, and recognize that, lurking in the background, “the mediator is there, 
above that line, radiating toward both the subject and object” (Girard, 1980, p. 2) and that both within the text 
and in the ensuing interpretations, we can see that it is mediated desire which ensures that character and critic 
alike are “imprisoned with their contemporaries.” (p. 3) 
 
James’ work, as he himself attests, is a work which traps those who approach it.  The ambiguity of the novella 
begs for a Truth to be established (is the Governess mad or are the ghosts real? Is the child evil or possessed?), 
and yet frustratingly, there is no definitive answer to be found within the text.  This Truth is applied to (read 
into) the text, for or against an Other. Similarly, the truth of Poe’s text, whilst being sought in, on or around 
the text, is fought out upon the plains of psychoanalysis.  What is at stake, much as in the James debate, is the 
validity of the psychoanalytic method of interpreting literary works (particularly prominent in Derrida’s 
critique10), and the legitimacy of the discipline’s method as a whole. 
We have acknowledged how the characters within Poe’s tale are defined in a two-fold manner by their 
mediators.  Their orientation (gaze) is directed towards the letter by their mediator, and the actions which 
follow this directing of gaze are similarly determined not by the letter itself, but by the mediator with which 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that another of Derrida’s critiques of Freud centres on the narrative interpretation he creates around 
the now well-worn ‘Child’s Game’ which, as we have acknowledged, informs the terms of the Lacanian interpretation of 
Poe’s work. 
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they are engaged at a given point in the drama11.  We have found further evidence of this mediation at play by 
dint of the fact that the letter as desired object ‘fades from view’ once it is successfully obtained from the rival 
for, once vanquished, another rival or object is found which re-directs the subject’s attention.  Specifically, this 
can be seen in the fluid transfer of rivalry from Dupin and the Minister, to Dupin and the Prefect (where the 
pre-existing rivalries between them have been noted) where we can recognize the letter’s role as a pretext 
which enters into an already pre-existing dynamic, a dynamic which evokes a veritable web of mediation.  
Such a recognition of overlapping and interweaving webs of mediation further allows us to take account of 
Derrida’s critique of Lacan’s insistence on the triangular ‘scenes’. By shifting attention away from the letter 
to the interplay of rivals, we can allow for the fluid dynamic required by Girard’s conception and account for 
the multiple ‘scenes’ that Derrida alludes to that strain against the restrictions that Lacan places on it with his 
rigid subject/signifier structure. 
 
Poe’s work operates both on an intra and extra-textual level and manifests one potential dynamic of mediated 
desire12.  By utilizing the ambiguity of the letter Poe is able to highlight the primacy of the mediator-rival by 
“multiplying surfaces on different planes” (Girard, 1980, p. 146) which generates desire for the letter and 
evokes the ridiculous one-upmanship that characterizes the actions of the actors within the tale.  The ambiguity 
of the letter, an ambiguity that serves to attract us, concurrently acts to deflect the gaze of the desiring subject 
away from that which generates that very desire – namely the dynamic of mediated rivalry.  This ambiguity 
seeps out of the text and towards those who approach it either as reader or critic, all of whom seek to demystify 
the object and reveal its ‘Truth’.  By desiring the object so much, we model our desire to grasp the Truth of 
Poe’s tale after the fashion of his characters.  Such desire is exacerbated by the unknown qualities that define 
the letter, qualities which cause the letter as Truth to become immensely seductive.   
 
                                                 
11 This is seen in Dupin’s desire to leave his trace upon the facsimile and his desire to extract 50,000 Francs from the 
Prefect, actions which seems incongruous with the equation of the letter with the signifier, leaving the blind-spot of 
revenge unexamined. 
12 It is noted that the structure of Mediated Desire is not a strict structure as found in Lacan’s Seminar, that and alternative 
structural permutations, such as will be seen when we return to Bataille’s L’Abbe C are possible.  Girard notes: “The 
triangle is a model of a sort, or rather a whole family of models.  But these models are not ‘mechanical’ like those of 
Claude Levi-Strauss.  They always allude to the mystery, transparent yet opaque, of human relations.” (1980, pp. 2-3) 
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It is this seduction by the unknown that opens us to the disorienting affect, the ‘poetic affect’ (Felman) of Poe’s 
work, and allows it to take root.  Dupin knows how to obtain the letter; he knows how it was concealed and 
what was inside it. The elaboration of his deductive method serves only to heighten the tension that surrounds 
the letter.  We know all about the letter save one thing, what was inside.  Dupin’s powers of deduction are 
unparalleled (it is owing to this that the Prefect grudgingly comes to seek his assistance in the first place), and 
it is these very powers of deduction which seduce Lacan into aligning his own (psycho)analytic method with 
that of Dupin. Therein lies the source of the “permanent displacement” that Felman alludes to; this 
displacement that is the affect of Poe’s work is a result of an intended ambiguity investing the letter, in tension 
with the clarity of the deductive method that permeates the rest of the work. By presenting a general aura of 
ambiguity as regards certain aspects and contrasting it with the clarity of exposition and deduction which 
precedes the letter’s return, Poe is able to create an affectivity which draws in those who read the text and, 
seeking to appropriate the methods of the mediator, opens them to the touch of the text which promises so 
much, indeed, clarifies so much, but leaves what is most seductive (the apparent Truth that the letter contains) 
so very much in the dark.  It is a tension that extends out of the tale and across the ‘Dupin trilogy’, such as in 
the strange circumstance which led to Dupin losing most – but not all – of his inheritance, the unnamed book 
which drew the Narrator and Dupin together in the first instance, or the vague allusions to the affront in Vienna. 
 
The process of interpretation determines heterogeneous elements (be they the blind spot of Lacan’s analysis 
identified by Derrida or the place of rivalry within Poe’s work that can be perceived through the lens of the 
Girardian method) delineates the terms by which a text will be approached and understood. The ambiguity at 
the heart of the novella lends itself well to interpretation, as we are able to fashion its shape after our own 
prejudices and utilize its lack of determinacy to support our conclusions. Given its indeterminate character, it 
retains the possibility of multiple readings and its very malleability allows it to fulfill whichever task it is 
employed to do. ffrench notes: 
Nevertheless, from within this world, this side, as it were, of the cut, the hole is constructed as a space, 
which can be occupied, and given a number of different figures, according to the reading one adopts. 
(1999, p. 126) 
However, given its adaptability to multiple readings, ambiguity also retains a threatening character, as the ease 
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of use which makes it so seductive to the interpreter also means it always retain a dimension which could 
exceed (as heterogeneous), and thus undermine, the reading it was employed to support. This plurality of 
meaning reveals a certain arbitrariness in the process interpretation and ensures that it is continually displaced: 
The text, its reading, are split. What is overcome, split, is the moral unity that society demands of every 
human product... in the text of pleasure, the opposing forces are no longer repressed but in a state of 
becoming: nothing is really antagonistic, everything is plural. (Barthes, 1975, p. 31) 
 
The Affect of Collapse 
 
Let us return to Bataille.  In the previous chapter we saw how the collapse of Robert at the altar ushered in the 
disintegration not just of sense within the novel but also, in the scene on the bed with Eponine sobbing, the 
potential difficulty in interpreting the event.  We found that the tension and conflicting emotions that Eponine 
exhibits in this passage did not sit well with either the Hegelian or Freudian model, and that her reaction was 
inconsistent with what we would expect from such a conception of human behavior.  What is common to both 
methods of interpretation is an assumed integrity between Eponine and her desires, that is, that her desires are 
definitively her own.  The Hegelian model, as we acknowledged, would fall short in this case as the removal 
or collapse of the opposing Other (Robert) in the face of the master (Eponine) would fail to give rise to such a 
collapse of self-certainty as discerned in her behavior.  Similarly, whilst the Freudian approach allows us to 
grapple more readily with the intricacies of her behavior, it still falls short of being able to account for the 
dissolution that she feels.  Both methods of interpretation have at base the assumption that Eponine’s actions 
are rooted in a desire which is very much her own, either as that of a self-certain master, or (supported by 
reference to the transference and displacements) of a young woman grappling to control her unconscious in 
the face of the traumatic memory of her former lover.  These models of behavior we can contrast with that 
proposed by Girard where, owing to the mediated nature of desire (and thus Identity), we are able to account 
for the displacements and transferences that constitute the characters’ interrelations, along with the collapse at 
the altar and the scene on the bed. 
Ultimately, his refusal to recognize the existence of Eponine exacerbated her desire for me, or mine for 
her; that was, no doubt, what made our relationship endure. (Bataille, 1988a, p. 55) 
Robert was known as a particularly pious priest, and yet, as was seen atop the church tower, he struggled to 
control the very sexuality that he sought to suppress.  When Eponine started to ‘sleep around as much as she 
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could’, Robert ‘pretended that he no longer knew her’.  His turn to the priesthood reeks of being a desperate 
move by an “affronted consciousness”, the reaction of a spurned lover who, as Girard notes, chooses “their 
political, philosophical and religious ideas to fit their hatred” (1980, p. 158).    Robert’s attitude towards 
Eponine is, much like hers towards him, one which is characterized by ambivalence.  If we agree with the 
premise that his turn to the priesthood is one that is made by a wounded animal seeking to sublimate his 
feelings of hurt at her previous behavior13, then the repeated and increasingly feverish rejections of her 
advances become problematic.  For if he wanted no more than to be re-united with Eponine, if indeed that was 
the motivating desire behind his turn to religion, then what accounts for his continual refusal to indulge in what 
he truly wants?   
When the mother refuses her son a kiss she is already playing the double role characteristic of internal 
mediation: she is both the instigator of desire and a relentless guardian forbidding its fulfillment. (Girard, 
1980, p. 35) 
 
He can only hope to draw the desires of his beloved towards himself by feigning indifference; but he 
can hide his desire only by suppressing everything that is real and concrete in his sexual drive. (Girard, 
1980, pp. 159-60) 
The betrayal that constitutes the point of trauma within the narrative is shot through with double mediation.  
In her turn away from Robert, Eponine becomes like a mother weaning her baby, who necessarily distances 
herself from the child, forbidding the continuance of previous behavior, while concurrently exacerbating the 
very desire to continue with this practice in the child.  Robert (if his turn to the church is directly related to his 
wish to be with Eponine) plays the reverse role by totally rejecting his sexuality and portrays himself as 
‘indifferent’ to Eponine, which in turn exacerbates her desire to possess him.  Robert’s desire to be indifferent, 
to pretend that she does not exist, can be traced back to the desire to draw Eponine to him, to refuse her access 
and thus make himself taboo, that is, more desirable. Each player’s desire is directly influenced by the actions 
of the other; Eponine’s actions, her fervent desire to debase Robert, generates a matching desire in him for his 
own body that results in the asexual position that he struggles to maintain.   
As soon as the subject reveals his desire for possession the mediator copies that desire.  He will desire 
his own body; in other words, he will accord it such value that to yield possession would appear 
scandalous to him. (Girard, 1980, p. 159) 
The feverish interrelation and escalating tension between the pair (and also of Charles as the doubled-Robert) 
evokes the nature of mediated desire as mapped out by Girard, where Robert and Eponine successively feed 
                                                 
13 The reasons for his complete rejection of sexuality as a method of externalising the source of trauma (Eponine’s 
betrayal) have been explored previously 
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off and into each other’s desire.  This dynamic serves to define their Identity, for the link between desire and 
identity remains consistent within the Girardian model, yet importantly we can see that the desires themselves, 
such as Eponine’s fervent desire to destroy Robert and his flight into asceticism, are generated within the 
actions and desires of the other.  This self-referential looping of causes, where one feeds off and in reaction to 
the other, removes the grounding that is given with a theory of behavior which gives primacy to the autonomous 
individual.  Without this potential anchor, things begin to spiral out of control.  The sight of Eponine’s bare 
bottom on top of the tower causes Robert to get an erection.  She taunts him by sending his brother to him: 
“‘Tonight, at nine o’clock, Eponine will be in her room. You will join her there, but she won’t tolerate the least 
bit of hesitation.  She’ll be undressed, and you won’t have to speak to her’” (Bataille, 1988a, p. 59).  Robert 
becomes successively more fragile, ever closer to the point of collapse, whilst Eponine becomes more 
determined and frantic in her pursuit of him.  Charles is also not immune to the influence of double mediation, 
for his ‘perfect identity’ with Robert and his role as Eponine’s “most ardent lover” (p. 60) means he oscillates 
between the opposing poles of his twin and his lover, making him one moment her emissary against his brother, 
and then, when ‘switching sides’ against Eponine, he is accused of the “height of perfidy” (p. 63) by her.  All 
three are caught up in what Girard defines as the “whirlwind of increasing velocity and narrowing 
circumference” (1980, p. 249) that characterizes double mediation, where despite the fact that each is 
“diminished through the fault of the other, and we each inevitably felt that the other, being the cause of that 
diminution, was hostile” (Bataille, 1988a, p. 63), they are nevertheless drawn closer together to the ultimate 
confrontation at the altar.  
 
Without the locus of an ‘autonomous’ free self that stabilizes the participants, without a foundation to which 
they can cling to weather the ‘whirlwind’, the possibility of the collapse of one of the participants raises the 
specter of disaster.  During the course of the altar-cation, we discover that Robert’s character, his piety and 
actions were really only a ‘masquerade’ and this unveiling reveals the mediated element of their relationship.  
The narrator tells us that following the scandal at the altar “I can see now that, without that ridiculous farce, 
we would have continued to be mindlessly dependent on each other”, recognizing as he does that the contrary 
dispositions they previously held betrayed “the similarity, not the contrast between our characters”, and that it 
was this similarity which led them to “express opinions that were incompatible and which were most likely to 
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disappoint and irritate the other person.” (Bataille, 1988a, p. 77)  Thus we are able to draw attention to two 
factors at work in Bataille’s novel, and it is these factors that generate the ambiguity of Eponine’s dissolution.  
The first is the link between a relational, mediated identity and self-consciousness, brought into stark contrast 
by this novel14, and the second, complementing the first, is that if the illusory foundation of self-consciousness 
– the image-inary self of the Freudian or Lacanian Ego – is undermined then this leads to a dissolution of the 
certainty of self.   
 
Girard notes that, should the mediator fail, or should the object be obtained, then (as we saw in our analysis of 
Poe’s work) the mediated subject will simply slide to another: “the disillusioned hero can let his former 
mediator point out another object for him, or he can change mediators” (1980, p. 89).  This ‘sliding’ from one 
object or mediator to another would allow for the lack of reality (of the illusory nature of the spontaneous 
subject) to be hidden, brushed aside as it is by the sliding from one mediator to another.  Such is one of the 
byways through which mediated subjectivity is able to maintain its illusion of mastery, those “new romantic 
lies destined to prolong the Promethean dreams to which the modern world desperately clings.” (1980, p. 258)  
In Bataille’s work, the web of mediation builds with each successive revolution down the spiral, the trio move 
closer and closer and, caught as they are, their “ontological sickness grows more and more serious” (Girard, 
1980, p. 279), the tension escalates and the delirious activity results in all else fading into the background.   In 
the scene at the altar, this tension has reached such a fever-pitch that despite occurring in an “enormous church” 
(Bataille, 1988a, p. 72) and despite the presence of others, the overwhelming feeling is given that only three 
are really present, Robert, Charles and Eponine.    
 
The dramatic revelation that was Robert’s collapse proves that the identities that all have constructed are only 
so many masks, each having built their desires through the other, where the revelation of the real masquerade, 
coupled with the peak of intensity that the mediation has brought them to, irrupts into the narrative.  By 
                                                 
14 We also recall that from both Hegel and Nietzsche Bataille inherited the notion of self-consciousness as a socialised 
identity, both with the stifling Hegelian absolute relation and the Nietzschean critique of the ‘poverty’ of this self-
consciousness.  
157 
 
focusing on Eponine as we have done, we can now perceive the duality in her dissolution.  Anguish at the 
revelation of Robert’s ‘sham’ is combined with the recognition of the illusory nature of her own sense of self.  
This revelation is the end result of a non-deferred mediation, it being “the fragmentation and… complete 
disintegration of the subject.” (Girard, 1980, p. 279)  The collapse of Robert and the ensuing unveiling of the 
illusory nature of the self bring to the fore the “contradictions caused by internal mediation” (p. 279), and gives 
rise to the Janus like laugh that is “at the heart of excessive sensual pleasure and makes it a source of pain” 
(Bataille, 1988a, p. 114).  This is the heart of the ambiguity in Eponine’s laugh, this contested illusion that is 
the ‘poetic affect’ within Bataille’s work, and forms the central tension that is his ‘whole human being’:    
Everything that had just happened was amazingly simple.  I knew that either my sufferings or Robert’s 
affectations were a game… I ceased to distinguish between a simplicity that amazed me and the 
awareness of a vast deception – a prodigious, ingenious deception.  It would be hard for me today to 
give the meaning of the word, but I know that it had the universe as its object and that there wasn’t 
anything anywhere that was any different… I surrendered to sleep: it was the only way I could endure 
what was happening to me.  But I immediately became convinced that the ‘deception’ was eluding me.  
And, while I couldn’t resign myself to that universal deception, I was not about to let it get away!  This 
is an awkward way to say it (the preceding is not a good account of what I felt) but, as I alternated 
between sleep and a revelation I couldn’t accept, I found consolation… If I were to say now that death 
is my consolation I would be going too far, at least in the following sense: there was, in that 
imperceptible shift, a sudden revelation: as long as I simply remember, the revelation remains; but as 
soon as I write!... (Bataille, 1988a, pp. 114-5) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Epilogue 
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The Possessed 
 
 
The reasons for writing a book can be traced back to a desire to modify the relations that exist between 
a man and his fellow creatures.  The extant relations are judged unacceptable and are perceived as an 
agonizing affliction. (Bataille, 1991, p. 11) 
 
Through the course of this work we have explored the work of Bataille in relation to an idea.  Two central 
notions have been under examination; firstly that the existing relation of individuals to themselves and each 
other is insufficient and secondly that the aim of writing is to enact a modification of those relations through 
the creation of a traumatic moment.  What has become apparent is that the two are not distinct, separate issues, 
and in truth are intimately connected.  We can identify that the ‘extant relations’ of which he speaks are those 
restricted identities of self-consciousness which Bataille’s writing seeks to wound through the mode of 
affecting trauma.  We have also noted however that the very self-conscious relational Identity is formed in 
such a manner as to protect against and exclude this very trauma, a trauma that Bataille is able to align with 
those hidden, repressed or forgotten desires which threaten to destabilize restricted Identity, whether it be that 
of Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge, Freud’s Ego or Lacan’s Subject under the sway of the signifier.   
 
Through examination of Bataille’s notions of Eroticism, Transgression and Taboo alongside analyses of 
Bataille’s literary works we have identified how the ‘insufficient’ Identity is driven by its desire to seek out 
those very activities that seek to undo the surety of self that it seeks to maintain.  Through the characters of 
Marcelle and Eponine we have seen how conflict arises between the self that seeks to be master of its own 
destiny but is unable to understand (as in the case of Marcelle), or unaware (for Eponine) that their actions are 
throwing them headlong into traumatic episodes which their constructed selves seek to avoid at all costs.  It is 
such a conflict of interest, between the subject that seeks to maintain itself and desire which drives to its 
destabilization which creates this state of ‘agonizing affliction’, an open space of ambiguity laced with “an 
empty, mobile, unpredictable extreme” (Barthes, 1975, p. 52). The desire to maintain the distinction of 
restricted Identity (that the I is autonomous and unique) is at odds with the desire of the self to incorporate all 
that it is not into this distinct Identity; to be everything but at the same time remain distinct is the conflict that 
is the agonized ‘whole human being’.  This conflict is as much Bataille’s as it is the readers, he is not (or not 
only) distancing himself from his readership to teach them a truth to which he is privy and we are not, but 
instead seeks to create through the effect of trauma a moment of intense communication, a visceral, fleshy 
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communication between himself and the world.  It is this moment of trauma that he sees as being able to undo 
the barriers that are erected between restricted individuals, if only momentarily, and which through 
externalization (either that of the self as in Freud or through a forgetting of the transgression which generates 
the taboo) seeks to neuter the power of those moments which produce this unraveling.  Within the contested 
‘coincidences’ in his Story of the Eye, Bataille, evoking the moment of Trauma as the opening of a wound 
through which communication can flow, tells us: 
That utterance, which in a split second annihilated the demoralizing effects of a strict upbringing, left 
me with a steady obligation, unconscious and unwilled; the necessity of finding an equivalent to that 
sentence in any situation I happen to be in. (2001a, p. 73) 
 
The mad ravings of a blind, disease riddled father lacerate the young Bataille and show as limited, restricted 
and poor the Identity of the child tied to this man and the ‘strict upbringing’ he received from him and his 
mother.  The screams resulting from syphilitic delirium rip through and reveal the death of the God-father of 
stability. His cries of “Let me know when you are done fucking my wife!” (p. 73) in turn sullies the God-
mother for she too is base, bodily and human. As the progeny of these two all too human individuals, these 
statements shatter any illusions of grandeur that we can imagine the young boy held of himself, bringing his 
burgeoning consciousness crashing down into the mud. It is here in the mud that a moment of communication 
occurs.  Between two or more individuals whose structured identities have been wounded, blood begins to 
flow and intermingle.  Between the cracks of their prisons of consciousness they touch and, by breaking 
through the barrier of restriction and overcoming the protective mechanisms that keep them isolated 
(mechanisms which are employed to maintain themselves), a moment occurs, akin to lovers lost in embrace: 
Two beings communicate with each other through their hidden rents.  There is no communication more 
profound: two beings are lost in a convulsion that binds them together.  But they only communicate 
when losing a part of themselves.  Communication ties them together with wounds, where their unity 
and integrity dissipates in fever. (Bataille, 1985b, p. 250) 
 
Nobody however can fuck indefinitely, nor can they bleed too much without risking death.  Eventually the 
pendulum will swing, the moment will pass and the decline back into individuated consciousness will happen 
for exhaustion, the need to work and maintain oneself all “spring from inevitable decline.” (Bataille, 2004, p. 
40) It is not however enough for Bataille to ‘explain’ or ‘illustrate’ this laceration – Bataille is more than 
Kilber’s “imaginative craftsman” (1974, p. 218) – and he must enact it; effect it between himself, the world 
and the reader.  Owing to the protective mechanisms which seek to sublimate (Freud/Lacan) or defer (Girard) 
the moment of trauma, mere presentation, regardless of how “supremely” (Kilber, 1974, p. 218) it is carried 
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out is clearly insufficient.  To merely describe would, like Nietzsche’s madman1, attract derision, appropriation 
and misunderstanding which, whilst not seeking to dismiss Bataille’s insights, would fail to engage with what 
he is working towards. 
 
We do not find Bataille with the madman in the marketplace, and although we can conjecture that he felt the 
Death of God no less keenly than that infamous herald of deicide, he takes another course of action that 
distinguishes his writing from the actions of the madman (as Richman attests: “The death of God is therefore 
coeval with access to the impossible… . But once it is dead, what will fill the void?” (1982, p. 71)). Instead, 
were we to look for Bataille within the pages of another we would instead find him in a small rented room, 
with an icon and a small rubber ball, living with a man who “rejects morality as such and is in favour of the 
latest principle of general destruction” (Dostoyevsky, 2004, p. 106).  It is with a man whom Camus (providing 
a characterization that could equally have been about Bataille) described as “childish and irascible, passionate, 
methodical and sensitive.  Of the Superman he has nothing but the logic and the obsession, whereas of man he 
has the whole catalogue” (2000, p. 97).  We are talking here of course of Dostoyevsky’s atheistic engineer 
Kirilov who, for the sake of man, kills himself. 
 
Another Man’s Sins 
 
 
‘Stavrogin, you’re beautiful!’ Verkovensky cried almost in ecstasy. ‘Do you know that you are beautiful? 
What is so fine about you is that sometimes you don’t know it. Oh, I’ve made a thorough study of you! 
I often watch you without you being aware of it. You’re even simple-minded and naive – do you know 
that? You are, you are! I suppose you must be suffering, and suffering genuinely, too, because of your 
simple-mindedness.  I love beauty. I am a nihilist, but I love beauty. Don’t nihilists love beauty? The 
only thing they do not love is idols, but I love an idol. You are my idol! You don’t insult anyone, and 
everyone hates you; you look on everyone as your equal, and everyone is afraid of you. That’s good. No 
one will ever come up to you and slap you on the shoulder. You’re an awful aristocrat. An aristocrat who 
goes in for democracy is irresistible. To sacrifice life – yours and another man’s – is nothing to you. 
You’re just the sort of man we need. (Dostoyevsky, 2004, p. 420) 
 
One would be forgiven for thinking that within this treatment of Bataille’s literature, that in him I have sought 
to found a “crown-prince” (p. 422) to be held up as an example whose teachings can help ‘show us the way’ 
                                                 
1 We will recall how Nietzsche’s madman, upon entering the marketplace was met with the following response: “Since 
many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together just then, he caused great laughter” (2001, p. 
119) 
 
162 
 
(Kilber). This however is not the case and, despite the tendency to the contrary that pulls incessantly, I have 
no intention of making such a claim.  Peter Verkovensky’s desire to use (and abuse) Stavrogin, to set him up 
as a “pretender” (p. 422) who he sees as being that Archimedean “lever to lift up the earth” (p. 423), reminds 
us of Felman’s warning against the tendency to find an answer ‘for’ a text.  Just as Peter Verkovensky seeks to 
appropriate Stavrogin as the ‘crown-prince’ of his revolutionary movement, to read into Bataille’s work the 
acme of transgressive literature solely as a liberating or subversive exercise will result in a failure to understand 
the object of our study.  Verkovensky fails to read into Stavrogin’s character a lack of desire to be party to his 
‘society’s’ plots, and instead seeks to shoehorn him into actions which support his own desires, desires which, 
despite his outward presentation, reveal that he is “a rogue, and not a Socialist.” (p. 421)  It is not however 
Verkovensky’s Machiavellian plotting that is of chief concern to us here (although we will see that the eventual 
failure of his machinations has import for our discussion of Bataille’s work), but instead it is through the 
character and actions of the engineer Kirilov that we will be able to find an analogy that allows us to view 
Bataille’s paradoxical thought and the place of his traumatic literature. 
One thing, though, does puzzle me: you want to build our bridge, and yet you say you’re in favour of 
the principle of general destruction. They won’t let you build our bridge. (p. 107) 
 
Kirilov is a man who is presented to us as a paradox. His thoughts on the “latest principle” (p. 106) are in stark 
contrast to his occupation as an engineer. This paradox extends to his very mannerisms; he is able to engage 
someone with his “black, lusterless eyes” whilst simultaneously looking “kindly and affably.” (p. 241)  Such 
a description reminds us of Bataille whose obsessive thought is at odds with his life as a librarian, and who is 
surprised that other people could see his own laughter as “so bitter.” (Bataille, 2001f, p. 73)  However, the tie 
that binds the two is Kirilov’s suicide, both the thought that founds it and the deed itself which sought to reveal 
“the secret of the deception.” (Dostoyevsky, 2004, p. 126) 
 
Camus contends in his Myth of Sisyphus that Kirilov’s behaviour places him in good company (notably with 
Don Juan and Sisyphus himself) as paragons of rebellious virtue.  He holds that Kirilov’s decision to commit 
suicide (as a result of logical deduction) in order to free man from his chains, to create a ‘man-god’ in 
opposition to the ‘god-man’ of Christ, encapsulates the desire for rebellion in the face of a meaningless world.  
Indeed, a superficial reading which glosses over the act of Kirilov’s suicide would give the reader that 
impression.  To read Kirilov’s Promethean philosophy (where he seeks to steal divinity from the gods) that 
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‘justifies’ his suicide divorced from the moment of its completion (and the effect that this has on others) is to 
misunderstand both the place of Kirilov as one of the ‘devils’ within the novel (as part of Dostoevsky’s critique 
of atheistic revolutionary movements) and more importantly, to miss the link between the act of Kirilov’s 
suicide and its relation to the standard bearers of the old order (Von Lembke, Stephan Verkovensky et al) and 
those of the new (Liputin, Peter Verkovensky etc.)  Camus here is guilty of Felman’s charge as he seeks to 
sublimate his version of Kirilov (the Kirilov he wants to read into the text) into his grander vision of the 
rebellion of man in the face of absurdity.  Applying the model we encountered in the previous chapter, by 
ignoring the circumstances of Kirilov’s suicide but appropriating other factors of his behavior which supports 
his thesis, we see Camus take the place of Peter Verkovensky (in a process reminiscent of the Prefect->Dupin-
>Lacan model) who himself sought to appropriate Kirilov’s suicide to further the ‘society’s’ aims: 
‘The idea has occurred to the society,’ he went on, ‘that I could be useful to them by committing suicide, 
and that when you get yourself in a mess here and the police are looking for those responsible for it, I 
should suddenly shoot myself, leaving a letter in which I’d take the blame for everything, so they 
wouldn’t suspect you for a whole year.’ 
(...) 
‘Yes, but remember that you undertook to write your last letter with my help and that, on your arrival in 
Russia, you’d be at my – well, in a word, at my disposal; I mean, for that occasion only, of course. 
(Dostoyevsky, 2004, p. 377) 
 
Kirilov is not concerned with the ‘society’s’ aims (which are in truth only Peter Verkovensky’s) nor with their 
desire to cover up their activities by using his suicide as cover.  Kirilov is so assured of the power that his act 
of self-immolation contains that he is initially happy to agree to sign a suicide note which implicates him as 
the distributor of revolutionary pamphlets which would buy Peter time to flee to safety.  His desire to kill 
himself is founded upon the belief that such an act will be so traumatic that upon its completion the impact 
will break the chains that bind man in servitude: “the only salvation for all is to prove this idea to everyone. 
Who will prove it? I! (...) I shall begin and end, and open the door. And I shall save.” (p. 614)  
 
The shot to the head that he foresees as showing others his new “terrible freedom” (p. 615) is evocative of the 
traumatic effect that Bataille sought to produce through his writing which comes as a result of that ‘steady 
obligation’ he felt to undermine the illusory stability of self.  The gunshot which “will save mankind and will 
transform it physically” (p. 614) aligns with the trauma that is the expected result of Bataille’s work (as 
identified by Crowley and his notion of the ‘Tacky Touch’). Just as Kirilov sees within man a stifled “Self-
Will” that is the “attribute” of his “divinity” (p. 615) which will be released by his suicide, so too have we 
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found within Bataille’s obscene writings the desire to undo the binds of restricted, ‘insufficient’ consciousness 
through the introduction of the “demand for violent gratifications implied by social life” (Bataille, 1985d, p. 
97).  There is here a great hope – ultimately a false hope – that is bound up with Kirilov’s desire to commit 
suicide. This hope is founded upon his belief that his action will transform the extant structures which he 
perceives as holding man back from realizing his potential.  One can be forgiven for reading into Bataille’s 
work a self-same desire where engagement with the bodily and base aspects of human existence would lead to 
the establishment of a new man, freed from the restrictions of an inherited Christian morality.  However, to do 
so would be to fall back into the trap that caught Lacan (and catches Peter Verkovensky within Dostoyevsky’s 
work) and we must remain mindful that while the drive towards the summit that typifies the erotic moment of 
communion is underway, the decline is from the outset inevitable, and indeed, to speak of this summit at all is 
“in reality, speaking in the name of the morality of decline.” (Bataille, 2001f, p. 59)  This trap of which we 
speak is to infuse Bataille’s writing with the power to undo the ‘insufficient’ restricted subject without 
acknowledging the ultimate failure of this undertaking – particularly at the stage of trying to speak about it.  
Such a blindness, however, to the eventual failure of the attempt is not avoidable and, returning to Kirilov, at 
the moment of suicide we will see (unlike Camus it should be noted) the paradoxical mixture of possibility 
and failure that is contained within the moment where the trigger is pulled and trauma unleashed. 
 
Kirilov, on the night of the his death, is met in his lodgings by Peter Verkovensky who comes to ensure that he 
holds to his word and agrees to sign the note that implicates him in the recent occurrences within the province. 
Initially, upon hearing of the death of Shatov he refuses to honour his word and during a stand-off with Peter 
tells him that “I won’t write that I killed Shatov and – I won’t write anything now. There won’t be any 
document!” (Dostoyevsky, 2004, p. 608). Such an outburst does not however catch Peter off-guard; he was 
expecting Kirilov to back out of his agreement to sign the dictated suicide note and perhaps the very idea of 
committing suicide itself: “I’ve foreseen everything, and I shan’t go before I’ve blown your brains out with 
this revolver, as I did that swine Shatov’s, if you get frightened and decide to put it off, damn you!” (p. 609) 
The argument between the two flows back and forth and eventually Kirilov is engaged in a soliloquy (in which 
he returns to the ideas he expounded earlier within the novel to Stavrogin), the effect of which is to work him 
up into a state of frenzy: 
His face was unnaturally pale and his look unendurably melancholy.  He was like a man in a high fever. 
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For a moment Peter thought that he would collapse. 
‘Give me the pen!’ Kirilov cried unexpectedly in a sudden onrush of inspiration. ‘Dictate! I’ll sign 
everything. I’ll sign that I killed Shatov, too. Dictate while I’m amused. I’m not afraid of the thoughts 
of supercilious slaves! You’ll see for yourself that all that is secret will be made plain. And you’ll be 
crushed. I believe! I believe! (p. 615) 
 
Kirilov is gripped with delirium by his idea, his anger with Peter and the vertiginous feelings that accompany 
his approaching suicide.  He feels that despite Peter’s best efforts to appropriate his suicide for his own ends 
that the power of his act will ‘open the door’, will contain such a truth that will rip through the ruses and 
deceptions of ‘supercilious slaves’ and that what has been hidden (both the ‘devils’ plots and the revelation 
that will ‘save mankind’) will be brought into the light.  He sees his impending demise as containing such 
power as to be able to violate the integrity of the edifices which maintain the ‘deception’ which he sees as 
being obliterated, along with his temple, by the bullet that will spiral out of the chamber of his revolver: “It 
makes no difference. Deception will be killed. Everyone who desires supreme freedom must dare to kill 
himself. He who dares to kill himself has learnt the secret of the deception.” (p. 126)  His frenzy intensifies 
and he becomes intoxicated with the form of the final flourish that his signature upon the letter will take, 
initially wanting to draw “a face with the tongue out on the top”, but rejecting this in favour of dictating the 
anger of his “tormented spirit... with the tone!” (p. 615) He then writes the letter according to Peter’s 
specification subsequently deciding to add a postscript in French to his letter: 
‘Wait, a little more. I’ll sign again in French, you know. “de Kiriloff, gentilhomme russe et citoyen du 
monde.”Ha, ha, ha!’ He burst out laughing. ‘No, no, no, Wait! I’ve found something better. Eureka! 
“Gentilhomme séminariste russe et citoyen du monde civilise!” That’s better than any – ’ 
He jumped up quickly from the sofa and suddenly snatched up his revolver from the window with a 
quick gesture, ran out with it to the other room and shut the door tightly behind him. Peter stood still 
thoughtfully looking at the door. (pp. 616-7) 
 
Here we see Kirilov taken to the summit of ecstasy and spiraling into a manic episode where the power of his 
idea has carried him outside of himself, and out of the door.  An uneasy silence follows Kirilov’s departure 
and Peter, with an observation that is reminiscent of Bataille’s comment that to start talking of the summit is 
to speak in the name of the decline, he notes: “If he does it now, he will shoot himself, but if he starts thinking, 
nothing will come of it” (p. 617)  No shot comes however, and Peter flying into a “blind rage” (p. 619) puts 
down the suicide note that he was mulling over and follows Kirilov into the other room, to facilitate the final 
encounter. Entering the room he finds Kirilov in the corner in a “very curious attitude – rigid, erect, with his 
arms held stiffly at his sides, his head raised and pressed hard against the wall in the very corner, as though he 
wanted to hide and efface himself.” Things at this stage are suspended momentarily; Kirilov looks as if made 
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“of stone or of wax” (p. 619), the air is taut with suspense and Peter reaches out and grabs him by the shoulder: 
Then something so horrible happened, and so quickly, too, that Peter could never afterwards get a 
coherent picture of it. As soon as he touched Kirilov, the latter quickly lowered his head and knocked 
the candle out of Peter’s hands... At the same moment he felt a terrible pain in the little finger of his left 
hand. He screamed, and all he could remember was that in his fury he had struck three resounding blows 
with his revolver on the head of Kirilov, who had bent down and bitten his finger.  At last he tore his 
finger away and rushed headlong out of the house, groping his way in the dark. He was pursued by 
terrible shouts from the room... 
(...) 
As he ran into the entrance hall, he suddenly heard a loud shot. He stopped there in the darkness and 
stood thinking for five minutes. (p. 620) 
 
There are here, both following Kirilov’s final moments and before the bullet which pierces his skull leaves the 
floor covered in “splashes of blood and brains” (p. 620), several salient issues which we must acknowledge. 
These issues will allow us to align Bataille’s traumatic literature with the death of the engineer by recognition 
of the tortured paradox that comes to the surface at this moment.  Within the scene leading up to and including 
Kirilov’s suicide we find a stark illustration of various strands that we have identified previously in this work 
that show themselves as aspects of the irruption of traumatic eroticism.  Recalling Eponine’s ambiguous 
dissolution following the revelation of Robert’s true nature, we see parallels between her desires to bring about 
his collapse and the ensuing effect that this has upon her, with the frightened Kirilov who, when literally backed 
into a corner, is unable to escape the oblivion in front of him that ultimately was of his own making. His 
faltering at this moment similarly reminds us of poor Marcelle who, after indulging in her carnal desires, 
imprisons herself in the wardrobe, unable to face what has ultimately come from within her. On the reverse 
side of this coin, we also can draw parallels between the ecstatic Kirilov who wants to poke fun by drawing a 
face ‘poking out its tongue’ at the top of his suicide note and Robert subtly pinching his brother Charles 
following his collapse at the altar. What we see within Kirilov’s behaviour is the ever increasing velocity as 
the subject collapses inwards, with the structure of reason, Identity and knowledge becoming destabilised in 
the face of the impending death of the individual.  Death threatens and hangs over the integrity of his 
individuality, piercing that ‘protective shield’ (Freud) that was the logic that underpins his desire to commit 
suicide, leading him to recognise concurrently the ridiculousness and gravity of his actions. This moment of 
the summit of eroticism is acknowledged by Bataille: 
On entering into nonknowledge, I know I erase the figures from the blackboard. But the obscurity that 
falls in this way isn’t that of annihilation, it is not even the “night when all the cows are black.” It is the 
enjoyment (jouissance) of the night. It is only slow death, death that it is possible to enjoy. And I am 
learning, slowly, that the death at work in me wasn’t missing only from my knowledge, but also from 
the depths of my joy. I learn this only in order to die. I know that without this annihilation already within 
my thought, my thought would be servile babble, and I will not know my ultimate thought as it is the 
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death of thought. I would not delight in my deliverance and I won’t ever have dominated everything: I 
will delight in the moment of my freedom. And I will never know it! In order to know it, it would have 
been necessary for this joy, this fulguration of joy, not to be the death of my joy and of my thought. But 
one cannot conceive of the filth wherein I founder, the divine and voluptuous filth, behind all thought 
and everything of this world that raises thought, so that all representable horror is heavy with the 
possibility of my joy. The death of thought is the voluptuous orgy that prepares death, the festival held 
in the house of death. (2001d, p. 205) 
 
It is this, the moment suspended in front of the void that threatens to ‘erase the figures on the blackboard’, that 
drives Kirilov into the dark room.  His conviction that he is in fact God (and thus all) we can infer is shaken 
by the irresistible movement which Libertson attributes to the paradoxical desire that is at the root of Bataille’s 
thought: “This abolition of exteriority is continuity: being without limits.  To want to be all is to want to lose 
the limits of one’s particularity, and at the same time to want to enclose all within the limit of one’s 
particularity.” (1995, p. 216) Kirilov is unable to maintain himself as the man who has the notion of becoming 
God with the requirement that he must kill himself to become that very God.  Such an idea is an absurd one, a 
fact recognised by Kirilov himself when he states that this paradoxical idea is “an absurdity” (Dostoyevsky, 
2004, p. 214), the ultimate destination of which is death.  This paradox necessarily leads to the failure of the 
suicide, a failure that one can read into Kirilov’s behaviour by dint of the fact that he swings wildly from anger 
to agitation and excitement up to the point of his composing the suicide note, contrasted with the specter that 
greets Peter upon entering the room.  Recognising the ultimate failure of his attempt, we find Kirilov ‘hiding’ 
with his face taking on an ‘unnatural’ aspect.  The recognition of this inevitable failure is one shared by 
Bataille, where the ascent to the summit is always followed by the descent into the morality of decline.  This 
however does not preclude the importance that the act of trauma (in this case, Kirilov’s suicide) has for the 
other actors within the drama, and if we recall the characters within Bataille’s writings, we will recognise that 
the trauma that affects each individual draws in and wounds others around them, being as they are intimately 
“bound by what happened” (p. 621). 
 
The revelation of Robert’s masquerade as a priest and Marcelle’s debasement binds the other characters 
together in a moment of crime, where the violation that accompanies and follows the traumatic moment 
breaches the boundaries of the stable, fictive selves (whether Eponine’s ‘authentic’ sensuality or Marcelle’s 
piety) and generates a moment of communication.  This binding through crime is the express aim of Peter’s 
request to Kirilov to sign his name to the atrocities he took no part in, along with his implication of others in 
his plot.  Talking to his relation Erkel, Peter remarks that “Not one of them would betray us. Who will run the 
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risk of utter ruin unless he’s lost his reason?” believing as he does that by their complicity in the crimes they 
would be bound to silence2, to which Erkel replies, perhaps acknowledging the pressure that the successive 
moments of trauma (for Kirilov’s suicide is only the final act in a series of increasingly tumultuous episodes) 
have built up, that “they will lose their reason” (p. 621) 
  
Like the characters explored previously in Bataille’s works, the ‘Devils’ within Dostoyevsky’s work actively 
carry out actions which seek to bring about circumstances which, as time goes on, catch them within what 
Girard terms “a whirlwind of increasing velocity and narrowing circumference.” (1980, p. 249) They are all 
aligned to that ‘latest principle’ of ‘general destruction’ and work to bring about its fruition.  However, as 
becomes apparent, they are unprepared for the results of their machinations, and with pressure building to its 
‘boiling point’, they, like Eponine and Marcelle, are torn asunder by the fallout.  The ensuing reactions of each 
of the participants (some fold and go willingly to the police, some do not, some flee) are all carried out within 
an atmosphere of desperation.  The final act of Kirilov’s suicide, carried out to ‘show others the way’ ends in 
the inevitable failure of both his intended aim and that of the wider group. Kirilov’s intensity of thought that 
led him to suicide leads him instead to be branded a ‘madman’, echoing the trajectory of the movement of 
thought from knowledge to nonknowledge, where the logical basis of his desire to die cohabits with Bataille’s 
recognition; ‘my ultimate thought as it is the death of thought.’ 
 
The gunshot that spilled ‘blood and brains’ across the floor of that dank room extends out beyond the confines 
of those four walls and signals the collapse of the revolutionaries’ plot.  He sought to free man from the chains 
that bind him but, instead, just as the decline is inevitable from the summit of suicide, he succeed in nothing 
more that loosening the chains of dogma that bound those devils together.  That single gunshot, a traumatic 
explosion of the structure, sends ripples emanating out from Kirilov’s shattered temple and impacts all 
involved.  They are indeed bound together as Peter foresaw but, it will not keep them quiet, nor will it succeed 
in freeing them as Kirilov hoped.  Failure is inevitable from the outset here, just as aiming for the summit is 
bound to fail.  This failure however does not mean that we cannot unintentionally reach a moment of 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to note a biographical similarity between the thought of Peter here and the supposed plot by the Acephale 
group to murder one of their members, an act which sought to bind the group through a voluntary sacrifice.  According 
to the myth that surrounds this group, a willing victim could be found, but no one would agree to commit the murder 
itself. 
169 
 
communication, but recognises that the communication that occurs, that lacerates those touched by it, will also 
be the one that binds them together in failure. 
 
Communication is borne of this laceration; it cuts through the walls erected through fear, piety and exhaustion.  
Between the bleeding wounds the blood intermingles and the impossible flows, a momentary, inconsistent, 
ambiguous touch enjoins these partners in crime. ‘We touched each other just now, you and I’ and that is all 
that remains.  A tacky residue of communion lingers unspoken and is unable to be removed; it remains to attest 
to the dissolution of self that occurred in the moment: 
As I was staring at the void in front of me, a touch – immediately violent and excessive – joined me to 
that void. I saw that void and saw nothing, but it, the void, was embracing me. 
My body was tense. It contracted as if, by itself, it might’ve had to reduce itself to the expanse of a point. 
One lasting flash was going from this inner point, to the void. I was grimacing and laughing, lips wide 
apart, teeth naked. (Bataille, 1998, p. 99) 
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